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UP-031

ADD 1 CIA, WASHINGTON (UP-027)

IN CALIFORNIA, THE SACRAMENTO BEE QUOTED A FORMER AGENT AS SAYING THREE MAFIA GANGSTERS SUPPLIED INFORMATION THE CIA USED TO PLAN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION OF CUBA IN 1951.

THE BEE YESTERDAY QUOTED THE UNIDENTIFIED AGENT AS SAYING THAT IN RETURN FOR THE DATA THE MAFIA MOBSTERS WOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO RECOVER MONEY THEY LEFT BEHIND WHEN CASTRO TOOK CONTROL OF THE COUNTRY AND TO REOPEN THEIR CUBAN CASINOS -- IF THE INVASION SUCCEEDED.

THE FORMER AGENT SAID LAWRENCE HOUSTON, RETIRED GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE CIA, RECEIVED THE INFORMATION FROM THE THREE MAFIA MEMBERS AND ONE OF THEIR ASSOCIATES THROUGH TWO CIA EMPLOYEES WHO WERE DEALING WITH THE ORGANIZED CRIME FIGURES.

HOUSTON TOLD THE BEE, "I DO NOT RECOLLECT SUCH A THING, BUT THAT DOESN'T MEAN IT DIDN'T HAPPEN. I WON'T DENY IT, BUT I DON'T REMEMBER ANYTHING LIKE THAT."

THE THREE MAFIA FIGURES WERE NAMED AS RUSSELL BUFAFINO, JAMES PLUMERI AND SALVATORE GRANELLO.

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 The New York Times _____
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 The National Observer _____ b7C
 The Los Angeles Times _____

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UPI-232

(CUBA)

MIAMI--FOUR CUBAN EXILE PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE AERIAL ACTION CONNECTED WITH THE PIGS BAY INVASION SAID TODAY FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS WERE SHOT DOWN IN COMBAT AND KILLED OVER CUBA ON APRIL 19, 1961.

THE FOUR AMERICANS HAD BEEN INSTRUCTORS FOR THE EXILE AIR FORCE AT THEIR SECRET AIR BASE NEAR PUERTO CABEZAS, NICARAGUA. THEY VOLUNTARILY FLEW TWO OF THE EXILE AIR ARM'S OBSOLETE B26S ON A SUPPORT MISSION BECAUSE SO MANY OF THE PILOTS OF THE WOULD-BE LIBERATION ARMY HAD BEEN KILLED IN THE FIRST TWO DAYS OF HOSTILITIES, THE CUBANS SAID.

THE AMERICANS WERE NOT IDENTIFIED. THEY WERE NOT BELIEVED TO BE MEMBERS OF ANY U.S. ARMED SERVICE.

THE FOUR CUBANS, GONZALO HERRERA, GUSTAVO VILLOLDO, ALFREDO CABALLERO AND JULIO GONZALEZ REBUEL SAID IN A STATEMENT TO UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL.

"THE AMERICAN INSTRUCTORS ASSURED US ON APRIL 17 (THE DAY OF THE INVASION) THAT WE WOULD HAVE AIR COVER. BUT THAT DID NOT HAPPEN AND WE LOST SIX AIRPLANES THAT DAY."

HERRERA, WHO SAID HE FLEW IN FORMATION WITH THE TWO AMERICAN-MANNED AIRPLANES, SAID THE CUBAN PILOTS HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO RADIO A NEARBY U. S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER IN CASE OF ANY KIND OF EMERGENCY.

"WE MADE SEVERAL DISTRESS CALLS. THEY WERE ALL IGNORED," HERRERA SAID.

HE SAID BOTH OF THE AMERICAN-CREWED BOMBERS CRASHED IN FLAMES INTO THE SEAS AS THEIR RADIOMEN WERE CALLING TO THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER FOR AIR-FITHER SUPPORT. BOTH PLANES HAD BEEN RIDDLED BY T-33 JETS OF THE CASTRO AIR FORCE, HERRERA SAID.

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Three Mafia mobsters funneled information to the Central Intelligence Agency that it used to prepare the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961, the Sacramento Bee reported. The accusation was made by an unidentified former CIA agent. He told the newspaper that in return for the data the Mafia men would have been allowed to recover money they had left behind when Fidel Castro took control of Cuba and to reopen their Cuban casinos—if the invasion succeeded. The former agent said Lawrence R. Houston, retired general counsel of the CIA, had received the information. Houston told the Bee he did not remember the incident. But that doesn't mean it didn't happen."

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[C.I.A. Operations] ~~SECRET~~ (U)

Aide in Bay of Pigs Fiasco Outlines Views on Planning

By JEREMIAH O'LEARY
Star-News Staff Writer

The man who was inspector general of the CIA during the Bay of Pigs fiasco now believes it would have been wiser to have trained the invasion force at a military base inside the United States to preserve the security of the anti-Castro operation.

Prof. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr., now on the faculty of Brown University, disclosed this view in a lecture delivered at the Naval War College in Newport, R.I. The speech has been published in the current college review.

Kirkpatrick also said: "If the President makes the policy to get rid of Castro, that is about the last he should hear of it. If something goes wrong he can fire and disavow, which is what a President should do, not acknowledge and accept blame. Of course, I am being critical of the President (Kennedy) but I think this is essential."

The former CIA official said the control of "covert" opera-

tions like the Bay of Pigs exercise in 1961 should be at a much lower level of government than the President's office. Having covert operations run out of the White House or even out of the office of the secretaries of state or defense "makes absolutely no sense whatever in any society."

"Never Understood" Although he said he was speaking only his personal views, Kirkpatrick said the blame for failure of the Cuban exile invasion belongs to the CIA, not on the military where President Kennedy tried to place it.

"If can be concluded," said Kirkpatrick, "that the President never really fully understood that this proposal entailed a military operation in the true sense of the word. Instead of an assault landing consisting of some 1,500 men, Kennedy seemed to think this was going to be some sort of mass infiltration that would perhaps, through some mystique, become quickly invisible."

Kirkpatrick said it would have been more feasible to have used U.S. bases instead of those in Guatemala and Nicaragua for the invasion of Cuba because the United States could have isolated the brigade and trained the pilots without disclosure.

"The Bay of Pigs experience," he said, "does not mean that we should forget covert operations as a tool for implementing national policy. In fact, that's the last thing it means. The capability to mount a covert operation is an exceedingly important capability for our government to have."

Looking back over the Bay of Pigs operation, Kirkpatrick said the most vital lesson learned was from the operators' failure to secure accurate intelligence. He said inaccurate intelligence was the basis for the disaster adding, "there is no other place to put the blame for that than on the agency mounting the operating."

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ALL BACKED JFK ON BAY OF PIGS McNAMARA SAYS

By United Press International

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara says he wants "the American people to know" that all of President John F. Kennedy's advisers were in favor of undertaking the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.

"When President Kennedy assumed full responsibility for that action, he didn't say what he might have said, that every single one of his advisers, me included, recommended it."

"It is very much on my conscience," McNamara said yesterday on NBC. "And it was a serious error."

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Bad Guess on Castro Power Held Cause of 'Pigs' Failure

Associated Press

A former high-ranking CIA officer says the major cause of the failure of the 1961 Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion was "a complete miscalculation by the CIA operators of what was required to do the job."

By the eve of the ill-fated landing, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr. adds, many were pessimistic about its chances—but went ahead anyway in belief a last-minute cancellation would have worse consequences than a failure.

As it turned out, he says, Havana's Red forces proved so much stronger and more loyal than the CIA operators had predicted that the 1443-man invading brigade would probably have lost even if Castro had not had airplanes or tanks.

Kirkpatrick, now a professor at Brown University, writes of his 2-year career in the cloak-and-dagger business in "The Real CIA" (Macmillan, \$6.95), one of the few books published

by senior officials with inside knowledge of the Central Intelligence Agency.

As CIA's inspector general for eight years, he was picked by the then intelligence chief, Allen Dulles, to conduct a thorough post-mortem within the agency.

Kirkpatrick concludes that the Bay of Pigs attempt met catastrophe not because of CIA itself, but failure to use what was available within CIA for an objective intelligence judgment divorced from those carrying out the operation.

It was essentially the same group of people processing the intelligence, planning the operation, selling the project to the policymakers, and finally directing the final effort," he says.

"If there had even been a moment during the battle when the Cuban exile brigade had been near to achieving victory, then we might be able to

say that it had been close; in my opinion, the outcome was never close," Kirkpatrick writes.


Kirkpatrick absolves the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff from major blame.

He also shunts aside claims that Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, and others opposed to the invasion had torpedoed it by persuading President Kennedy to call off a planned second air strike by the free Cubans.

When the air strike was called off just ahead, he writes, "the landing could have been recalled."

But the 'operators' had a very strong conviction that if for any reason the operation did not go through, the Cuban brigade would either act on its own, or mutiny, or create such a disturbance that it would be more dangerous than even a failure of the operation."

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Cuban Invasion

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The Washington Post

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REC 39

CUBA INVASION LOSS ATTRIBUTED TO C.I.A.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 13 (AP) —A former high-ranking officer of the Central Intelligence Agency says the major cause of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961 was "a complete miscalculation by the C.I.A. operators of what was required to do the job."

By the eye of the ill-fated landing, Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Jr. says, many persons were pessimistic about its chances but went ahead with the operation anyway in the belief that a last-minute cancellation would have worse consequences than a failure.

As it turned out, Mr. Kirkpatrick says, Cuba's forces proved so much more stronger and loyal than the C.I.A. operators had predicted that the 1,443-man invading brigade would probably have lost "even if Castro had no airplanes or tanks."

Mr. Kirkpatrick writes of his 23-year career in "The Real C.I.A.," published by the Macmillan Company.

The Washington Post

Times Herald

The Washington Daily News

The Evening Star (Washington)

The Sunday Star (Washington)

Daily News (New York)

Sunday News (New York)

New York Post

The New York Times

The Sun (Baltimore)

The Worker

The New Leader

The Wall Street Journal

The National Observer

People's World

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REBUTTAL IS MADE BY SCHLESINGER

Explains Comment on Times
but Editor Stands Firm

Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. has challenged the assertion that he was mistaken in reporting that The New York Times suppressed a dispatch about the build-up for the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in 1961.

Mr. Schlesinger, author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning book, "A Thousand Days," and a former special assistant to President Kennedy, made his rebuttal in a letter to the editor of The New York Times. The letter, written from the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, N.J., on June 9, read as follows:

"My attention has been called to a speech by Clifton Daniel, managing editor of The Times, in which he claims that I mistakenly wrote in the book 'A Thousand Days' that The Times had suppressed a dispatch from Tad Szulc describing the C.I.A.-Cuban refugee invasion build-up before the Bay of Pigs. I trust I may be permitted comment.

Denies Making Statement

"I. Actually my account of this episode on page 261 of 'A Thousand Days'—a passage quoted in its entirety by Mr. Daniel—does not say that The Times suppressed the Szulc dispatch. The account reports that James Reston 'counseled' gains publication" but at no point does it say that the piece was killed. [Mr. Reston, now an associate editor of The Times, was then its chief Washington correspondent].

"In short, Mr. Daniel's evidence does not sustain his charge; and, since one assumes that the managing editor of The Times knows how to read, I am at a loss to know what point he was making in quoting a passage which does not say what he claims it says. The only reference in the book to The Times having killed the story occurs in connection with the Cuban missile crisis.

"2. Mr. Daniel goes on to confirm my account of Mr. Reston's recommendation. He also concedes that The Times deliberately played down a story which its editors knew deserved a multi-column head and the 'never before had the front-page play in The New York Times been changed for reasons of policy.'

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"He further concedes that The Times cut out the statement that the invasion was imminent, that The Times eliminated all reference to the C.I.A. [Central Intelligence Agency] and that The Times otherwise emasculated what would normally have been a dispatch of vital importance.

"It was this considered and purposeful emasculation by The Times of its own story which led President Kennedy subsequently to tell Turner Catledge, 'If you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake' and which led me to write in 'A Thousand Days,' 'In retrospect I have wondered whether, if the press had behaved responsibly, it would not have spared the country a disaster.' [Mr. Catledge, now executive editor of The Times, was managing editor at the time involved].

Apologizes for Error

"3. Mr. Daniel is correct in saying that I misstated the situation on 'Meet the Press.' Instead of saying that The Times was 'reprehensible in misleading the American people by suppressing the Tad Szulc story,' I should have said 'by emasculating the Tad Szulc story.'

"I am sorry for that and can only plead that unpremeditated oral comments are less considered than written testimony. In a common respect for accurate information, I would hope that Mr. Daniel will now modify the charge he made—and in a premeditated speech—against 'A Thousand Days.'

Commenting on the letter, Mr. Daniel said yesterday:

"Mr. Schlesinger should read his own book—an excellent book—more carefully. Page 261 must be taken in conjunction with page 809, where, dealing with the Cuban missile crisis, Mr. Schlesinger wrote, '...once again The Times killed a story about Cuba.'

Mr. Daniel's speech was delivered at the World Press Institute at MacAlester College in St. Paul, Minn., on June 1.

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EDITORS' DECISION ON CUBA RELATED

Kennedy Later Wished Times
Had Printed All It Knew

ST. PAUL, June 1 (AP)—President Kennedy told an executive of The New York Times that if the paper had printed all it knew about preparations for the Bay of Pigs invasion, the nation would have been saved from a "colossal mistake," a Times editor disclosed today.

The disclosure was made by Clifton Daniel, managing editor, in a speech at MacAlester College before a forum of the World Press Institute. The forum was held in honor of recent Pulitzer Prize winners and foreign journalists studying at the college.

Mr. Daniel recalled a number of difficult decisions at The Times before both the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis a year later, as to whether the paper's responsibility to publish the news conflicted with national security.

He traced in detail some strong differences of opinion among Times executives that led to the toning down of a dispatch describing plans for the invasion of Cuba.

The dispatch, by Tad Szulc, appeared on Page 1 of The Times in the edition of Friday, April 7, 1961. Invasion forces landed in Cuba on Monday, April 17, 1961.

Kennedy of Two Minds

Mr. Daniel depicted President Kennedy as apparently torn in two directions by the course The Times took during the Bay of Pigs buildup.

At one point, meeting with a group of editors after the incident, President Kennedy "ran down a list of what he called premature disclosures of security information," mostly in The Times, Mr. Daniel said.

"While he scolded The New York Times," he went on, "the President said in an aside to Mr. Catledge, 'If you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake.'"

Turner Catledge was then managing editor of The Times. He is now executive editor.

"More than a year later," Mr. Daniel said, "President Kennedy was still talking the same way."

Mr. Daniel said that in a White House conversation on Sept. 13, 1962, never made public before, the President told the late Orvil Dryfoos, publisher of The Times:

"I wish you had run everything on Cuba. . . I am just sorry you didn't tell it at the time."

A Historical Footnote

Mr. Daniel added another historical footnote to the Bay of Pigs invasion.

In both a television interview on Meet the Press and in his own book, "A Thousand Days," Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. said that The Times had suppressed an article giving "a fairly accurate account of the invasion plans," Mr. Daniel said.

Holding up a copy of the April 7, 1961, edition of The Times, Mr. Daniel said:

"Mr. Schlesinger, was mistaken, both in his book and in his appearance on 'Meet the Press.'"

Mr. Daniel told of detailed and heated exchanges among Times executives before the decision was made to give the controversial dispatch a smaller headline, eliminate a reference to an "imminent" invasion, and drop a reference to participation of the Central Intelligence Agency in invasion preparations.

Mr. Daniel said his own view today is that the Bay of Pigs operation "might well have been canceled and the country would have been saved enormous embarrassment if The New York Times and other newspapers had been more diligent in the performance of their duty."

He added, however, that James Reston, then chief of The Times's Washington Bureau and now an associate editor, disagrees.

'62 Article Withheld

"If I had it to do over, I would do exactly what we did at the time," Mr. Daniel quoted Mr. Reston as saying. "It is ridiculous to think that publishing the fact that the invasion was imminent would have avoided this disaster. I am quite sure the operation would have gone forward."

By contrast, Mr. Daniel said, when the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 reached a climax, The Times, at the personal request of President Kennedy, withheld an exclusive article until the Government had had an opportunity to complete plans to counter its effects.

Mr. Daniel also made public a letter from President Kennedy to Mrs. Dryfoos some time after the death of her husband in which the President praised the decision to withhold the article as having been in the interest of national security.

In describing The Times's decision on the Bay of Pigs dispatch, Mr. Daniel said that the recollections of some executives who took part still differed as to when Mr. Reston was consulted and where he was at the time.

No Records Kept

"None of those who took part . . . kept records of what was said and done," Mr. Daniel said. "That is unfortunate, and it should teach us a lesson. The Bay of Pigs was not only important in the history of United States relations with Latin

America, the Soviet Union, and world Communism; it was also important in the history of relations between the American press and the United States Government."

Mr. Daniel described a tense scene at The Times after the Bay of Pigs article was ordered toned down. He said:

"After the dummy for the front page was changed, Ted Bernstein, who was the assistant managing editor on

night duty at The Times, and Lew Jordan, the news editor sat in Mr. Bernstein's office fretting about it. They believed a colossal mistake was being made, and together they went into Mr. Catledge's office to appeal for reconsideration.

"Mr. Catledge recalls that Mr. Jordan's face was dead white, and he was quivering with emotion. He and Mr. Bernstein told the managing editor that never before had the front-page play in The New York Times been changed for reasons of policy. They said they would like to hear from the publisher himself the reasons for the change."

"Lew Jordan later recalled that Mr. Catledge was 'flaming mad' at this. However, he turned around in his big swivel chair, picked up the telephone, and asked Mr. Dryfoos to come downstairs. By the time he arrived, Mr. Bernstein had gone to dinner, but Mr. Dryfoos spent 10 minutes patiently ex-

plaining to Mr. Jordan his reasons for wanting the story played down.

"His reasons were those of national security, national interest and, above all, concern for the safety of the men who were preparing to offer their lives on the beaches of Cuba. He repeated the explanation in somewhat greater length to Mr. Bernstein the next day."

"I describe the mood and behavior of the publisher and editors," Mr. Daniel said, "only to show how seriously and with what intensity of emotion they made their fateful decisions."

Schlesinger Unavailable

Mr. Schlesinger could not be reached for comment. His secretary at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N. J., said he was in London and would be flying to Peru. She said he would not be available for several days.

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Excerpts From Speech on Coverage

of Bay of Pigs Buildup

Following are excerpts from an address delivered by Clifton Daniel, editor of The New York Times, before the World Press Institute in St. Paul—an address that adds information about events preceding the Bay of Pigs to what has been presented before by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. and other observers:

This morning I am going to tell you a story—one that has never been told before—the inside story of The New York Times and the Bay of Pigs, something of a mystery story.

In its issue of Nov. 19, 1960, The Nation published an editorial under the heading, "Are We Training Cuban Guerrillas?"

I had never seen this editorial and had never heard it mentioned, until a reader of The New York Times sent in a letter to the editor. He asked whether the allegations in the editorial were true, and, if so, why hadn't they been reported by The New York Times, whose resources for gathering information were much greater than those of a little magazine like The Nation.

The Nation said: "Fidel Castro may have a sounder basis for his expressed fears of a U.S.-financed 'Guatemala-type' invasion than most of us realize. On a recent visit to Guatemala, Dr. Ronald Hilton, Director of the Institute of Hispanic-American Studies at Stanford University, was told:

"1. The United States Central Intelligence Agency has acquired a large tract of land, at an outlay in excess of \$1-million, which is stoutly fenced and heavily guarded. . . . It is 'common knowledge' in Guatemala that the tract is being used as a training ground for Cuban counter-revolutionaries, who are preparing for an eventual landing in Cuba. . . . United States personnel and equipment are being used at the base."

"2. Substantially all of the above was reported by a well-known Guatemalan journalist . . . in La Hora, a Guatemalan newspaper."

"3. More recently, the President of Guatemala, forced to take cognizance of the persistent reports concerning the base, went on TV and admitted its existence, but refused to discuss its purpose or any other facts about it."

"4. We believe the reports merit publication; they can, and should, be checked immediately by all U. S. news media with correspondents in Guatemala."

Off to Guatemala

With that last paragraph, The New York Times readily agreed, Paul Kennedy, our correspondent in Central America, was soon on his way to Guatemala.

He reported that intensive daily air training was taking place there on a partly hidden airfield. In the mountains, commando-like forces were being drilled in guerrilla warfare tactics by foreign personnel, mostly from the United States.

Guatemalan authorities insisted that the training operation was designed to meet an assault from Cuba. Opponents of the government said the preparations were for an offensive against the Cuban regime of Premier Fidel Castro. Mr. Kennedy actually penetrated two miles into the training area.

His article was published in The New York Times on Jan. 10, 1961.

The Nation also printed another article in its issue of Jan. 7, 1961, by Don Dwiggins, aviation editor of The Los Angeles Mirror.

And now Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. takes up the story in "A Thousand Days," his account of John F. Kennedy's years in the White House.

"On March 31," Mr. Schlesinger says, "Howard Handelman of U.S. News and World Report, returning from 10 days in Florida, said to me that the exiles were telling everyone that they would receive United States recognition as soon as they landed in Cuba, to be followed by the overt provision of arms and supplies."

"A few days later Gilbert Harrison of the New Republic sent over the galleys of a pseudonymous piece called 'Our Men in Miami,' asking whether there was any reason why it should not be published. It was a careful, accurate and devastating account of C.I.A. activities among the refugees, written, I learned later, by Karl Meyer. Obviously its publication in a responsible magazine would cause trouble, but could the Government properly ask an editor to suppress the truth? Defeated by the moral issue, I handed the article to the President, who

instantly read it and expressed the hope that it could be stopped. Harrison accepted the suggestion and withdrew questions—a patriotic act which left me oddly uncomfortable."

"About the same time Tad Szulc filed a story to The New York Times from Miami describing the recruitment drive and reporting that a landing on Cuba was imminent. Turner Catledge, the managing editor, called James Reston, who was in his weekend retreat in Virginia, to ask his advice. Reston counseled against publication: either the story would alert Castro, in which case The Times would be responsible for casualties on the beach, or else the expedition would be canceled, in which case The Times would be responsible for grave interference with national policy. This was another patriotic act; but in retrospect I have wondered whether, if the press had behaved irresponsibly, it would not have spared the country a disaster."

Article Was Not Suppressed

As recently as last November, Mr. Schlesinger was still telling the same story. In an appearance on "Meet the Press," he was asked about the article in The New York Times in which he was quoted as saying that he had lied to The Times in April, 1961, about the nature and size of the landing in the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Schlesinger replied that, a few days before he misinformed The Times, the newspaper had suppressed a story by Tad Szulc from Miami, giving a fairly accurate account of the invasion plans.

"If," he said, "I was reprehensible in misleading The Times by repeating the official cover story, The Times conceivably was just as reprehensible in misleading the American people by suppressing the Tad Szulc story from Miami. I, at least, had the excuse that I was working for the Government."

"I prefer to think," he said, "that both The Times and I were actuated by the same motives: that is, a sense, mistaken or not, that [it] was in the national interest to do so."

Mr. Schlesinger was mistaken, both in his book and in his appearance on "Meet the Press." The Times did not

suppress the Tad Szulc article. We printed it, and here it is, on Page 1 of the issue of Friday, April 7, 1961.

What actually happened is, at this date, somewhat difficult to say.

None of those who took part in the incident described in Mr. Schlesinger's book kept records of what was said and done. That is unfortunate, and it should teach us a lesson. The Bay of Pigs was not only important in the history of United States relations with Latin America, the Soviet Union and world Communism; it was also important in the history of relations between the American press and the United States Government.

We owe a debt to history. We should try to reconstruct the event, and that is what I am attempting to do today.

Late in March and early in April, 1961, we were hearing rumors that the anti-Castro

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forces were organizing for an invasion. For example, the editor of ~~The Miami Herald~~, Don Shoemaker, told me at lunch in New York one day, "They're drilling on the beaches all over southern Florida."

Tad Szulc, a veteran correspondent in Latin America with a well-deserved reputation for sniffing out plots and revolutions, came upon the Miami story quite accidentally.

He was being transferred from Rio de Janeiro to Washington and happened to stop in Miami to visit friends on his way north. He quickly discovered that an invasion force was indeed forming and that it was very largely financed and directed by the C.I.A. He asked for permission to come to New York to discuss the situation and was promptly assigned to cover the story.

His first article from Miami—the one I have just shown to you—began as follows:

"For nearly nine months Cuban exile military forces dedicated to the overthrow of Premier Fidel Castro have been in training in the United States as well as in Central America.

"An army of 5,000 to 6,000 men constitutes the external fighting arm of the anti-Castro Revolutionary Council, which was formed in the United States last month. Its purpose is the liberation of Cuba from what it describes as the Communist rule of the Castro regime."

His article, which was more than two columns long and very detailed, was scheduled to appear in the paper of Friday, April 7, 1961. It was dummed for Page 1 under a four-column head, leading the paper.

While the front-page dummy was being drawn up by the assistant managing editor, the news editor and the assistant news editor, Orvil Dryfoos, then the publisher of The New York Times, came down from the 14th floor to the office of Turner Catledge, the managing editor.

He was gravely troubled by the security implications of Szulc's story. He could envision failure for the invasion, and he could see The New York Times being blamed for a bloody fiasco.

He and the managing editor solicited the advice of Scotty Reston, who was then the Washington correspondent of The New York Times, and is now an associate editor.

Recollections Conflict

At this point, the record becomes unclear. Mr. Reston distinctly recalls that Mr. Catledge's telephone call came on a Sunday, and that he was spending the weekend at his retreat in the Virginia mountains, as described by Arthur Schlesinger. As there was no telephone in his cabin, Mr. Reston had to return the call from a gas station in Marshall, Va. Mr. Catledge and others recall, with equal certainty, that the incident took place on Thursday and that Mr. Reston was reached in his office in Washington.

Whichever was the case, the managing editor told Mr. Reston about the Szulc dispatch, which said that a landing on Cuba was imminent.

Mr. Reston was asked what should be done with the dispatch.

"I told them not to run it," Mr. Reston says.

He did not advise against printing information about the forces gathering in Florida; that was already well known. He merely cautioned against printing any dispatch that would pinpoint the time of the landing.

Others agree that Szulc's dispatch did contain some phraseology to the effect that an invasion was imminent, and those words were eliminated.

Tad Szulc's own recollection, cabled to me from Madrid the other day, is that "in several instances the stories were considerably toned down, including the elimination of statements about the 'imminence' of an invasion."

"Specifically," Mr. Szulc said, "a decision was made in New York not to mention the C.I.A.'s part in the invasion preparations; not to use the date of the invasion, and, on April 15, not to give away in detail the fact that the first air strike on Cuba was carried out from Guatemala."

After the dummy for the front page of The Times for Friday, April 7, 1961, was changed, Ted Bernstein, who was the assistant managing editor on night duty at The Times, and Lew Jordan, the news editor, sat in Mr. Bernstein's office fretting about it. They believed a colossal mistake was being made, and together they went into Mr. Catledge's office to appeal for reconsideration.

Mr. Catledge recalls that Mr. Jordan's face was dead white, and he was quivering with emotion. He and Mr. Bernstein told the managing editor that never before had the front-page play in The New York Times been changed

for reasons of policy. They said they would like to hear from the publisher himself the reasons for the change.

Angry at Intervention

Lew Jordan later recalled that Mr. Catledge was "flaming mad" at this intervention. However, he turned around in his big swivel chair, picked up the telephone, and asked Mr. Dryfoos to come downstairs. By the time he arrived, Mr. Bernstein had gone to dinner, but Mr. Dryfoos spent 10 minutes, patiently explaining to Mr. Jordan his reasons for wanting the story played down.

His reasons were those of national security, national interest and, above all, concern for the safety of the men who were preparing to offer their lives on the beaches of Cuba. He repeated the explanation in somewhat greater length to Mr. Bernstein the next day.

I describe the mood and behavior of the publisher and editors of The New York Times only to show how seriously and with what intensity of emotion they made their fateful decisions.

Mr. Bernstein and Mr. Jordan now say, five years later, that the change in play, not eliminating the reference to the imminence of the invasion, was the important thing done that night.

"It was important because a multi-column head in this paper means so much," Mr. Jordan told me the other day.

Mr. Reston, however, felt that the basic issue was the elimination of the statement that an invasion was imminent.

Ironically, although that fact was eliminated from our own dispatch, virtually the same information was printed in a shirttail on Tad Szulc's report. That was a report from the Columbia Broadcasting System. It said that plans for the invasion of Cuba were in their final stages. Ships and planes were carrying invasion units from Florida to their staging bases in preparation for the assault.

When the invasion actually took place 10 days later, the American Society of Newspaper Editors happened to be in session in Washington, and President Kennedy addressed the society. He devoted his speech entirely to the Cuban crisis. He said nothing at that time about press disclosures of invasion plans.

Appeal by President

However, a week later in New York, appearing before the Bureau of Advertising of the American Newspaper Publishers Association, the President asked members of

the newspaper profession to re-examine their own responsibilities.

He suggested that the circumstances of the cold war required newspapermen to show some of the same restraint they would exercise in a shooting war.

He went on to say, "Every newspaper now asks itself with respect to every story, 'Is it news?' All I suggest is that you add the question: 'Is it in the interest of national security?'"

If the press should recommend voluntary measures to prevent the publication of material endangering the national security in peacetime, the President said, "the Government would cooperate wholeheartedly."

Turner Catledge, who was the retiring president of the A.S.N.E., Felix McKnight of The Dallas Times-Herald, the

incoming president, and Lee Hills, executive editor of the Knight newspapers, took the President's statement as an invitation to talk.

Within two weeks, a delegation of editors, publishers and news agency executives was at the White House. They told President Kennedy they saw no need at that time for machinery to help prevent the disclosure of vital security information. They agreed that there should be another meeting in a few months. However, no further meeting was ever held.

That day in the White House, President Kennedy ran down a list of what he called premature disclosures of security information. His examples were mainly drawn from The New York Times.

He mentioned, for example, Paul Kennedy's story about the training of anti-Castro forces in Guatemala. Mr. Catledge pointed out that this information had been published in La Hora in Guatemala and in The Nation in this country before it was ever published in The New York Times.

"But it was not news until it appeared in The Times," the President replied.

While he scolded The New York Times, the President said in an aside to Mr. Catledge, "If you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake."

"Sorry You Didn't Tell Us"

More than a year later, President Kennedy was still talking the same way. In a conversation with Orvil Dryfoos in the White House on Sept. 13, 1962, he said, "I

wish you had run everything on Cuba. . . I am just sorry you didn't tell it at the time."

Those words were echoed by Arthur Schlesinger when he wrote, "I have wondered whether, if the press had behaved irresponsibly, it would not have spared the country a disaster."

They are still echoing down the corridors of history. Just the other day in Washington, Senator Russell of Georgia confessed that, although he was chairman of the Senate Armed Forces Committee, he didn't know the timing of the Bay of Pigs operation.

"I only wish I had been consulted," he said, in a speech to the Senate, "because I would have strongly advised against this kind of operation if I had been."

It is not so easy, it seems, even for Presidents, their most intimate advisers and distinguished United States Senators to know always what is really in the national interest. One is tempted to say that sometimes—sometimes—even a mere newspaperman knows better.

My own view is that the Bay of Pigs operation might well have been canceled and the country would have been saved enormous embarrassment if The New York Times and other newspapers had been more diligent in the performance of their duty—their duty to keep the public informed on matters vitally affecting our national honor and prestige, not to mention our national security.

Perhaps, as Mr. Reston believes, it was too late to stop the operation by the time we printed Tad Szulc's story on April 7.

"If I had it to do over, I would do exactly what we did at the time," Mr. Reston says. "It is ridiculous to think that publishing the fact that the invasion was imminent would have avoided this disaster. I am quite sure the operation would have gone forward."

"The thing had been cranked up too far. The C.I.A. would have had to disarm the anti-Castro forces physically. Jack Kennedy was in no mood to do anything like that."

Prelude to Graver Crisis

The Bay of Pigs, as it turned out, was the prelude to an even graver crisis—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.

In Arthur Schlesinger's opinion, failure in 1961 contributed to success in 1962. President Kennedy had learned from experience, and once again The New York Times was involved.

On May 28, 1963, the President sat at his desk in the White House and with his own hand wrote a letter to Mrs. Orvil Dryfoos, whose husband had just died at the age of 50. The letter was on White House stationery, and the President used both sides of the paper.

The existence of this letter has never been mentioned publicly before. I have the permission of Mr. Dryfoos's widow, now Mrs. Andrew Heiskell, to read it to you today:

"Dear Marian:—
"I want you to know how sorry I was to hear the sad

news of Orvil's untimely death.

"I had known him for a number of years and two experiences I had with him in the last two years gave me clear insight into his unusual qualities of mind and heart. One involved a matter of national security—the other his decision to refrain from printing on October 21st the news, which only the man for The Times possessed, on the presence of Russian missiles in Cuba, upon my informing him that we needed twenty-four hours more to complete our preparations.

"This decision of his made far more effective our later actions and thereby contributed greatly to our national safety.

"All this means very little now, but I did want you to know that a good many people some distance away, had the same regard for Orvil's character as did those who knew him best.

"I know what a blow this is to you, and I hope you will accept Jackie's and my deepest sympathy.

"Sincerely, John F. Kennedy."

In the Cuban missile crisis, things were handled somewhat differently than in the previous year. The President telephoned directly to the publisher of The New York Times.

He had virtually been invited to do so in their conversation in the White House barely a month before.

That conversation had been on the subject of security leaks in the press and how to prevent them, and Mr. Dryfoos had told the President that what was needed was prior information and prior consultation. He said that when there was danger of security information getting into print, the thing to do was to call in the publishers and explain matters to them.

In the missile crisis, President Kennedy did exactly that.

Ten minutes before I was due on this platform this morning Mr. Reston telephoned me from Washington to give me further details of what happened that day.

A Call From Kennedy

"The President called me," Mr. Reston said. "He understood that I had been talking to Mac Bundy and he knew from the line of questioning that we knew the critical fact—that Russian missiles had indeed been emplaced in Cuba."

"The President told me," Mr. Reston continued, "that he was going on television on Monday evening to report to the American people. He said that if we published the news about the missiles Khrushchev could actually give him an ultimatum before he went on the air. Those were Kennedy's exact words.

"I told him I understood," Mr. Reston said this morning, "but I also told him I could not do anything about it. And this is an important thought that you should convey to those young reporters in your audience.

"I told the President I would report to my office in New York and if my advice were asked I would recommend that we not publicize it was not my duty to decide. My job was the same as that of an ambassador—to report to my superiors.

"I recommended to the President that he call New York. He did so." That was the sequence of events as Mr. Reston recalled them this morning. The President telephoned the publisher of The New York Times; Mr. Dryfoos in turn put the issue up to Mr. Reston and his staff.

And the news that the Soviet Union had atomic missiles in Cuba only 90 miles from the coast of Florida was withheld until the Government announced it.

What conclusion do I reach from all these facts? What moral do I draw from my story?

My conclusion is this; Information is essential to people who propose to govern themselves; It is the responsibility of serious journalists to supply that information—whether in this country or in the countries from which our foreign colleagues come.

Still, the primary responsibility for safeguarding our national interest must rest always with our Government, as it did with President Kennedy in the two Cuban crises.

~~SECRET~~

Up until the time we are actually at war or on the verge of war, it is not only permissible—it is our duty as journalists and citizens to be constantly questioning our leaders and our policy, and to be constantly informing the people, who are the masters of us all—both the press and the politicians.

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~~SECRET~~**JFK Quoted: 'Colossal Mistake'****News Might Have Barred
Bay of Pigs Invasion**

Associated Press

CLIFTON DANIEL
... on Bay of Pigs

ST. PAUL, Minn., June 1 (AP)—The late President Kennedy told a New York Times executive that if the Times had printed all it knew about the pending Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the United States would have been saved from a "colossal mistake," a Times editor disclosed here today.

Managing editor Clifton Daniel revealed — for the first time, he said — some painful decision-making at the Times before both the Bay of Pigs invasion and the later Cuban missile crisis.

The Times editor spoke at the MacAlester College World Press Institute Forum honoring 1966 Pulitzer Prize winners and foreign journalists studying at the college.

Daniel painted a picture of a President apparently torn in two directions by the course the Times took during the Bay of Pigs buildup.

Premature Disclosures

At one point, meeting with a group of editors after the incident, President Kennedy "ran down a list of what he called premature disclosures of security information," mostly from the Times, Daniel said.

"While he scolded the New York Times," Daniel went on, "the President said in an aside to Mr. Catledge, 'If you had printed more about the operation you would have saved us from a colossal mistake.'"

(Turner Catledge was then managing editor of the Times and is now executive editor.)

In a White House conversation on Sept. 13, 1962, never made public before today, Daniel said, the President talked with the late publisher of the Times, Orvil Dryfoos.

"I wish you had run everything on Cuba ... I am just sorry you didn't tell it at the time," Daniel quoted the President as telling Dryfoos.

Exchanges Heated

Daniel told of detailed and heated exchanges among top Times executives before the decision was made to give the controversial dispatch a lesser headline, eliminate reference to an "imminent" invasion, and drop reference to participation of the Central Intelligence Agency in invasion preparations.

Daniel said his own view today is that the Bay of Pigs operation "might well have been canceled and the country would have been saved enormous embarrassment if the New York Times and other newspapers had been more diligent in the performance of their duty."

He added, however, that James Reston, then chief of the Times Washington Bureau and now an associate editor, who was in on the decision-making, disagrees.

By contrast, Daniel added, when the crisis of Russian missiles in Cuba came to a head, the Times, at the personal request of President Kennedy, withheld its exclusive story until the Government had had an opportunity to complete plans to counter it.

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New York Post

The New York Times

The Baltimore Sun

The Worker

The New Leader

The Wall Street Journal

The National Observer

People's World

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SCHLESINGER BACKS CUBA 'COVER STORY'

WASHINGTON, Nov. 28 (AP) — Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. said today that perhaps he should have resigned from the Government "rather than mislead" the New York Times about the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.

But, Mr. Schlesinger went on, he wanted to continue working with the Kennedy Administration and deliberately gave The Times misinformation about the invasion.

The former Special Assistant to President Kennedy made his remarks in an interview on "Meet the Press," a radio-television program of the National Broadcasting Company.

Mr. Schlesinger was asked about an article in The Times "in which you said that you had lied to the press at the time of the Bay of Pigs about the size of the men and people who were there, and you regretted that you had passed along the cover story."

Mr. Schlesinger said that, a few days before he misinformed The Times, the newspaper had "suppressed a story by Tad Szulc from Miami, giving a fairly accurate account of the invasion plans."

"If I was responsible in misleading The Times by repeating the official cover story, The Times conceivably was just as reprehensible in misleading the American people by suppressing the Tad Szulc story from Miami. I, at least, had the excuse that I was working for the Government."

"I refer to think," he said, "that both The Times and I were actuated by the same motives; that is, a sense, mistaken or not, that this was in the national interest to do so."

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Ydigoras Says He Talked JFK Out of Canceling Cuba Action

MIAMI, Sept. 18 (UPI)—Former President of Guatemala Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes claims he helped dissuade the late President Kennedy from calling off the abortive 1961 Cuban invasion by sending him a note by personal envoy. Ydigoras, living in San Salvador, El Salvador, since his 1963 ouster in a military coup, made his claim in a statement sent here. Ydigoras said his interest grows from recent articles by former Kennedy confidants touching on the Bay of Pigs invasion of April 17, 1961.

According to Ydigoras, two delegates were sent to Guatemala City in March of 1961 to inform him that President Kennedy had called off the planned invasion. [In their accounts of the Bay of Pigs episode published this year, neither Theodore Sorenson nor Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. made reference to any decision by President Kennedy to cancel the invasion plan.]

Some 2000 Cuban exiles were training secretly in Guatemala for the invasion, Ydigoras said in his statement this was the result of arrangements he made with the Eisenhower Administration in 1960.

Ydigoras said he wrote a personal note to Mr. Kennedy, asking that he go ahead with the invasion, and sent it by a special representative. He said Mr. Kennedy received the Guatemalan envoy and told him: "Your President is one of the few who inspire me to continue with this operation. . . there are many who are opposed to it and one of them is Mr. (Thomas C. Mann, my adviser for affairs in this area."

According to Ydigoras, Mr. Kennedy then informed the envoy: "Tell your President that the operation will be carried out."

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Cuban Invasion 1961

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(CAR DONA)

SAN JUAN, P.R. -- JOSE MIRO CARDONA, PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN
 REVOLUTIONARY AT THE TIME OF THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION, TODAY
 CRITICIZED HISTORIAN ARTHUR SCHLESINGER'S RECENTLY PUBLISHED BOOK
 ON THE ABORTED INVASION ATTEMPT.

MIRO CARDONA REFERRED TO SCHLESINGER'S VIEWS AS "SCANDAL, NOT
 HISTORY... THEY SERVE ONLY AS PROPAGANDA FOR THE ENEMY TO USE IN
 ATTACKING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA WHICH TODAY IS ENGAGED IN A
 DEADLY STRUGGLE AGAINST COMMUNIST WORLD DOMINATION..."

THE CUBAN EXILE LEADER, NOW TEACHING HERE, ACCUSED SCHLESINGER
 OF TRYING TO "BELITTLE" PRESIDENT JOHNSON, AND OF PRESENTING THE LATE
 PRESIDENT KENNEDY AS "UNCERTAIN, INSECURE (AND) ONE TRUSTING TO LUCK...
 HE BLURS THE IMAGE OF THE LEADER AND STATESMAN..."

MIRO CORDONA FLATLY DENIED THE SCHLESINGER STATEMENT OF ANY PRE-
 SIDENTIAL DECISION TO WITHDRAW AGREED (U.S.) SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION.
 "THAT IS FALSE, TOTALLY AND ABSOLUTELY FALSE," THE CUBAN SAID.

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UPI-75

(BAY OF PIGS)

NEW YORK--THE NEWLY-ESTABLISHED ~~LATIN AMERICAN TIMES~~ TODAY
 BEGAN PUBLICATION OF A THREE-PART SERIES BY ITS WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT,
 JOHN T. ~~SKELLY~~, ENTITLED "INSIDE STORY OF THE BAY OF PIGS."

IN AN EDITORIAL BOX ACCOMPANYING THE FIRST ARTICLE, THE TIMES
 SAID: "MANY QUESTIONS DEALING WITH MAJOR MISCALCULATIONS OF THE
 ADMINISTRATION IN THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS FIASCO HAVE REMAINED LARGELY
 UNANSWERED UNTIL NOW...MANY PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN ASPECTS OF THE BUNGLED
 CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT ARE DISCLOSED BY CUBAN EXILE LEADERS WHO WERE
 DIRECTLY INVOLVED."

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Today in National Affairs

More Revelations on Bay of Pigs

By David Lawrence

WASHINGTON

These are times when it seems to be a fad to downgrade the military mind and to arrogate to the civilian a superior capability in dealing with purely military operations. On Thursday, United Press International, in a dispatch from New York, said:

"The late President Kennedy, to the day of his death, felt the CIA and his military advisers led him into making the worst mistake of his career—the Bay of Pigs disaster, according to a close Kennedy aid.

"While publicly and privately assuming full blame for the tragedy, Kennedy was aghast at the enormity of his error and bitter at having been badly misled by his advisers.

"Kennedy's aid, Theodore Sorensen, revealed the late President's personal reaction in an article published yesterday in Look magazine.

"How could I have been so far off base?" Sorensen said Kennedy remarked. "All my life I've known better than to depend on the experts. How could I have been so stupid to let them go ahead?"

"Sorensen said the key to Kennedy's error lay in the fact he approved an invasion plan bearing little resemblance to what he thought he had approved.

"That so great a gap between concept and actuality should exist at so high a level on so dangerous a matter reflected a shocking number of errors in the whole decision-making process," Sorensen said. "Errors that permitted bureaucratic momentum to govern instead of policy leadership."

Perhaps the most authoritative explanation thus far available about what did happen was given by Robert Kennedy, Attorney General at the time. As the brother of the President and a participant in the secret conferences beforehand at the White House, he was familiar with the whole Bay of Pigs operation. In an interview published in the Jan. 28, 1963, issue of "U. S. News & World Report," the Attorney General said that it was never contemplated there would be U. S. air cover for the invasion. Excerpts from the interview—the text of which was approved by the Attorney General before publication—are as follows:

"What happened was this: One air attack had been made

on Saturday on Cuban airports. There was a flurry at the United Nations and elsewhere and, as a result, U. S. participation in the matter was coming to the surface. This surfacing was contrary to the pre invasion plan. There was supposed to be another attack on the airports on Monday morning.

"The President was called about whether another attack which had been planned should take place. As there was this stir about the matter, he gave instructions that it should not take place at that time unless those having the responsibility felt that it was so important it had to take place, in which case they should call him and discuss it further.

"And that's what was postponed. It wasn't air cover of the beaches or landings. And, in fact, the attack on the airports took place later that day.

"Q. Wasn't there to be air cover of the beaches from Central America?

"A. That is correct—and that was not disturbed. All of the planes that were supposed to be utilized were utilized—all in the planning. I might say they proved to be inadequate. The air cover at the beaches was definitely inadequate—but not because of some last minute decision by the President or anyone else.

"Q. Who did the planning?
"A. Now, that's the third point. The President has

taken responsibility for this whole matter.

"Q. Well, was the planning by the military, or somebody else?

"A. The plan that finally went into effect was approved by our military—the pentagon, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as well as the Central Intelligence Agency. This wasn't something that was planned by a few fellows over at the White House and then put in operation. However, the President had to give approval to the plan and he quite properly has accepted the responsibility.

"Q. There have been many reports that the military did not approve the thing—

"A. As Gen. Lemnitzer, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has said, they did approve it. Although responsibility for the planning lay primarily with the CIA.

"The President had made it clear from the beginning, prior to the approval of this operation, American manpower, American Air power and American ships would not be used.

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"And this plan had to go into effect without that. The military approved the plan that finally went into operation on that basis.

"Q. What accounts for the miscalculation here? You say the forces that went in were not adequate—

"A. I think it's a difficult question to answer—the plans and the recommendations obviously were not adequate.

"Q. Why were American forces there if they were not used?

"A. The plan was that, if the invasion ships starting from Central America were sighted by a Cuban plane, or in some fashion the Communists learned about the invasion, they were going to turn around. Our forces had permission to protect them from attack as they returned.

"Q. You have quoted the President as saying, 'I want it understood that American forces are not going to be used, and if you still think this plan is good enough, we'll go ahead.' Is that right?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Who was it he was talking to?

"A. To all those who were involved in the planning. All those involved in the planning understood that American forces would not be used."

What the episode proves is that American military men should not be asked to assume any responsibility for operations which they neither command nor control.

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UPI-36

(BAY OF PIGS)

NEW YORK--THE LATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY, TO THE DAY OF HIS DEATH, FELT THE CIA AND HIS MILITARY ADVISERS LED HIM INTO MAKING THE WORST MISTAKE OF HIS CAREER--THE BAY OF PIGS DISASTER, ACCORDING TO A CLOSE KENNEDY AIDE.

WHILE PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY ASSUMING FULL BLAME FOR THE TRAGEDY, KENNEDY WAS AGAST AT THE ENORMITY OF HIS ERROR AND BITTER AT HAVING BEEN BADLY MISLED BY HIS ADVISERS.

KENNEDY'S AIDE, THEODORE C. SORESENSEN, REVEALED THE LATE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REACTION IN AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED YESTERDAY IN LOOK MAGAZINE. THE ARTICLE IS THE FIRST INSTALLMENT OF A SERIES BASED ON SORESENSEN'S FORTHCOMING BOOK "KENNEDY" TO BE PUBLISHED IN OCTOBER.

THE FULL EXTENT OF KENNEDY'S BITTERNESS WAS EXPRESSED TO SORESENSEN DURING A WALK AROUND THE WHITE HOUSE SEVERAL DAYS AFTER THE CUBAN INVADERS HAD BEEN DEFEATED.

"HOW COULD I HAVE BEEN SO FAR OFF BASE?" SORESENSEN SAID KENNEDY REMARKED. "ALL MY LIFE I'VE KNOWN BETTER THAN TO DEPEND ON THE EXPERTS. HOW COULD I HAVE BEEN SO STUPID TO LET THEM GO AHEAD?"

SORESENSEN SAID THE KEY TO KENNEDY'S ERROR LAY IN THE FACT HE APPROVED AN INVASION PLAN "BEARING LITTLE RESEMBLANCE TO WHAT HE THOUGHT HE HAD APPROVED."

"THAT SO GREAT A GAP BETWEEN CONCEPT AND ACTUALITY SHOULD EXIST AT SO HIGH A LEVEL ON SO DANGEROUS A MATTER REFLECTED A SHOCKING NUMBER OF ERRORS IN THE WHOLE DECISION MAKING PROCESS," SORESENSEN SAID. "ERRORS THAT PERMITTED BUREAUCRATIC MOMENTUM TO GOVERN INSTEAD OF POLICY LEADERSHIP."

THE FORMER WHITE HOUSE AIDE SAID KENNEDY HAD "GRAVE DOUBTS" ABOUT THE INVASION'S SUCCESS FROM THE MOMENT HE WAS BRIEFED ON THE OPERATION AS PRESIDENT-ELECT IN PALM BEACH.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Feared Exile Attack on Central America CIA Man in Bay of Pigs Gave Warning

By David Wise
Washington Bureau Chief

WASHINGTON

Richard M. Bissell Jr., who ran the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion for the Central Intelligence Agency, said yesterday that the armed Cuban exile brigade might have tried to seize territory in Central America if it had not been sent to invade Cuba.

The suggestion that the CIA might have lost control of the Cuban exiles if President Kennedy had canceled the invasion, and that the intelligence agency warned of this possibility, had not been made publicly before. Mr. Bissell spoke out in a lengthy copyrighted interview in The Washington Evening Star.

The account was the latest in a spate of stories that have revived debate over the disastrous Cuban invasion, the worst setback of the Kennedy administration. On Monday, historian Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., wrote about the Bay of Pigs in Life magazine. Tomorrow Theodore C. Sorenson will give his version in Look magazine. Both men are former assistants to Mr. Kennedy, and both accounts are taken from books they will publish this fall.

In the Star interview, Mr. Bissell said: "We did warn more than once that there would be a very difficult problem with this armed, highly motivated unit in case the operation were canceled. We had no final plan of what would become of it."

"They (the exiles) were the most powerful military force between Mexico and Panama, and it is entirely possible that they might have tried to seize a base in Nicaragua, Honduras or Guatemala. There is not the slightest doubt that they could have defeated any Guatemalan force."

It was the second time Mr. Bissell had broken silence since he resigned from the CIA in February, 1962, during the shakeup that followed the Bay of Pigs invasion. On May 4, he was interviewed on an NBC-TV documentary "The Science of Spying."

The former CIA Deputy Director for Plans, who directed the U-2 program for the intelligence agency, was interviewed in Hartford where he is an executive of the United Aircraft Corp.

The exile force he spoke of was trained clandestinely in Guatemala by the CIA, and dispatched by President Kennedy on April 17, 1961, to invade the south coast of Cuba

at the Bay of Pigs. Training of the exiles had commenced under President Eisenhower.

According to the Star interview, Mr. Bissell feels that President Kennedy's decision to cancel a second air strike by exile B-26 bombers against Premier Castro's airfields might have made a "critical difference" in the outcome of the invasion.

"If we had been able to dump five times the tonnage of bombs on Castro's airfields, we would have had a damned good chance," he said in the interview. Mr. Schlesinger wrote that the President's decision to cancel the second strike was "an error," but not

The Exile B-26 Bombers took off Nicaragua and attacked Castro's Air Bases in the first strike. A CIA "cover story," announced in Miami, said it was the work of pilots defecting inside Cuba. President Kennedy canceled the second strike, scheduled for the day of the invasion, be-

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cause the U. S. role was seeping out.

In the Star interview, Mr. Bissell is quoted as saying U.S. officials miscalculated the chances of keeping the U. S. role in the invasion secret. "The hope existed that it could be plausibly disclaimed by the U. S. government," he said.

The star said Mr. Bissell is "convinced that the U. S. will have to intervene in the affairs of other countries with some frequency in the future."

The Star also published for the first time a picture of Mr. Bissell receiving the national security medal from President Kennedy in April, 1962. It had previously been reported that Mr. Bissell received a medal when he left the CIA, but there was no announcement at the time.

White House officials said 12 national security medals have been awarded since 1953, but that only about half of the recipients have been publicly identified.

Cuban Invasion: 3 in Kennedy Administration Review '61 Failure

By TOM WICKER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, July 21

Three new accounts of the Bay of Pigs invasion, provided by former Kennedy Administration officials, agree that President Kennedy's political misgivings about the project materially reduced whatever chances of success it had.

Two of these accounts, by Theodore C. Sorensen and Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr., also agree that the ill-fated invasion of Cuba never had much chance of success.

"How could everybody involved have thought such a plan would succeed?" Mr. Kennedy exclaimed after it was all over, according to Mr. Sorensen. "How could I have been so far off base? All my life I've known better than to depend on the experts. How could I have been so stupid, to let them go ahead?"

Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Schlesinger also agree that President Kennedy's decision to cancel a scheduled air strike on the morning of the invasion, April 17, 1961, probably was mistaken and unnecessary, but that it had little to do with the failure of the Cuban force.

The third account, however, by Richard M. Bissell Jr., suggests that the operation would have had "a damned good chance" had there been sufficient air support for the Cuban volunteers.

Parts of Forthcoming Books

Mr. Sorensen was Mr. Kennedy's special counsel in April, 1961, when the Cuban volunteer brigade was defeated and captured by Fidel Castro's forces after a three-day fight. Mr. Sorensen's version, a part of a book to be published next fall by Harper & Row, appeared in Look this week.

Mr. Schlesinger was a special assistant to the President in 1961. His account, also part of a forthcoming book, was published in Life this week. Yesterday The Washington Evening Star published a copyright interview with Mr. Bissell, who was in charge of planning the invasion for the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Schlesinger make it plain that President Kennedy, finding the invasion plan well advanced when he took office, had grave misgivings about it and gave consideration to abandoning it. Ultimately, he felt he had no choice but to proceed within the limitations he had.

U.S. Military Move Barred

The primary limitation was that there was to be no overt United States military participation.

This decision, Mr. Sorensen wrote, "led to other restrictions designed to make the operation more covert and our involvement more concealed, restrictions that in fact impaired the plan's military prospects."

Among other things, the decision sharply limited the amount of air support available to the invaders. They had to rely on outdated B-26 aircraft piloted by refugees and based in Nicaragua.

"Since [President Kennedy] was unwilling to conduct an overt operation through the Defense Department," Mr. Sorensen wrote, "he should have abandoned it altogether as beyond the C.I.A.'s capability."

Restriction on Landing Site

Mr. Kennedy also made a political decision against attempting the landing at Trinidad, at the foot of the Escambray Mountains. That site had been selected by the Joint Chiefs of Staff from alternatives presented by the C.I.A., as the most likely for success.

Mr. Sorensen wrote that Trinidad was "ruled out as being too conspicuous." Mr. Schlesinger wrote that Mr. Kennedy considered the proposed operation at Trinidad "too spectacular... he wanted a quiet landing, preferably at night."

The Joint Chiefs then named the Bay of Pigs as the best of the remaining alternatives. But it was separated by 80 miles of swamp from the Escambray Mountains, and thus it was impossible for the invaders to scatter into the mountains as guerrillas, as Mr. Kennedy had expected.

Both authors make it clear that this difficulty was never explained to the President. Mr. Sorensen wrote: "The vast majority of the [invaders] had not been given any guerrilla training." A guerrilla operation, he added, was "never a realistic alternative."

"It was never even planned by the C.I.A. officers in charge of the operation," he added, and they neither told the President that they thought this option was out nor told the exiles that this was the President's plan.

Where Accounts Differ

Mr. Sorensen and Mr. Schlesinger differ sharply on one point about the shift in the invasion site.

Mr. Sorensen wrote that when the Joint Chiefs learned that Trinidad had been ruled out, "they selected the Bay of Pigs as the best of the alternative sites offered without informing either Kennedy or [Secretary of Defense] McNamara that they still thought Trinidad preferable."

Mr. Schlesinger, after writing that it was the President who ruled out Trinidad, said the Joint Chiefs agreed that the Bay of Pigs "seemed the best of the three alternatives, but added softly that they still preferred Trinidad."

A source involved in the decision said privately that his recollection was clear that the Joint Chiefs' continuing preference for Trinidad had been expressed in an official paper. He said he could not say whether this paper had gone to the President or had been closely studied by him.

Mr. Bissell was quoted in the interview as having said he believed that the invasion plan "can be criticized for allowing this chipping away to go on without insisting on the

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Theodore C. Sorensen

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the whole decision-making process, errors that permitted bureaucratic momentum to govern instead of policy leadership."

For that reason, Mr. Sorensen wrote, "the whole project seemed to move mysteriously and inexorably toward execution without the President's being able either to obtain a firm grip on it or reverse it."

He said Mr. Kennedy, new in office, hesitated to overrule "renowned experts" who had the project well under way. He did not know these experts well, failed to realize that the operation could not be kept covert in an "open society," and accepted the advice of "experts" over his own political doubts, the skepticism of some aides like Mr. Schlesinger and the open opposition of Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas.

Mr. Schlesinger wrote that Mr. Kennedy never saw the written protest of Chester Bowles, then Under Secretary of State and now Ambassador to India. He said that he himself was advised by Robert F. Kennedy, then the Attorney General: "You may be right or you may be wrong, but the President has made his mind up. Don't push it any further."

How C.I.A. Viewed Operation

Mr. Sorensen said that the C.I.A. presented the plan to President Kennedy as a question "whether he was as willing as the Republicans to permit and assist these exiles to free their own island from dictatorship, or whether he was willing to liquidate well-laid preparations, leave Cuba free to subvert the hemisphere, disband an impatient army in training for nearly a year under miserable conditions, and have them spread the word that Kennedy had betrayed their attempt to depose Castro."

Mr. Bissell, who now lives and works in Hartford, Conn.,

raised another point in the Evening Star interview. [The exiles], he said, "were the most powerful military force between Mexico and Panama and it is entirely possible that they might have tried to seize a base in Nicaragua, Honduras or Guatemala; there is not the slightest doubt that they could have defeated any Guatemalan force."

There was no "final plan," he said, of how to dispose of this unit and "we did warn more than once that there would be a very difficult problem with this armed, highly motivated unit in case the operation were canceled."

Mr. Schlesinger's account of the pressures on Mr. Kennedy coincided substantially with Mr. Sorensen's. All three accounts picture an operation almost impossible to reverse once in motion.

Mr. Bissell appeared, however, to believe still that there had been a chance for success. He said there were two possibilities — an established beachhead around the Bay of Pigs airstrip, which would have permitted the rebel air force to bomb Cuban military targets, and brought down the Castro Government; or an impasse, with neither side winning or losing, which might have led to negotiations and free elections.

He did not mention guerrilla operations. But he said: "If we had been able to dump

five times the tonnage of bombs on Castro's airfields, we would have had a damned good chance."

Mr. Bissell also said the exiles had been told clearly that there would be no United States military intervention. Mr. Sorensen asserted the opposite. "Most members of the brigade were in fact under the mistaken impression, apparently from their C.I.A. contacts, that American armed forces would openly and directly assist them, if necessary," he said.

Views on Air-Strike Decision

One strike on Cuban air bases had already had carried out by the refugee airmen when President Kennedy decided to cancel a second air strike. In discussing that decision, Mr. Sorensen says:

"The first strike, designed to be the key, turned out later to have been remarkably ineffective, and there is no reason to believe that Castro's air force, having survived the first air strike and then been dispersed into hiding, would have been knocked out by the second one."

whole plan or on cancellation." "Because we were so involved in seeing it go ahead," he said is quoted as having said, "we did not insist on as great freedom of action as needed."

But the Sorensen and Schlesinger articles assert that the invasion play had never had any realistic chance to succeed and that President Kennedy came to believe this after the event.

'Wild Misjudgment'

Assurances that the operation could succeed without United States military involvement, Mr. Sorensen wrote, were "a wild misjudgment." The project was "diplomatically unwise and militarily doomed from the outset . . . that so great a gap between concept and actuality should exist at so high a level on so dangerous a matter reflected a shocking number of errors in

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Says JFK Inherited Problem

Schlesinger Ties Bad Advice to Cuba Disaster

The 1961 Bay of Pigs disaster was caused by President Kennedy's unwillingness to refuse bad advice, according to former Special Assistant to the President Arthur M. Schlesinger.

Mr. Schlesinger, as quoted by Henry Brandon in the July issue of Harper's Magazine, said Mr. Kennedy inherited a Government apparatus "more or less committed to this project" and allowed it to go ahead because "the problem of disengagement" seemed more difficult to overcome.

SKEPTICAL

After the disaster, Mr. Schles-

inger said, Mr. Kennedy became skeptical of the advice he received from some of the "most distinguished and eminent" men around him, and wary of the quality of information from the military, diplomatic and intelligence establishments.

It was then, according to Mr. Schlesinger, that Mr. Kennedy began to rely more on his White House staff.

The White House staff responded, said Mr. Schlesinger, by becoming more aggressive in defending the President's interests.

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Bay Of Pigs Stamp Bold Jab At U.S.

By JON VAN DYKE
Reporter of The Miami News

Castro's exultation over his Bay of Pigs Victory on April 17, 1961, seems to increase as the years go by.

The Cuban stamp issued to commemorate the third anniversary of this battle, received here today, is the most blatantly anti-American stamp of the series.

In bold, contrasting colors, the stamp shows an eagle — traditional symbol of American might — falling from the air after having been shot. An image of a rifle's sighting mechanism is superimposed on the dead eagle's breast.

Like the stamp celebrating the second anniversary of the Bay of Pigs invasion, this stamp is obviously designed for U.S. consumption. Its value is 13 cents — the cost of Cuba-U.S. airmail.

Last year's stamp showed a battle, with forces from South America meeting North Americans at Panama. Cuba was shown as a lighted beacon, surrounded by sinking ships and

planes — presumably those of defeated invaders.

The stamp of two years ago was much simpler. It showed two Cuban soldiers clutching each other in friendship, watching an enemy plane plunge to its destruction.

This year's anniversary issue like the earlier stamps, seems to forbode future military action. This is the first time, however, that the action has been so obviously directed at the United States.



New Cuban Stamp,

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 9: 'Infamy'

The 1,500 Cuban patriots of Brigade 2506 were trapped on the beaches of the Bay of Pigs. Their supply ship was sunk, promised air cover never came and they were running out of ammunition. In earlier installments, the leaders of the brigade gave formerly unknown facts about how the group was organized and trained by the CIA. They told how they hit the beaches at night and came under fire immediately, due to a series of CIA miscalculations.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, José Pérez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)



Castro militia on the Playa Giron front.

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On the third day of the battle, Wednesday, April 19, 1961, everyone knew the invasion had failed—except the members of Brigade 2506. Until the end, they did not know they were beaten. It was a day in which a gallant, forlorn and fool-hardy attack made Castro's superior forces break and run.

The desperate pleas for protective jet air power continued. The messages filtered back from the battlefield to the American destroyer operating off the Cuban coast, then to the Washington command group, and then to their final destination, the White House.

For the President, who was also commander in chief, those must have been searing hours. The nature of John F. Kennedy's personal feelings is reflected in part by the orders that went out from Washington that day. They indicate how close the United States came to a total commitment.

Evacuation Ordered

First, CINCLANT (Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic) was instructed to fly reconnaissance missions over the beach and to send two destroyers to positions off Playa Giron to determine the possibilities for evacuation. Two hours and 52 minutes later, in mid-afternoon, CINCLANT received these instructions: "Have destroyers take Brigade personnel off beach to limit capture. Navy use Brigade boats and craft as practicable and provide air cover. Destroyers authorized return fire if fired on during this humanitarian mission."

"All of a sudden we get the order that we're going in and this time we get no opposition from anybody," Andy Pruna said. "When the final order comes that we're going in, even the ones that were trying to mutiny were ready to go."

The Blagar, the Barbara J., the Atlantico, the three LCUs formed a line. Moving up alongside them came the American destroyers. "So now we know that we are going in," said one aboard ship. "These destroyers are not going in for nothing. And they are going full speed ahead right beside us. And it is a wonderful sight. Everybody is ready to die. Everybody is ready to go."

(But the destroyers arrived too late. Some survivors on the beach said that when the ships came under Castro's artillery fire, they turned away.)

Pepe San Roman (the young commander of the Brigade) continued to send his battle reports and appeals for assistance during the day. Better than anything, the stark words sent out over the airwaves told the story of the disaster that was overtaking the invaders. The radio log read as follows:

5:00 a.m. Do you people realize how desperate the situation is? Do you back us or quit? All we want is low jet air cover. Enemy has this support. I need it badly or cannot survive.

6:13 a.m. Blue Beach under attack by B-26. Where is promised air cover? Pepe.

6:42 a.m. C-54 dropped supplies on Blue Beach. All went into sea. Send more. Pepe.

7:12 a.m. Enemy and trucks coming from Red Beach are right now 3 km. from Blue Beach. Pepe.

7:50 a.m. We are fighting in the west flank of Blue Beach with tanks. Pepe.

8:15 a.m. Situation critical left flank west Blue Beach. Need urgently air support. Pepe.

8:40 a.m. Blue Beach is under air attack. Pepe.

9:14 a.m. Blue Beach under attack by 2 T-33 and artillery. Where the hell is jet cover? Pepe.

9:25 a.m. 2,000 militia attacking Blue Beach from east and west. Need close air support immediately. Pepe.

9:55 a.m. Can you throw something into this vital point in the battle? Anything. Just let jet pilots loose. Pepe.

(Red Beach was Playa Larga at the head of the Bay of Pigs. Blue Beach was Giron, the center of the invasion landings.)

'Enemy Closing In'

Toward the end, messages came quickly: "In water. Out of ammo. Enemy closing in. Help must arrive in next hour." "Fighting on beach. Send all available aircraft now."

Through all the chaos and despair of defeat, Pepe retained the calm that was his hallmark. Even his anger was quiet. He was not a pounder or a shouter. Those who heard him on the radio that day, and many on

the convoy of the Bay of Pigs did, heard the quiet voice sounding. Tired, edged more with anger and bitterness but still determined and still calm.

From the north, the west, the east and from the air, the Brigade was under heavy attack. To the south, at their backs was the sea—both a barrier and the last hope. Gray (the American receiving San Roman's messages) kept saying to hang on; that help was coming from the sea.

There were many heroes to pick from that day. One was Alejandro del Valle, 22 years old, handsome, blond, athletic and cocky, an inspiration to his men.

Del Valle organized a counterattack with his paratroopers and the Third Battalion.

Standing on top of one of his two tanks, Del Valle signaled for the attack. The men moved forward under a heavy artillery barrage, some walking dazedly, others running, but all going ahead. To the forward observers, watching through binoculars, it was like a picture: the lines of men, the bright blue sky and the early morning sun, the puffs of smoke and earth rising from the craters, the flash of small arms fire and the blue uniforms of the enemy. Del Valle was hit and knocked from the tank. He immediately climbed back and the tank moved ahead in the vanguard of the troops.

It was a gallant, forlorn even fool-hardy attack—and yet it was succeeding. Castro's vastly superior forces broke and ran. Some enemy soldiers tore off their shirts and waved them in surrender. That moment marked a crest for the Brigade. For a few fleeting seconds the liberation army felt victorious. And then the attack faltered and stopped, first with the Third Battalion on the right flank, and then on down the line, and men began moving to the rear. They were running out of ammunition.

The Third Battalion retreat became disorganized. A few of the paratroopers joined their ranks and the retreat threatened to become a rout. In rage and with tears in his eyes, Del Valle ran among the men trying to stop them, shouting: "All paratroopers back to the line!"

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and die there." He repeated it over and over.

His men regrouped and formed a line on the sides of the road, placed their bazookas, and waited, two miles south of San Blas, at a junction called Berméja. As they were forming their position the paratroopers were astonished to see a jeep driven by a captain in Castro's militia come racing straight into their lines. Slitting beside the captain was Maj. Duque Estrada, one of the top enemy commanders.

The major had been in charge of the troops at Yaguaramas, and in the mistaken belief that the forces coming from Cova-donga already had taken San Blas and moved south, he took a short cut—straight into the lap of the Brigade.

Speaks Up Boldly

The captain was frightened but Maj. Estrada spoke up boldly: "Men, you don't know what's coming toward you. I have 5,000 men and 14 tanks. You'd better surrender. You know you're going to lose this war."

Cocky as ever, Del Valle snapped back: "You don't know what Del Valle can do with a hundred paratroopers."

A Brigade soldier called out, "Let's hang these Communists."

The major, still unperturbed, answered, "I am a Socialist but I am not a Communist. You are Cubans and you are harming your country."

With that, Del Valle personally took the major back to Giron and reported to Pepe San Roman.

(The Brigade commanders were never informed of the alternative plan drafted by the high command in Washington for use if the frontal assault should fail. This called for escape to the Escambray Mountains and operation as a guerrilla force; but the Central Intelligence Agency withheld it from the Cubans.)

Erneido Oliva, commander of the armored battalion, after studying the situation on Tuesday morning, proposed the alternative plan on his own initiative. In his opinion, the forces approaching were so large that the Brigade would be unable to resist. He suggested

that the troops be pulled back, re-united with the Brigade and its five tanks, and "an arrow-head strike" be launched to the east and into the mountains.

San Roman, the Brigade commander, not knowing that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had indorsed such a plan, overruled it. There was not enough transportation and ammunition, he told Oliva, and no communications to let the support ships know where they would be. At that time, he was still certain of support from the sea.

Still Confident

In the end, Pepe's decision was based on his confidence in the Americans—confidence, as he expressed it, that something was coming and "if we could hold this position for two or three days everything was going to be all right. We didn't feel demoralized. I knew that we were in a very rough situation, very dangerous, but I felt optimistic about everything."

Had Pepe and his officers been prepared from the beginning to take alternative action, had they known that the Americans had drafted such a plan for use at such a time, perhaps the Bay of Pigs would have had a different ending. No one will ever be able to say for certain.

Oliva's forces on the first night, numbering less than 370 men, had faced—and defeated—2,100 Castro soldiers, plus 20 tanks, including Sherman and Stalin tanks. The best available estimate of Castro's casualties that night, from a Castro doctor who later defected, places the dead at 500, with over 1,000 wounded. Oliva's men suffered only 10 to 20 dead, 40 to 50 wounded.

They were well trained, they massed their fire brilliantly and they were superbly led. After that battle, the men began calling Oliva "Maceo," after Antonio Maceo, the great Cuban hero of the Wars of Independence against Spain. Maceo, like Oliva, was a Negro. At one time Oliva had wanted to become an architect, but those who saw him in the battles of Playa Larga never doubted where his true talent lay. He exhibited complete steadiness under fire and a quality of strength and decision that made men want to follow him.

In the last hours, the men of the brigade remembered Oliva standing on the beach and shaking his fist at the sea. He believed that he and his men had been betrayed by the Americans. He shouted to 300 men of the Second and Sixth Battalions surrounding him that he would not abandon them.

"I can still see Oliva standing there shaking his fist," one said long after.

Young Amado Gayol, who had fought magnificently on the San Blas front, drew a pistol. He was going to shoot himself "because I didn't want my parents to suffer knowing I had

been captured and then executed."

But Oliva yelled at him: "No. You are a man. Not like those at sea."

Several yards down the beach the wounded Maximo Cruz crawled out of the infirmary and saw the American destroyers still moving toward the coast. He yelled to Padre Lugo who was walking away, "Father, Father, Don't leave. Here are the Americans. They have come to save us." As he was speaking, two artillery shells landed in front of the ships. The ships turned and left.

Rage Pours Out

The frustration and rage poured out. Soldiers ran to a tank to try and shoot at the destroyers. Their hatred spilled over onto their own men. Brigade soldiers fired rifles trying to hit the men on the sailboat and also those who were leaving on rubber rafts. They were the final shots in the Bay of Pigs invasion. A soldier watching the last American ship said: "In the wake of that ship goes 200 years of infamy."

Oliva and his men blew up their tanks, shot their truck tires and destroyed their heavy equipment. Then they began marching in a column to the east. They had walked only five hundred yards when two T-33s and a Sea Fury attacked them. When one of the planes dived low, a soldier saw the Cuban flag on its wings. He felt—horribly—like an outlaw in his own land. The column broke and the men ran into the jungle. It was every man for himself.

Tomorrow: The Last Battle.

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The Bay of Pigs

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is that Prince Edward County school children, if they go to school in their own county must go to racially segregated schools which, although designated as private, are beneficiaries of county and State support.


A State, of course, has wide discretion in deciding whether laws shall operate State-wide or shall operate only in certain counties, the legislature "having in mind the needs and desires of each." A State may wish to suggest, as Maryland did in Salsburg, that there are reasons why one county ought not to be treated like another. But the record in the present case could not be clearer that Prince Edward's public schools were closed and private schools operated in their place with State and county assistance, for one reason, and one reason only: to ensure, through measures taken by the county and the State, that white and colored children in Prince Edward County would not, under any circumstances, go to the same school. Whatever nonracial grounds might support the State's allowing a county to abandon public schools, the object must be a constitutional one, and grounds of race and opposition to desegregation do not qualify as constitutional.

In Hall v. St. Helena Parish School Board, 393 U.S. 30, 80 S.Ct. 519, 20 L.Ed.2d 391, 1969-1 C.L.B. 1, 100-1, 100-2, 100-3, 100-4, 100-5, 100-6, 100-7, 100-8, 100-9, 100-10, 100-11, 100-12, 100-13, 100-14, 100-15, 100-16, 100-17, 100-18, 100-19, 100-20, 100-21, 100-22, 100-23, 100-24, 100-25, 100-26, 100-27, 100-28, 100-29, 100-30, 100-31, 100-32, 100-33, 100-34, 100-35, 100-36, 100-37, 100-38, 100-39, 100-40, 100-41, 100-42, 100-43, 100-44, 100-45, 100-46, 100-47, 100-48, 100-49, 100-50, 100-51, 100-52, 100-53, 100-54, 100-55, 100-56, 100-57, 100-58, 100-59, 100-60, 100-61, 100-62, 100-63, 100-64, 100-65, 100-66, 100-67, 100-68, 100-69, 100-70, 100-71, 100-72, 100-73, 100-74, 100-75, 100-76, 100-77, 100-78, 100-79, 100-80, 100-81, 100-82, 100-83, 100-84, 100-85, 100-86, 100-87, 100-88, 100-89, 100-90, 100-91, 100-92, 100-93, 100-94, 100-95, 100-96, 100-97, 100-98, 100-99, 100-100.

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 8

The leaders of the Cuban liberation force told in earlier installments how the Central Intelligence Agency organized and trained their brigade at a secret base in Guatemala. They were led to believe they would get plenty of support from the air and from civilians rising up against Castro within Cuba. Nothing went as planned at the Bay of Pigs. The invaders were in a dire situation, deserted by their support ships, their supply ship sunk and Castro's planes strafing them as the story continues 24 hours after the landing.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artline, José Pérez San Roman, Ernesto Olive and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

It must have been a day of frustration and anguish for John Fitzgerald Kennedy. The news from the front continued to grow blacker. Not a single element of the invasion plan had proved successful and now the total disaster that he and his top officials had been assured could not happen was imminent.

(It was Tuesday, April 18, 1961, and 24 hours since 1,500 Cubans, trained as an invasion force under orders issued by President Eisenhower in March, 1960, had begun a desperate attempt to establish a beachhead at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's southern coast. It had been a night for heroes, but dreadful miscalculations had doomed the effort almost from the start.)

There was the threat that Russia might act. Soviet Premier Khrushchev had made that clear in a special message to the President that morning. It stated the Soviet position in chilling terms. The Cuban government would be given "all necessary assistance in beating back the armed attack on Cuba."

Temperate But Firm

The President's reply was temperate but firm. He had stated before and he stated again that the United States intended no military intervention in Cuba. But should an outside force intervene, "We will immediately honor our obligations to protect this hemisphere against external aggression."

10 o'clock, the day in his office, leaders of his cabinet prepared for his cabinet congress and guests. At the put on white at 10:15 he and ked down the he entrance



A Castro soldier stands on the tail section of a Brigade B-26 downed during the invasion.

were to be given American air protection, the exhausted Cubans in two of the bombers were relieved by four American pilots. Four bombers in all took off from Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, early Wednesday for the three-hour and 20 minute flight to the Bay of Pigs, but one turned back because of engine trouble.

In the first light of the day, the B-26s were approaching their target—nearly one hour before their jet support was supposed to arrive at 6:30. Why they arrived an hour early is not clear, but the result was disastrous: the United States jets were still on the carrier deck when the planes flown by the Americans were attacked by Castro's jets.

One B-26 was shot down and crash-landed in flames on the air strip at the Central Australia sugar mill. The other fell into the sea enveloped in flames and smoke. The four Americans died. By the time the mournful word was passed to the carrier, the bombing mission had ended.

Gonzales Herrera, one of the Cuban pilots, who had heard his American comrades vainly calling the distress signal "Mad Dog Four! May Day! May Day!" to get carrier support, proceeded on to his target: enemy troop and artillery concentrations massed in front of San Blas. The Brigade troops had been under heavy artillery fire all night and Castro's forces were ready for a massive attack when Herrera's plane dived, strafed the position with machine guns, turned, made a second pass and dropped two napalm bombs. After a tremendous explosion,

as far as 218 miles south of the Bay of Pigs. The Cuban crews on some of the ships refused to go back.

"We are lost, this is a disaster," they said. "We have been betrayed and we are not going back unless the American destroyers come with us."

By midnight, Pepe San Roman, "mad as hell," took a 25-foot boat and left for the open sea to search for the ships. He went nearly six miles offshore in the darkness, calling in vain for the ships. There was no answer. For hours, the radio calls went out, in code, to the missing fleet: "Dolores, this is Beach. Dolores, this is Beach. I am trying to find you. We need you. We need you." There was no answer.

On Tuesday morning, radio contact was established with one of the ships, the Blagar. The first words from the sea were congratulations to the Brigade for its "victory." The message was given in the name of the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

Pepe's profane reply to the voice on the radio was that the "victorious" troops had run out of ammunition; that ammunition, medical supplies and support was needed, not congratulations. Then he asked to speak directly to the American "last force" commanders. This is how Pepe remembers the conversation:

Commander: "Hello, Pepe, how are you?"

Pepe: "Where have you been, you son of a bitch? Where the hell have you been? You have abandoned us."

Commander: "I know that you have your problems, but

heavy artillery fire. By this time, he had 20,000 troops massed in the area, a superiority of about 20 to 1, but he did not attack the tiny force, defending on the northern front. This failure to act saved many lives but also prolonged the battle.)

A Coincidence

The failure of Castro's large force to deliver the decisive blow was due to a curious coincidence. Two paratroopers, in the advance guard at Covadonga, were captured that morning and immediately questioned about their strength. One man, Carlos Onetti, bravely said that he was part of a force of more than one thousand men holding the road from Covadonga to San Blas. The other, less brave and more practical, told the truth: the invaders' positions had been defended by only 19 men.

A militia captain cursed the second paratrooper as a liar trying to lead them into a trap. It was impossible for 19 men to hold that outpost for more than 24 hours, the captain said. To soften up the "large" force ahead of them, four batteries of 122-mm. artillery began pounding San Blas, but the troops were withheld.

(The outside world, meanwhile, was led to believe that the invasion was succeeding. In New York City, a press agent named Lem Jones, head of a public relations firm bearing his name, was issuing cheering bulletins on behalf of the Cuban Revolutionary Council. On Tuesday afternoon, he reported "peasants, workers and militia joining the freedom front and aiding the rapidly expanding area already liberated by the revolutionary command." Miami newspapers reported even more extravagant claims of invasion victories.)

Apparently there was misinformation in official quarters also. In Guatemala, at Homestead Air Force Base outside Miami and at Key West, additional Cuban recruits were told that the Brigade was winning and that they were to prepare and wait to join the victorious fight.

Since his angry exchange with the American, Gray, on the supply ship that morning, Pepe had been on a radio con-

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter

15: The Summing Up

The heartbreak at seeing their country crushed under Communist rule, their training and tense preparations to try and free the land, the bloody nightmare of the battle, the months in dismal prisons near starvation—all were over now for the men of Brigade 2506. Now would come the hollow task of mulling over defeat and trying to find out who or what to blame. Here is the last of the 15 chapters excerpted from "The Bay of Pigs."

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, Jose Perez, San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.)

When the battle was over, what Churchill calls the "terrible ifs" began to accumulate.

If the underground had been alerted in time and had launched a major sabotage campaign (instead of not being informed about the invasion until after Castro had rounded up thousands of suspects);

If Nino Diaz had landed and fought his diversionary action in Oriente (instead of failing in his mission two nights in a row);

If the second bombing raid on Monday had not been canceled (by President Kennedy, partly on the basis of false reports that the B-26s had virtually destroyed Castro's air force on Saturday);

If the landing area had been explored and charted in advance (disclosing coral reefs and waiting Castro troops instead of a deserted, isolated area);

If military landing craft had been used instead of boats with outboard motors (many of which failed to work);

The Damaging Jets

If the military experts had recognized how damaging an unopposed T-33 jet trainer could be when armed with rockets (two ships were sunk by such planes);

If fighter planes had accompanied the B-26s;

If the Brigade had been trained to take alternative action as guerillas;

If the landing area had been adaptable for guerrilla action;

If President Kennedy had not publicly stated that the United States would not intervene;

If clouds had not obscured the target over Castro's air base (when the invaders' B-26s arrived Tuesday morning);

If the B-26s had not arrived an hour early on Wednesday morning (before planes from the United States carrier Essex, finally ordered to provide protective cover, could take off);

If so vast a majority of the mandatory supplies had not been loaded on the Houston (a supply ship sunk by Castro's air force on the first morning of the invasion);

If the ships had succeeded in unloading the supplies;

If the convoy had not fled so far and had been in time to land help (American destroyers came rushing in at the last moment but turned away);

And the final, tantalizing "if"—if all these had taken place, would the brigade have won?

At the moment of defeat, there were no answers—only questions. President Kennedy, appearing grim and rather determined, addressed the American Society of Newspaper Editors in Washington on the day after the final rout at the Bay of Pigs, when the invaders were still being hunted in the Zapata swamps.

There were useful lessons for all to learn from "this sobering episode," he said. "We intend to profit from this lesson."

He closed dramatically, "Let me then make clear as the President of the United States that I am determined upon our system's survival and success, regardless of the cost and regardless of the peril."

The eloquent words and the fighting stance did not alter the embittering fact that the Bay of Pigs had been a devastating defeat for the United States.

And for Mr. Kennedy, who hated to lose even more than most, it also was a deep personal defeat. As the President remarked ruefully to reporters later, "There is an old saying that victory has 100 fathers and defeat is an orphan." The orphan was on his doorstep.

On April 23, the President appointed his brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to head a committee to find out what happened at the Bay of Pigs. Allen Dulles, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations, were the other members of the committee.

They began working immediately, going back into the documents in existence and talking to the men who had planned the operation. It was an investigation of far-reaching significance, and it came at a time when United States prestige had dropped to its lowest point in the Cold War era.

It has never been reported to whom the committee talked or what its finds were; everything was conducted in secrecy. The investigation was not a means to develop political careers. Also, there was no attempt to find a convenient scapegoat, for the President had stated firmly, both publicly and privately, that he assumed full responsibility for the invasion.

That something was seriously wrong, and that the Nation's very survival might depend on uncovering and correcting

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weaknesses, was apparent to everyone involved. Yet from the outset the investigation was handicapped by one crucial lack: few of the invaders were available, and none of the top leaders.

'Damaging to All'

(When Gen. Taylor was called before a congressional committee in executive session, he pleaded executive privilege in refusing to disclose his findings. They would only divide the country, arouse controversy, and "be damaging to all parties concerned.")

Roberto San Roman, brother of Pepe San Roman, the Brigade commander, and four other Brigade members who had escaped capture were called before the special committee. In Washington, they met "Frank," one of the CIA agents who had trained them at the mountain base in Guatemala. Frank was "very mad" about what had happened.

"He said he had gone before the committee already and that it had been rough," said San Roman. "He told me this would be my only chance and that I should say everything—feel free to talk and to ask. And that is exactly what I did!"

The five Cubans were taken to the Pentagon, where Gen. Taylor and Robert Kennedy were leading the questioning. Behind the two was a large map with the area of operations at the Bay of Pigs.

"They wanted to know," Roberto said, "the reaction of the enemy, how soon they reacted with tanks and artillery. How much did they fire and how much did we fire? How many did we kill and how many men of ours died? The reaction of the population—and this was a question of Mr. Kennedy—he wanted to know the reaction of the people.

"They wanted to know if we thought we could have won the battle. What did we need to win the battle? I told them we needed only three or four jet planes, that's what we needed to win. Three or four jet planes that could knock out the little air force that Castro had at that time. I told them I didn't know how they could do this to us. Our troops were so good—because they involved people from every class, rich and poor, rebels, and soldiers and everybody together against the common enemy—and they didn't answer those questions."

It was Robert Kennedy, Roberto said, who asked what had been promised the Cubans in the way of American support.

"I said that we were never told by any uniformed man of the United States armed forces that we would have this battalion or this air force squadron supporting us but that during the briefing, as in the training, they let us to believe things."

Roberto spoke at length about what Frank had said to them and how "we thought if we needed air fire support, we would have it." When he first mentioned Frank, Gen. Taylor asked, "Who is this Frank?" and Allen Dulles said, "Col. Frank—."

For several hours Roberto told his story, and by the time he was finished a number of colored pins had been placed on the big map, indicating the combat lines.

The other Cubans were called in one by one, but for much briefer periods of time. When Blas Casares, a frogman who had been on the flagship Blagar, was questioned, the committee seemed particularly interested in the Cuban fleet.

"They asked me if ships had gone back any time," Blas said. "Apparently that had been worrying them. And I told them that we had started going back to resupply the people on the beach when they said they didn't have any ammunition. We did start back, of course, and in one of our messages that we sent we asked for support, for the Santiago and the Tampico (code names for American destroyers) to escort us, because if they didn't we believed we would lose all our ships. But we turned back when they (the Americans) gave us the order to turn back. They (the committee) were very interested in that.

"At the end," Casares said, "they asked me if I wanted to say anything of my own, and at that moment I felt very bitter, and I told them I didn't know who planned the invasion, but whoever planned it, I believed he was crazy. They laughed a little bit, all except Dulles. He just looked right through me. That is the only way I can describe it."

From the Cubans and from the Americans who had been on the scene, the committee quickly determined that Brigade 2506 had fought with extraordinary courage under extremely difficult conditions. Yet the very courage and determination of the men tended to obscure some more basic aspects of the invasion. The deeper the committee delved, the more apparent it became that the entire operation had been poorly planned.

Two of the most glaring miscalculations concerned Castro's air and ground forces. Castro's army was far stronger and fought more fiercely than anyone had anticipated. Consequently, the Brigade would have needed many more men—perhaps 10,000, perhaps 20,000—to accomplish its mission. Added to this was the erroneous belief that the Brigade B-26s would control the air and enable the men to operate at will on the ground.

Obvious Miscalculation

Another miscalculation was obvious: There had been no uprising, no mass defections from Castro's forces. And the CIA's alternative plan for the Brigade had not been employed.

None of the Cubans knew anything about an alternative plan. It was discovered that the plan had not been given them at their briefing in Puerto Cabezas. At the time of the investigation in May of 1961, the CIA contended that Pepe and Oliva had been told privately by Frank about the guerrilla option just before the ships left. Since Pepe and Oliva were then in prison, the committee had no way of establishing the real facts in the case. Examination did show that the CIA had shied away from any talk of guerrilla warfare or alternative action because it might weaken the resolve of the Cubans to keep fighting.

In any event, the committee's investigation led to a further

conclusion: That even if the Cubans had been given an alternative plan and even if they had been trained as guerrillas, as the CIA claimed before the invasion, the invasion site itself was totally unsuited to guerrilla warfare. It was completely unrealistic, given the terrain of the Zapata Swamps, to think the Brigade could have reached the Escambray Mountains 80 miles away. Yet, from the beginning, that guerrilla alternative and the escape valve in the Escambray had been a key element in the planning, and of great influence in the President's decision to approve the invasion.

Upon closer scrutiny, other aspects of the planning that once had seemed so plausible were seen to be faulty. An operation that had started out as a clandestine covert action had changed drastically to a full-fledged overt military campaign. This was such a basic change in concept, that if it were to succeed, the entire plan would have had to have been altered.

Launching an invasion is quite different from putting ashore some guerrillas in the middle of the night. The military plans, nevertheless, remained the same. Incredible as it seemed in retrospect, no one appeared to have recognized the implications of this change in operations.

There were other serious handicaps: messages from the fighting zone at the Bay of Pigs took too long to reach the top level at Washington, the ships provided for the invasion were inadequate, the number of planes was inadequate, the Bay of Pigs itself was inadequate.

How was it possible that such

a plan could have been approved by the leading military minds of the country? How was it possible that some of the most intelligent men in the executive department failed to spot and counsel against such obvious shortcomings? The implications were grave.

Everywhere President Kennedy turned he could find those responsible: the military had failed, his own advisers had failed and he himself had failed, after only 90 days in office.

Throughout the entire planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion there had been an air of unreality, of vagueness, of unjustified confidence. The desire to conceal the fact of United States support led to a number of compromises: the landing at night, the canceling of the second air strike on Monday, the reluctance to act decisively when disaster approached and an apparent refusal to recognize how disastrous a defeat would be—not only to the cause of Cuban freedom and democracy in the hemisphere, but to the United States and its role as the leader of the West.

The Bay of Pigs has been surrounded by so much partisan controversy that a number of assumptions have come to be accepted as fact by otherwise responsible citizens. Depending on the point of view, the failure has been attributed to leftwingers in the State Department, to the young professional amateurs in the White House, to a weak President, to the CIA or to the military.

Sometimes a more sinister explanation for the failure is given: "someone" wanted the Cubans to fail and deliberately scuttled a good plan with a good chance of success. This

assumption is equally spurious for, if anything, the Bay of Pigs was a classic tragedy of good intentions.

Where Blame Rests

No one wanted the invasion to fail but fail it did. The fault was shared by all who had a hand in it, but principally and finally the blame must rest with the Central Intelligence Agency.

The CIA, by its nature, remains in the shadows: it lends itself to the role of the villain, however frayed the cloak and however bent the dagger. Even this is not a fair generalization: the CIA has brilliant, dedicated men and women who perform thankless and dangerous jobs throughout the world that help to safeguard the United States and the free world. It is a cliché of the agency that its successes never got reported and its U-2 flights and Bay of Pigs invasions become causes célèbres.

The CIA is necessary to the survival of the United States and it will remain necessary for as long a time as can be anticipated. Acknowledging these as truths, however, does not make the CIA sacrosanct, or does it relieve the agency of its responsibilities or hide the dangers that are inherent in such an organization.

The gathering of intelligence, with all that is implied in that general term, is the lifeblood of the agency. However, in the Cuban invasion the CIA went far beyond this function. The CIA's men in the field tended to take matters into their own hands, to cross over the line from intelligence gathering to the formation of policy.

They did this in Miami when

they picked and groomed men and then dictated of the Frente. They acted for the United States—or implied that they were—when dealing with the Cubans and led them to believe much that was not true. Later there was no way for the Cubans to prove they had been promised anything. In the American terminology, they were left holding the bag.

In Guatemala, the CIA—or at least its agents—was acting at times contrary to established United States policies and even contrary to the wishes of the President. The agents came dangerously close to taking things into their own hands. When Frank told the Cuban leaders to proceed with the invasion, even if orders came from Washington to stop it, he was exhibiting, at its most extreme, the potential threat of a powerful organization with virtually unlimited funds, accountable for its actions only to a few, and operating beyond established guidelines in sensitive areas throughout the world.

Understandably, the CIA would like to bury its Cuban past and conceal its shape in the cloak of "national interests" or "national security." This writer will not soon forget traveling through the Sierra Madre Mountains in Guatemala in the summer of 1963 with one of the leaders of Brigade 2506 in search of Base Trax. High above the Helvetia plantation, in sight of the volcano, with the sound of River Nil far below, we reached a place where the road should have been. It had vanished.

Eventually, from fearful Indian peasants in those mountains and later from Cubans who were the last to leave the

camp, the story came out. Two weeks after the invasion, all of the records at the camp were placed into a freshly dug hole and a bulldozer covered the hole with earth. Soon after that, Guatemalan soldiers and laborers came. They broke up the camp and carried away every vestige—including the cement foundations for the barracks. Then the road itself was bulldozed and covered. Now the jungle has taken over and all that one might find to link that territory with the Bay of Pigs is a stray shell or perhaps a rusting can.

Despite attempts to cover the facts, the Bay of Pigs remains an ominous page in our history.

It was more than a mock-heroic tragedy, a footnote to history. It was perhaps the most heavily publicized of the many bungled, poorly planned operations since the Light Brigade charged into oblivion at Balaklava.

It seems clear now that the disaster in the Zapata Swamps led almost inevitably to the confrontation with Russia. From a period of seeming indecision, inexperience, weakness and defeat, the United States, in October of 1962, drew an essential lesson.

It is seven years since another small band of freedom fighters was crushed and the light went out in Hungary. Today, in their moments of despair and bitterness, the Cuban exiles often refer to what their future holds, but they are determined they are not going to live a lifetime in exile, in the manner of the White Russians and the Hungarians. Each is waiting to return to Cuba.

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 Belmont ✓
 Mohr ✓
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The Bay of Pigs--

Chapter 14: A Bittersweet

Reunion Party

The bargaining with Fidel Castro for the lives of the more than 1,000 men of Brigade 2506 held in Cuba prisons was bogging down. On the advice of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Enrique Ruiz-Williams contacted James B. Donovan, New York lawyer. Mr. Donovan agreed to help. Under his impetus, and with major co-operation of the United States Government, negotiations moved forward. On Sunday, December 23, the initial shipment of ransom drugs was accepted by Castro and, as the sun was setting, the first plane carrying 108 of the haggard survivors of Brigade 2506 landed at Homestead Air Force Base, Fla.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artimo, José Pérez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.)

On a Saturday morning at the end of November, 1962, an operation was launched without precedent in American history—an operation in which the United States Government threw its power and its prestige into raising millions of dollars to ransom 1,100 prisoners from a foreign nation.

The negotiations with Fidel Castro, begun in April, had been dormant since the October missile crisis. James B. Donovan, the man who had arranged the exchange of Soviet spy Rudolph Abel for U-2 pilot Gary Powers, had continued to explore the possibility of obtaining contributions of more than \$50 million worth of drugs, chemicals and baby food demanded by Castro.

But little progress had been made. According to reports from Cuba, many of the prisoners, after 19 months in dungeons, were near death. It was at this point that Attorney General Kennedy, with the full knowledge and backing of the President, began using his powers to accelerate the pace of the negotiations.

Mr. Kennedy on November 30 had lunch with Louis E. Oberdorfer, the assistant attorney general in charge of the Justice Department tax division. The Attorney General stressed the importance the administration attached to the prisoner exchange. The goal was to liberate the prisoners by Christmas. "Lean on it," Mr. Kennedy said. Oberdorfer, quiet, tough-minded and efficient, worked full time thereafter to co-ordinate all activities.

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For the first time, it was suggested that drug manufacturers could make direct contributions in goods with assurance that these contributions would be considered as tax-deductible gifts. The drug companies would have to work together and they wanted assurance that they would not be subsequently accused of anti-trust action. Nor should they be required to disclose their cost and markup data, they noted, in order to secure tax deductions.

The entire board of directors of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association would meet in New York December 11. That date immediately became a target for the formulation and presentation of the final plan to the manufacturers. Internal revenue and Justice Department officials worked intensively on their tax and antitrust rulings.

It became apparent that the Cuban Families Committee did not have an administrative organization to carry through such a large endeavor. John Wilson, executive vice-president of the American Red Cross, agreed to co-ordinate the transportation of the goods to Miami and then to Cuba. The Red Cross was, in effect, pledging to stand behind a payment on \$53 millions.

On December 7, Robert Kennedy met with the top officials of the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association. He told them that the prisoners, in their attempt to liberate their country, had been assisted by United States personnel and supplies; that the plans had been initiated in the Eisenhower administration and continued in the present one; that the Kennedy administration felt a moral obligation to assist the men.

On December 11, the board of directors of the Pharmaceutical Association were presented with a ruling by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue permitting them to deduct contributions of merchandise at a value measured by the lowest wholesale catalog price at which the products were customarily sold. They also were guaranteed that no antitrust action would be taken.

The list of drugs requested by Castro, now 237 pages long, typed and single-spaced, was submitted. It contained 10,000 items, specified by brand name and manufacturer. Only co-ordinated action of the entire drug industry could meet these requirements.

If it was avoided. Because of the newspaper strike, then under way in New York, secrecy could be preserved. Less than nine days later, the 40 manufacturers represented at the meeting had put together a \$12 million drug shipment.

Because of the high markup for drugs, it was possible for some manufacturers to realize a "windfall"; the tax benefit realized by a corporate contributor (amounting to 52 per cent of the wholesale price) might exceed the actual cost of

the product. The government suggested that such profits be contributed to charity. The decision, of course, was left to the individual companies.

As problems arose, the government and the lawyers solved them. In two hours the Civil Aeronautics Board handed down a ruling permitting airlines to donate their planes to haul prisoners and freight. The railroads and the truckers received a similar ruling from the Interstate Commerce Commission. Immigration and Naturalization officials conferred with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the CIA and the Air Force to coordinate the reception and processing of the prisoners. The Commerce Department issued export licenses for the shipment of merchandise.

The Last Hurdle

The last hurdle before the negotiations could resume was to meet Castro's demand for an "irrevocable" letter of credit to guarantee all the shipments. Fidel wanted cash backing so that if any part of the deal fell through, the remainder of the ransom would be paid in dollars.

The Royal Bank of Canada insisted on formal guarantees from American banks. Three things were needed: A commitment of \$53 million from an American bank or banks to the Canadian bank on the application of the Red Cross; a commitment from the Red Cross to be bound by such a letter of credit; and a surety bond from an accepted insurance company, which would guarantee to the American banks that the Red Cross would meet its obligations.

By Monday, two \$26.5 million letters of credit had been obtained from the Bank of America and the Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. of New York. Bonds were issued on behalf of the

Red Cross by Continental Insurance Company, thus securing the deal. Mr. Donovan was attorney for Continental.

The supplies were piling up at various locations but no action had been taken to move them to Florida. On December 16, Mr. Oberdorfer gave the order for the first shipment of drugs to be transported to Florida and loaded at Ft. Everglades on the S. S. African Pilot, a freighter made available by the Committee of American Steamship Lines.

All that remained was Castro's acceptance of terms. On December 18, Mr. Donovan flew to Havana. Castro was suspicious about the value and size of the first shipment, containing 20 per cent of the ransom.

Mr. Donovan suggested that Castro send his own inspectors to examine what was being loaded on the African Pilot. He called Washington and permission was given for the Cuban technicians to enter the United States and inspect the goods. Their trip, however, was not to be made public.

Pivotal Day

Friday, December 21, was the pivotal day. Just before noon, the vital letter of credit from the Royal Bank of Canada was issued formally and delivered to the Cuban purchasing agent in Havana. It was immediately confirmed by Castro's government.

Mr. Donovan reported to Washington that he and Castro had signed the memorandum of agreement. He felt it vital to give some added proof of America's good faith. The down payment was "sweetened" by about \$500,000 worth of prime goods.

That night, Enrique Ruiz-Williams received a call in Miami from the Attorney General.

"You got it, Enrique," Mr. Kennedy told him. "This is it. The guy with the beard has accepted. Now what you've got to do is move fast."

In Cuba, Castro, bringing a bottle of Scotch, staged an impromptu celebration with Mr. Donovan and others. It was a moment of good will and they talked at length about communism, democracy and Catholicism.

In Miami at the Opa-Locka Airport where the goods were pouring in, one incident that day exemplified the determination of those behind the operation. Mr. Oberdorfer wanted some supplies of a better quality loaded on an Air Force plane for the first shipment. The plane would have to be unloaded and packed again. The Air Force colonel in charge objected, saying he had neither the manpower nor the time.

Mr. Oberdorfer, quietly but firmly, said, "Colonel, do you want to order these men to load that plane, or do you want the Secretary of the Air Force to order it?"

Donovan's Humor

Sunday morning, December 23, the prisoners in Principe Castle and on the Isle of Pines were taken from their cells, shaved and given haircuts, shoes and fresh uniforms. They still feared another cruel hoax.

They were transported to the technicians and Red Cross and San Antonio de los Baños air- Immigration officials. It was field in Havana province. The dark by the time the plane stopped and the engines were airport was alive with activity. cut off. Spotlights played about Castro militiamen were every- the field. One by one the men where, all carrying loaded came out.

weapons.

No matter how strained the situation, Mr. Donovan's sense of humor never left him. Perhaps that was the quality that Castro admired most—or, at least, Castro certainly appreciated it. Once that afternoon while Castro, Mr. Donovan and a large group were standing together on the air strip, four MIG jets unexpectedly roared low over the field, making a deafening sound. Instinctively, everyone ducked. One of the Cubans shouted, "What is it?" and Mr. Donovan, still in a crouch, instantly replied, "It's the invasion." Fidel laughed uproariously.

At 2 o'clock, the African Pilot from Miami docked and a tense waiting period began. At 5 p.m. Mr. Donovan gave the signal for the ship to be unloaded. Castro had been waiting for the other to make the first move. The prisoners were permitted to begin boarding the first plane. It took off with 108 men.

At exactly 6:06 p.m., as the brilliant winter sun was setting, the first plane landed at Homestead Air Force Base and taxied slowly toward a ramp while fire trucks and ambulances followed. A Cuban woman clutched at her throat, screamed, "Moy God, they're really here," and fainted. An Air Force lieutenant colonel announced that the second plane was already on its way. A cheer went up from the large crowd of newsmen and television

By 8:55 p.m., the fourth flight had landed at Homestead, bringing the number of prisoners liberated to 426. Then it was announced that no more planes would arrive that night.

Castro brought up the old debt. He said he still had not received the \$2,925,000 that the Cuban Families Committee had pledged to pay in April when the 60 wounded prisoners came out. It was a cash debt and the committee was clearly obliged to pay it.

So far, no cash payments had been made to Castro and there was hope that Mr. Donovan might be able to perform another miracle and persuade Castro to accept more goods in place of dollars. But Castro insisted that money had to be raised—and raised immediately. He was specific—no cash, no more prisoners.

John E. Nolan, Jr., (an attorney recruited for volunteer services in the ransom drive), flew from Havana to Miami that night and at 5 a.m. called the Attorney General.

The money had to be raised by 3 p.m. December 24 or the deal was off. Bob Kennedy took over. With one phone call to Cardinal Cushing in Boston, Mr. Kennedy raised a million dollars. The Cardinal, one of the sponsors of the Families Committee, long before had promised that when the time came he would do as much as anyone for the prisoners. Bob Kennedy

then called General Lucius Clay, also a sponsor.

Castro permitted two more planes to leave Havana in the morning, bringing the number of men liberated to 643.

Hours passed and the 3 p.m. deadline approached. The problem of raising such a sum was formidable enough, but, to make things even more difficult, the banks closed at noon the day before Christmas.

Gen. Clay borrowed money against future pledges and signed a note on his own signature. The note was deposited in the Royal Bank of Canada just before noon, but it took several more hours to obtain the necessary documents from banks in New York, Washington and Montreal. At almost 3 o'clock the Royal Bank notified Havana that the \$2.9 million could be released on written authorization from Mr. Donovan. Castro, Mr. Donovan and Mr. Nolan met in the Canadian Consul's office where the final document was signed.

At the airport the last three planes received the signal to leave and the leaders of the Brigade were put on board.

The last plane landed at Miami at 9:35 p.m. Christmas Eve. Pepe San Roman, the young Brigade commander, was asked to leave first so that members of the Brigade could salute him. Erneido Oliva, second in command, and Manuel Artime, civilian commander of the invasion, followed.

In the Dinner Key auditorium, their families awaited them, together with escaped members of the Brigade and other left behind in Guatemala.

"I saw my mother and then

my wife," said San Roman, "and I ran to them but the crowd wouldn't let me get to them. The same thing happened to Erneido and Manolo. Finally I got to them and I almost killed my mother and my wife and my kids with the embraces I gave them. It was a very great moment because I never thought I would see them again. And then they came and took us, Erneido and Manolo and myself, to the microphones, and Manolo spoke for us and I don't remember what he said because I was just crazy with happiness. And when he finished we were taken on the shoulders of our men and they walked around with us until I had a chance to get down and I went back to my family."

Two days after Christmas, the leaders drove to Palm Beach where President Kennedy had invited them. He told them he was sorry for what had happened at the Bay of Pigs. He asked if they really had expected jet air support.

San Roman said they had not been told at the briefings that they would have jets but because of the way things were handled and the obvious backing of the United States, "naturally we expected it because we had been told the sky would be ours and we knew the B-26s were not enough." The President looked serious. "It was very easy to see," Oliva said, "that he felt responsible for what had happened to us and for our long time in prison."

On Saturday, December 29, the President inspected the Brigade in the Orange Bowl in Miami. He was presented with the Brigade flag which had

flown over the command post during the three days that the Bay of Pigs battle was waged.

There never had been a ceremony quite like it. A deafening roar went up from the thousands in the stadium when the white convertible carrying the President and his wife, Jacqueline, entered the Orange Bowl. A thousand flags many of them homemade, waved in the warm Miami sunshine.

"We know how precious liberty is and we know that Cuba has no liberty," San Roman told the great crowd. "The 2506 Brigade, we offer ourselves to God and to the free world as warriors in the battle against communism."

He turned to the President. "Mr. President, the men of the 2506 Brigade give you their banner—we temporarily deposit it with you for your safekeeping."

"I can assure you," said the President, in return, his voice rising emotionally, "that this flag will be returned to this Brigade in a free Havana."

The Brigade rose and cheered wildly. Shouts of "Guerra! Guerra!" and "Libertad! Libertad!" came from 40,000 throats. Some men wept.

"I can assure you," the President continued, "that it is the strongest wish of the people of this country, as well as the people of this hemisphere, that Cuba shall one day be free again and when it is, this Bri-

gade will deserve to march at the head of the free column."

Jacqueline Kennedy stopped to the microphone and, in Spanish, said:

"It is an honor for me to be today with a group of the bravest men in the world. I feel proud that my son has met the officers . . . It is my wish and my hope that some day he may be a man at least half as brave as the members of Brigade 2506. Good luck."

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The Bay of Pigs--

Chapter 13: Bargaining

for Life Begins

The burden of responsibility for the 1,179 Cubans captured by Fidel Castro at the Bay of Pigs hung around the neck of the United States put there by a series of miscalculations in organizing and training the liberation army. Here, in today's installment, is a step-by-step account of how the administration reacted to Castro's demands for a \$62 million ransom.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artine, José Pérez San Roman, Erneldo Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

James Britt Donovan had been involved in mysterious affairs since youth. He became a public figure in 1957 when appointed by a New York court to defend Rudolph Abel, indicted as chief of Soviet espionage in the United States.

Later, in 1962, he was the man chosen by the United States government to negotiate the exchange in West Berlin between Abel and U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers.

Fresh out of Harvard law school in the early 40s, he had worked under Dr. Vannevar Bush with the United States Office of Scientific Research and Development, the agency that developed the atom bomb and

radar. After being commissioned in the Navy, he served through World War II as general counsel of the Office of Strategic Services, which preceded the Central Intelligence Agency. He assisted in the prosecution at the Nuremberg war crimes trials. Later, he became an eminently successful insurance lawyer representing a string of important and profitable clients.

Tough, Gregarious

Obviously, Jim Donovan's credentials suited him for the mission the Cuban families committed asked him to undertake—the raising of \$62 million in ransom to free 1,179 members of the Cuban brigade who were captured at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961.

Donovan's most important asset was his versatility. He could be gregarious, relaxed and disarming in his conversation. He could also be tough and blunt and discuss realities of politics, domestic and international, with the coldest clarity. Donovan, in short, was a

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Three men who were vital to the liberation effort: (left to right), Attorney General Robert Kennedy, Enrique Ruiz-Williams and James B. Donovan.

complex, shrewd, ambitious and fascinating person—and so was the man he had to deal with, Fidel Castro.

The committee had an impressive sponsorship — prominent men and women representing the arts, industry, education, labor and religion and its efforts had reaped wide publicity. But the ransom goal remained distant.

Fidel Castro had startled everyone with a sudden offer to prove his good faith: he would release 60 of the most seriously wounded prisoners and let them go back to the United States; when the committee had collected the ransom for these wounded men (\$2,925,000), it should deposit the money in the Royal Bank of Canada.

On April 14, 1962, exactly one year after the Cubans had sailed from Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, to begin the invasion, Castro kept his pledge. The wounded were flown to

Miami International airport to be greeted by 20,000 singing the Cuban national anthem. The scene was witnessed by millions of Americans watching on television.

Since that time, in the charge of Enrique Ruiz-Williams, who had received 70 shrapnel wounds in the engagement, they had appeared at more than one hundred luncheons; had held conferences in a number of cities; had met with governors, politicians and well-known public figures; had appeared on radio and television and been the subject of articles in the daily press and national magazines.

Donovan Selected

But not enough money had been collected to ransom even one of the 60 wounded prisoners, to say nothing of the men in Cuban prisons.

On June 19, Williams had told

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy of the difficulties. He said the committee needed a prominent American citizen to serve as chairman. But no one wanted the job.

"Enrique," Kennedy said, "you don't need a chairman. You can get a chairman under any rock in the trail. What you need is a man who knows how to deal with Castro. You need someone who can represent you. I think I know a lawyer who might help."

"Who is he?" Enrique asked. "Donovan."

Williams flew to New York and reported to committee members. Donovan gave them an immediate interview. They found him a stocky man of medium height, with white hair, pale blue eyes, a ruddy complexion and an extraordinarily prominent forehead.

After two hours of discussion, Donovan agreed to represent the committee without fee. He

said he would have to study Castro's personality intensively.

President Kennedy indorsed the committee's efforts at a press conference. A lengthy memorandum went to Mrs. Berta Barreto (mother of one of the prisoners), the committee's liaison in Havana, for transmission to Castro. Its key item was a five-page letter from Donovan to Mrs. Barreto, intended for Castro's eyes.

"It is my personal opinion," Donovan wrote, "that in his heart Fidel Castro is proud of his fellow-Cubans now imprisoned for their participation in the invasion of April 17, 1961. Fidel is a Cuban before he is a Marxist and he must have pride that fellow Cubans—however misguided or misled he may believe them to be—would risk their lives for what they thought to be in the best interests of Cuba. If reasonable conditions can be brought about, in the interests of the Cuban people, I believe he will carry out his pledge with respect to these fellow-Cubans and demonstrate not only to Latin America but to the world that he wishes to be regarded as the compassionate leader of all the Cuban people. It is in this belief that I have agreed to assist your cause toward a prompt accomplishment of its objectives."

Meeting With Castro

The next move was up to Castro. There was the question of whether Donovan had judged Fidel's personality correctly.

On August 30, Donovan boarded a plane for Havana. The next afternoon, he had his first interview with Castro.

Donovan, who does not speak Spanish, had asked Alvaro Sanchez to be his translator. He had instructed Sanchez to translate literally every word that was said, neither adding nor deleting nor interpreting. From the beginning Donovan was the sole negotiator with Castro. The members of the Families Committee, all of whom had relatives in prison, had asked him to make the decisions for them, fearing that their emotions might influence their judgment.

In addition to this responsibility, Donovan began the negotiations under a singular handicap: he was not a posi-

tion to offer cash. The Cuban tribunal had imposed a ransom sentence of \$62 million in cash, and Castro had made it clear to the Families Committee earlier that he intended to get just that: he wanted Yankee dollars. For practical and political reasons, however, the Kennedy administration would have no part of a deal in which cash was paid to Castro. (There is even some indication that the CIA had pledged to certain Senators that no American dollars would be sent to Castro.) Even if the administration had approved the ransom in cash, it is mostly unlikely that such a sum could have been raised—either through public or private subscription. Donovan had to get Castro to agree to accept the ransom in some other form.

List Approved

At the outset, Donovan conceded that the transaction would be an indemnification—something that previous American negotiators had refused to admit. He won from Castro a promise to consider payment of the indemnification in food products and medicines. It was not victory but it was a great step forward.

The next day, at another meeting, Castro was cordial, ordering coffee and lemonade, and talking expansively of education and real estate; he and Donovan exchanged pleasantries and seemed to enjoy each other's company. Then Castro got down to business. His government, he said, had approved the basic proposals of the day before, including acceptance of food products and medicines as ransom. Using the world market as a basis for prices, the Minister of Health and Welfare and the Minister of Commerce would prepare a list of products most necessary to the Cuban people and submit it to Donovan.

The list which Donovan received, after returning to the United States, mentioned products in seven different categories. A list of medical products was to follow. From 30 to 68 ships would be required to transport the food alone, too many for the American Government or public to accept in view of the rapidly deteriorating Cuban-American situation.

On October 3, Donovan flew back to Havana and reported that it was impossible to transport the food products by sea. However, two major private pharmaceutical corporations had agreed to donate large quantities of medical products. He had also established two letters of credit with the Royal Bank of Canada, one covering the debt of the 60 wounded prisoners, and another guaranteeing delivery of drugs and medicines in sufficient quantity to cover the ransom.

By this time Donovan and Castro had established both a working and social rapport. Fidel seemed to respond when Donovan would tell wry jokes or say, with a smile, "You know, Fidel, when I get out of here and you talk about me, please attack me very hard because with a few friends like you I don't need any enemies."

Castro indicated that drugs and medicine would be acceptable in place of food but he wanted the products at wholesale prices, thereby increasing the quantity for the same amount of money.

On October 10, however, Donovan found a changed and hostile atmosphere. No longer cordial and accommodating, Castro had a new list of products. Donovan turned, said, "That's it!" and walked out. The negotiations were broken. His second trip to Havana had lasted eight days.

Missile Crisis Brakes

On October 19, the new list of drugs and medicines was presented. Donovan, back in New York scanned it quickly and said, "Impossible! They want to break the negotiations." The new list quoted drug prices from Japan and Italy which were far lower than those of United States firms.

On October 22, 1962, national attention was focused on another matter. President Kennedy told the Nation that Russian missiles had been planted in Cuba. Russia and the United States, the two great nuclear powers, seemed on the verge of world conflict.

Donovan, asked to comment on the President's speech, knew that Castro would read what he said and that he ran the risk of destroying his mission. But he declared:

"In my opinion, if the President firmly adheres to the position set forth in his speech, the missiles will be removed, the Russians will leave, and not a shot will be fired."

That it did not destroy the mission is a matter of history.

Perhaps the most astonishing aspect of the Cuban crisis is that the negotiations for the Bay of Pigs prisoners remained open during all those searing hours.

By the end of November, tensions had eased. Alvaro Sanchez of the Cuban Families Committee told Attorney General Kennedy: "Now is the time to free these men. Bring them home to their families by Christmas. If there is any more delay, it will be too late."

To Isle of Pines

Sanchez meant that many of the prisoners soon would die.

In May, six months earlier, 211 prisoners, those with \$100,000 fines on their heads, had been taken from the Principe Castle prison in Havana, and flown to the Isle of Pines.

The Isle of Pines lies fifty miles from the Cuban mainland, directly in the path of the hurricanes that boil up in the Lesser Antilles to the southwest and whirl their way northeast. The island itself measures about 1,200 square miles. Its sandy soil is unsuited for agriculture, and a large swamp covers a third of the island. By location and by terrain, the Isle of Pines is not fit for human habitation, but for Castro's purpose it serves well. Overlooking the water, next to a marble quarry, stands the Modelo prison. There, all political prisoners and other enemies of the people are imprisoned.

The life in this prison was an endless hell of starvation and degradation. The men knew they were slowly dying; they could see it in each other's emaciated faces and feel it as their strength ebbed away. When they fainted from hunger, medical attendants gave them intravenous glucose injections and kept them just at the point of death.

Treatment of the 900 men who remained at the Principe castle became more harsh. Their daily food consisted of coffee and bread in the morning, macaroni and soup for lunch and noodle soup at dinner.

"If you are going to rescue these men," Sanchez told Kennedy, "this is the time, because if you wait you will be liberating corpses."

Tomorrow: A Bittersweet He-
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
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as it was toward reaching
publican voters in general.
The result: The Senator's
arrances each day have
limited, and a heavy pro-
on of them have been be-
audiences composed of his
workers. A second result:
campaign will not cost as
n.

spite the published polls,
for Goldwater aides believe
primary is still in doubt and
be decided by the unde-
p voters consistently turned
in the private polls they
conducted.

th the undecided in mind—
with the hope that Gov.
efeller's massive exposure
t will backfire against him
Goldwater camp decided
ld its final campaign step-
o a minimum. Except for
o the election eve press
erence and several televi-
showings—at a cost of \$5-
of a new 15-minute cam-
film narrated by actor
uld Reagan, the Goldwater
s of a few weeks ago have
ained intact.

e main elements:

committee was formed to raise
money to specifically meet the
expenses of that media. Eleven
Los Angeles radio stations, for
example, are carrying 265 min-
ute and half-minute Goldwater
spots in the five-days preceding
the election.

An hour television program
will be made at tomorrow
night's Orange County Gold-
water rally and telecast, be-
ginning Sunday, over 11 televi-
sion stations around the State.
Sponsored by the Orange Coun-
ty Goldwater organization, bills
for the show's distribution—
which reportedly will total \$10-
000—are being sent to the
American Forum, Inc., a Los
Angeles conservative organiza-
tion that is producing the pro-
gram.

On election eve, there will be
a State-wide six-city half-hour
telecast made up of edited film
clips taken during the Gold-
water California campaign. The
cost: \$12,000 to \$15,000.

The Goldwater organization
has also gone in heavily for
billboards. The program cost
\$110,000.

Nam and Cambodia, as we
discuss the immediate problems
arising out of the Communist
offensives.

Expanded military action by
the United States is another of
the possible courses to be con-
sidered.

Secretary of State Rusk said
in a speech a week ago that, if
Communist aggression con-
tinued, the result could be "to
expand the war."

Review of Entire Area

Mr. Johnson announced the
Honolulu meeting yesterday,
saying the purpose of the
cabinet-level talks would be "to
review the situation in the entire
area" of Southeast Asia.

Officials said the talks would
be secret, and that recommend-
ations would be reported only
to the President.

Secretary Rusk, after attend-
ing Prime Minister Nehru's
funeral in India, is scheduled to
visit Bangkok, Thailand, and
Saigon, South Viet Nam, this
week end on his way to Hono-
lulu. Others who will participate
in the conference will be Am-

though not as well as you are.
You're heavier than you were in
La Sierra."

He asked Artime what he was
expecting and Artime told him,
"Death." Castro drew out the
conversation by praising the
revolution and saying "revolu-
tion did not do things, at way.

Trial Brings Unity

On the fourth and last day of
the trial, Santiago Cubas, the
prosecutor, in a 40-minute

one and a half hour
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18 months. They w
brigade were confi
Nine hundred
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Work on the fort was
city of Havana and
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stands on the western
The Castillo del
(With Manuel Artime, Jose
Roman, Enrique Olive, and
Ruiz-Williams)

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THE EVENING STAR
Washington, D. C., Friday, May 29, 1964

Bay of Pigs--Chapter 12: The Dungeons

The survivors of the Bay of Pigs invasion now begin their long ordeal in dark, dungeons in Castro's Castillo Del Principe prison and are finally tried in the largest mass trial in Cuba's history. Strangely, the trial turns into a "victory" for the brigade and brings a new spirit of unity among the prisoners.

By HAYNES JOHNSON
(With Manuel Artime, Jose Pura San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

The Castillo del principe stands on the western edge of the Principe plateau on the highest point overlooking the city of Havana and its harbor. Work on the fort was completed in 1794. It remains a Spanish fortification of the 18th century and for generations prisoners have been housed there.

Nine hundred men of the brigade were confined there for 18 months. They were placed in the depths of the prison, in dark and musty dungeons, four of them holding 100 men each. The floors and walls were black stone and water dripped from the ceiling. High up on the walls were small windows with guards.

From May 13 to July 17, the prisoners had been kept in the naval hospital, a five-story building in Havana, where the sleep, 20 to a room, on mattresses on the floor, and were given soap and toilet articles. On May 18, Castro told the leaders of his proposal to exchange them for 500 bulldozer tractors costing \$23 million. Their spirits rose but the efforts of the "traitors" for freedom committed in the United States, led by Milton Eisenhower, Walter Reuther and the late Eleanor Roosevelt broke down late in June.

Reunited With Men

Manuel Artime, Pepe San Roman and Ernesto Oliva, the three leaders, were first placed in the worst cells in the prison. The cells were dark and filled with rats and cockroaches. The toilet was an uncovered hole in the middle of the floor. Later, they were reunited with their men in one of the large dungeons.

Artime's interrogation had been by far the most difficult and barbarous of any man in the brigade. He was the only one in the invasion who had dealt directly with the Americans in the United States. His captors wanted to know who those Americans were and what they had said.

During the interrogation, which may have been as long as three days, he was not permitted to sleep. Twice his captors said they were going to shoot him. The muzzle of a pistol was placed in his mouth and the trigger pulled; the hammer fell on an empty chamber.

When he passed out, he was brought back to consciousness by ice water or with lighted cigarettes. He carries scars with him today.

But when he was reunited with his men, many felt a great resentment toward Pepe. They believed that he had left them to fight on alone. As the truth gradually was learned, it be-



Capt. Pedro Luis Rodriguez of Castro's forces testifies against the brigade at the biggest mass trial in Cuba's history.

came apparent that San Roman was a brave officer and a good soldier.

Ten prisoners had been paroled by Castro and permitted to go to the United States in the futile attempt to negotiate the tractor deal. On July 31, eight returned to Cuba. Two refused to go back.

Hopes Fade

On the 17th of each month, the entire brigade stood at attention for a minute of silence in memory of the invasion and those who had died. They knew that a "Cuban families committee" had been organized in the United States to ransom the prisoners. They kept their hopes up by dreaming of going home for Christmas. But Christmas passed and the New Year began bleakly in Havana.

The food in prison became worse and the treatment more severe. Twenty-two of the "most dangerous" prisoners were isolated. On March 22, a Cuban government radio broadcast broke the news to the world. Time had run out for an exchange of the prisoners for tractors and the "mercenaries" would be tried as war criminals.

In the week before the trial, the brigade drew together into almost perfect unity. The most remarkable thing about their attitude was their decision not to speak against the United States, no matter how grave the consequences, and in spite of everything that had happened to them. One soldier explained it this way:

"The only ally that we have in fighting communism is the United States. And how are we going to go against the only ally we have?"

It was the largest mass trial in Cuba's turbulent history. In size, it recalled Stalin's purge trials of the early 1930s. But there the resemblance ended.

On Thursday morning, March 29, 1962, the men left their cells and walked to the courtyard in the center of the prison as if they were going to a party. There were jokes and laughter and shouts of vivas to comrades from other galleries whom they

had not seen in months. When Artime, San Roman and Oliva were brought in, the men stood at attention without command and sang the national hymn. Oliva stepped to a microphone and said, "If we are going to die, we are going to die with dignity. When they shoot us, we will sing the national hymn. This is not the time."

Pepe Sets Example

From the bench where the five-man tribunal sat in the shade facing the prisoners, Augusto Martinez Sanchez, the president of the tribunal, called out: "Jose Perez San Roman. Do you have something to declare?"

Pepe came to attention, walked briskly from his bench to a position directly in front of Sanchez, halted, with exaggerated clicking of heels and held loudly, "Me abstengo." (I refuse to answer.)

Other leaders followed San Roman's example. Silence followed when the brigade was asked if anyone wanted to speak. Finally, in one of the last rows, a tall Negro named Luiz Gonzales Lalony raised his hand.

"What have you to say?" asked Sanchez.

"I want to go to the bathroom," the prisoner replied. The brigade broke into laughter. The tension was broken.

Instead of the mass declarations accusing the United States that the Communists had hoped for, the trial was taking an unplanned and unwanted turn.

It was not the propaganda show they expected. Around the top of the prison, cables and television cameras had been stationed, ready to show Cuba and the world how the worms (Castro's favorite word for the invaders) reacted. But from the first moment when the fighting developed, the trial was not shown on television or broadcast on radio, and no Western newsmen were ever permitted inside the fortress.

As witnesses recited the crimes of the accused men, they sal all day in the sun without food or water. Photographers waited to take pic-

tures when a man dropped his head or looked dejected. It became something of a game among the men to see if they could keep holding their heads up in the direct rays of the sun.

'Confessions' Read

A brief statement over Havana radio, on the night following the first day of the Secret trial, merely said that the 1,180 prisoners had "confessed" their crime of "treacherous attack" against the Cuban people at the "direct instigation of the imperialistic government of the United States." No details were given the press.

Artime and the other leaders had been kept awake all night and urged to sign statements attacking the United States. On the second day of the trial, Artime was confronted with the statement and stood listening while it was read. He was asked to acknowledge it as his own.

"This is a complete lie," Artime answered. "From the ranks of the brigade came catcalls and laughter."

Several brigade members who had earlier given long statements accusing the United States during the first days of captivity were called to stand as those statements were read. All but two men denied their statements. Out of the entire brigade only two men made statements.

(In Bayfront park in Miami, more than 1,000 women knelt at night in a vigil for the prisoners.)

On the third day of the trial, the government summoned Maj. Jose Fernandez, a Castro officer, who gave a lengthy account of the battle at Girón. It was Fernandez who publicly stated for the first time that American destroyers had been spotted coming toward the beach Wednesday.

At the end of the fighting, he said the ships approached to within three or four miles of the shore, picked up survivors in small boats and left at high speed.

In everything that was said, there was a blend of fact and fiction; but the principal purposes of all the testimony seemed to be to demoralize the brigade by depicting it as cowardly and to place the blame for the invasion on the United States.

Trial Brings Unity

On the fourth and last day of the trial, Santiago Cubas, the prosecutor, in a 40-minute

summation termed the leaders traitors and the rest of the brigade "pawns," rich men and cowards. He asked for "the most severe punishment our laws permit"—from death and life imprisonment to 20 years in jail.

The final mockery in the trial came next. Antonio Cejas, the "defense" counsel, spoke for 90 minutes. He called his "clients" mercenaries and traitors and cowards, quoted from Fidel's speeches, and admitted that it was difficult for him to fulfill his duties as defense counsel because he was a revolutionary and the "participation of the defendants in the events they have been accused of has been proven amply." He asked the tribunal to render "a just and generous sentence."

Strangely many men experienced first a sense of release, and then a state of exultation, over the trial. "We did something there that was never done in the history of the world," one soldier said. Another, a man who had lost his arm, said, "The trial brought a very great spirit of unity. Nobody can feel what spirit we had unless he was there. When you are in prison with one foot in the grave, you know that it cannot be worse. But the ideals make you feel strong enough to defeat anything."

No matter what happened next, they had defeated their enemies in the trial, and that gave them all a sense of pride. As Pepe said, "A spirit has been born. We felt very happy for destroying the show that Castro had prepared. We beat them on the trial and they were mad."

Some time after midnight, Sunday morning, April 8, Castro paid a visit to San Roman and Artime in their cells. To the first, Castro was violent and profane. Tugging at his beard, he shouted:

"San Roman, what kind of guy are you? I don't understand you. I don't understand what kind of people you are."

Then he became conciliatory and said he recognized that many men in the brigade were valiant. But he became incensed again until he finally shouted: "San Roman, you don't deserve to live!"

"Major," Pepe said, "that is the only thing that we agree about. I don't want to live any more. I have been played with by the United States and now you are playing with me here. I am tired of being played with, kill me, but don't play with me any more."

Castro turned and walked away without saying another word and without telling the Pepe why he had come.

Learns Castro's Aim

Artime was the first to learn Castro's real purpose.

Fidel went directly to Artime's cell.

"I thought he was coming to see me before they killed me," Artime said, "just to make a fool of me, because I knew he had done that before to other people. He came with about 20 people around him and looked at me very deeply. Then he said, 'How are you, Artime?'"

"I told him, 'Very well, though not as well as you are. You're heavier than you were in La Sierra.'"

He asked Artime what he was expecting, and Artime told him, "Death." Castro drew out the conversation by praising the revolution and saying the brigade should know better the way it did not do things.

The Bay of Pigs-Chapter

With Defeat Came Deep Despair

The brutal battle of the Bay of Pigs was over at last. The 1,500 Cuban patriots who attacked Fidel Castro's tight little island in April, 1961, were beaten and demoralized. Here is their account of what happened after they scattered in desperate retreat from the beaches.

By HAYNES JOHNSON.

(With Manuel Artimis, Jose Perez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

In small groups they crawled through the swamps, afraid to stop, almost too tired to go on, numb and bitter from defeat. For three days they had fought without rest and with little food or water. They tried to get through to the mountains, to a town, or finally to firm ground. A very few made it.

Time itself became a haze and the hours of daylight and darkness blurred into one. The more religious prayed constantly. Some said their prayers were answered. Others tried and gave up in despair. For the lucky ones, water was found under a smooth white stone or in a small pond. The maddening thirst and gnawing hunger drove the rest to desperation—to drinking urine, to eating insects from under the bark of trees, to chasing lizards and snakes and eating them raw and drinking the blood.

Constantly overhead was the whirring sound of Castro's helicopters and the monotonous and continual burst of his machine guns firing aimlessly into the woods, everywhere and anywhere. Artillery shells raked the area and the few roads through the swamps were swarming with patrols. Castro's men made no effort to go after the Brigade. The Brigade had to come to them.

Each man was certain he would be shot if captured. But as the days passed, even that fear was changed until many didn't care what happened.

Objects of Scorn

Giron was a scene of confusion: long lines of soldiers, jeeps and trucks and buses; nurses and officers; newspapermen, television cameramen and photographers; and Chinese, Czechs and Russians in civilian clothes—all moving about with a sense of importance. The center of attention, the objects of scorn and shouts, were the prisoners. Dirty, disheveled, gaunt, unshaven, most wearing only the T-shirts and pants their captors had left them, they came into the town in long lines, bound together, poked by bayonets. They were silent and grim.

Enrique Ruiz-Williams, second in command of the armored battalion, carrying 70 shrapnel wounds, was one of the first to be captured. In the house near the sea where he and other wounded lay, they were suddenly confronted by the person of Fidel Castro. Williams recognized him at once. He groped under his thin mattress and tried to reach a .45 pistol he had concealed there earlier in the afternoon. Williams does not know whether he really drew the gun and pulled the trigger and the pistol did not go off, or whether he simply made the gesture and failed to get the weapon. Those lying there with him are certain only that he made such a gesture. All agree, however, on what happened next.

Castro said, "What are you trying to do, kill me?" and Williams replied, "That's what I came here for. We've been trying to do that for three days." Castro was not angry.

A militia police captain reached down and patted Williams and said, "Take it easy. Take it easy. You're in bad shape."

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Resentment

But the prisoners were bitter towards the United States.

"Everybody was very resentful of the United States Government," said Dr. Juan Sordo. "Everyone thought we had been stranded and left to die, for Fidel to kill us all and have a piece of Hungary for himself. I myself felt resentful and very bitter, because of the lost opportunity of freeing Cuba. I took it for granted I was going to be shot."

Of all the prisoners, Negroes received the worst treatment. Their presence in the invasion force infuriated Castro. It was contrary to the impression united, happy Cuba that

"THE EVENING STAR"
WASHINGTON, D.C.
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assiduously trying to cultivate.

One morning, the prisoners were lined up to get aboard a large trailer truck for the trip to Havana. In charge of the operation was Osmani Cienfuegos, the minister of public works, a stocky, pudgy man. The truck was American made, the kind used on express highways—aluminum, plywood stripping inside, and only two doors, one on each side in the middle of the truck.

By the time 100 men had been packed into the truck, the prisoners were shouting. "No more. No more. We can't breathe." Cienfuegos was unmoved.

"Let them die!" he shouted. "It will save us from shooting them." He waved his hand and ordered "forty more pigs" put on the truck.

Tragic Journey

When there were 149 men on the truck, the two doors were closed and bolted and the trip began. It was one o'clock of a hot, sunny afternoon. In the total darkness inside there was panic: men shouting, packed solidly against each other, desperately struggling for air. "It was the terrible heat," one man said. "Sweat ran like a river."

Terrified, the men ripped off their clothes and beat on the

walls with their fists and rocked the truck, vainly trying to turn it over—anything to stop it. From everywhere came shouts and screams.

Eight hours after they left Giron the truck stopped. When it did the pounding and shouting increased. From outside the prisoners heard voices ordering them to be quiet or the doors would not be opened. For what seemed an eternity they were quiet. Then the doors were opened. The prisoners staggered out, falling "like leaves," stumbling over their comrades, their faces turned black, yellow, gray. Nine men were dead. Another died after he was taken outside.

Ordeal in Havana

The Brigade had reached Havana.

(Among the few who escaped capture were 22 men, most of them paratroopers, who followed their commander, Alejandro del Valle, 22 years old, aboard a 22-foot sailboat which they found on the beach. Ten of them were to die before they were picked up at sea 15 days later in the middle of the Gulf of Mexico, 178 miles from the mouth of the Mississippi River.)

(Under the burning sun, without drinking water after the first days, almost totally with-

out food during most of the journey, the men were barely recognizable as human beings when found. Del Valle was one of the dead.)

The plight of the reds was not much better. Red, angry, bitter, the prisoners were brought to El Palacio de los Deportes (the sports palace) in the center of Havana. There in the amphitheater they sat in rows of hard, small chairs for more than 21 hours a day, 1,000 men from the demoralized Brigade. It was the low point.

Throughout night and day, loudspeakers blared out the names of the prisoners, ordering them to come forward for questioning. The continued lack of sleep made them numb and dizzy. From 3 to 6 in the morning, they were permitted to lie on the floor on dirty mattresses.

Their captors played on their fears and bitterness (toward the United States) and planned on extravaganzas that would prove American duplicity to the world. Carefully selected prisoners were to be questioned before a television panel.

For four nights, the parade of prisoners on television continued until 37 men had been interrogated at length. The propaganda show proved to be a mixed blessing for Castro. Some of the prisoners were abject but others spoke up bravely.

The most notable interrogation involved Felipe Rivero. Thirty-seven years old, an aristocrat and dilettante, he had never had to work for a living. He seemed exactly the type of person for Castro to parade before the world: He was a wealthy man with Batista connections and a perfect example of the complacent and corrupt aristocracy in contrast to the nobility of the revolution's workers.

Rivero was one of the last to appear. The panel members soon discovered they had been mistaken about him. Instead of a pliant prisoner, they were confronted with a man who behaved candidly and courageously.

Castro Gloats

He had joined the invasion, he said, "because this country has been dominated by a series of foreign powers and has come out of one form of imperialism to fall into another." He would not concede that the Brigade was composed of "mercenaries and murderers."

On the final night of the show, Castro stood in the center of the amphitheater under the klieg lights and gloated over the defeated Brigade. Despite the prisoners' hostility to Americans, the long harrangue back-

fired. As one man said later, "I admired Fidel in many ways before that, but when I heard him making such a propaganda show with the lives of our men, I realized what a monster he was. We were in the hands of a maniac."

Pepe San Roman, commander of the Brigade, was personally questioned by Castro, who alternated between anger and a conciliatory attitude.

President Kennedy was a madman, Castro said. The President had betrayed them.

Becomes Friendly

"How can it be that you are involved in this, San Roman?" he asked.

"All I have to say to you is my name and my serial number and my unit."

Pepe said later, "Castro got mad as hell. He threw something that he was holding in his lap and said, 'How in the hell can you come here attacking your own country, helped by our enemies? You are a traitor to your country. You have gone against all the rules and all the laws of the world. And now you say you are not going to talk.'"

After shouting and raging for several minutes, Castro abruptly became friendly. "Let's talk, San Roman," he said. "Don't feel that you are the Brigade

commander and that I am Fidel. Let's talk like two people. Why did you come back to your country this way? Why did you do it? Explain it to me."

Pepe said he wouldn't argue. "I don't know how to speak very well. I know that you will beat me on that field. The only thing I know is weapons and that is the field I took."

After several days, Castro came again. He offered Pepe a cigar.

"He was very kind as if he was my father. He stayed about an hour, explaining everything about the revolution and asking me the reasons why I had come to fight him."

Anger Shifts

During those days alone, Pepe brooded. Much later he said:

"I hated the United States, and I felt that I had been betrayed. Every day it became worse and then I was getting madder and madder and I wanted to get a rifle and come and fight against the United States. Many times I had the feeling that we were thrown there to see what happened, because they were sure that Fidel was going to capture us and put all of us in the firing squad and we would be killed and there would be a great scandal in the whole world. And

sometimes I felt that they changed their minds at the last moment, and they didn't have time to give us the order to come back. But anyhow I felt that if they had organized us and taken us through a whole year of that training, even if the world was going to fall to pieces, they should not have forgotten us."

He thought about Frank and Gray (the American agents for the Central Intelligence Agency) and the faulty intelligence information that had been supplied the invaders.

"How could they say that all the Castro planes were destroyed (Saturday, April 15)? They didn't have proof of that. Intelligence cannot work like that."

The more he thought, the more bitter he became. But weeks later, he learned of the 10 men in the brigade who died on the trailer truck ride from Giron to Havana.

"I tell you," Pepe said, "That made me sick at my stomach, knowing how those fellows died." From that moment on, "I didn't think any more about hating the United States. All my hate went back to Castro."

Tomorrow: Inside Castro's Red Prison.

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


The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 7:

"The Nightmare Begins"

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The men of Brigade 2506, confident of American air support, certain they would have the assistance of civilian uprisings, sure that the 1,500 men of their outfit formed but a part of the invasion plan, began their unprecedented night amphibious landing at the Bay of Pigs. They were doomed before they started. Nothing went right from the moment they started ashore in their pitiful little open boats. Here is the story of that nightmarish landing and the battle on the beach that wasn't supposed to happen, as told by the men who led the "Cuban liberation army."

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artima, José Pérez San Roman, Erneldo Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

At 3:15 in the morning of April 17, 1961, Fidel Castro was awakened in Havana. He was told that the enemy was landing at Playa Larga and Playa Giron (on the Bay of Pigs) and that his troops in those areas were resisting.

Castro alerted the forces he had in that section—a battalion of 900 men, and several platoons of armed militia. Orders went to Castro's air force to take off at dawn and attack the ships facing the landing area.

(The Castro air force reportedly had been destroyed by an air strike of B-26 bombers two days earlier. Partially as a result of this false report, President Kennedy had cancelled a second air strike, scheduled to coincide with the invasion. The invaders had also been given assurance by the Central Intelligence agents who trained them that Castro could not get troops to the "isolated area" for 72 hours.)

In the confusion of that first morning, which found the invasion already foundering at 4 a.m., Erneldo Oliva, 28-year-old commander of the armored battalion, landed with the early waves of troops. The men on his ship the Houston, were a little nervous; they hadn't expected the shooting to start so soon.

Sounds of Battle

Oliva climbed down the rope ladder, followed by a radio operator and several assistants. But in jumping from the ladder to the small boat below, one of the men struck the pilot and knocked him into the water. The boat drifted away. None of the seven men aboard knew how to operate the outboard motor and so they floated helplessly for 55 maddening minutes, while they heard the sound of battle on the shore, they drifted in the midst of the Bay of Pigs awaiting a launch from the Houston. Finally it came and Oliva ingloriously reached the shore. By then only sporadic firing was heard.

Oliva, headed toward the front, made an alarming discovery: "I saw the antenna of a micro-wave station and we captured it at once. You could see that they had transmitted from there recently." It was another crucial failure in intelligence, the plan was predicated on the inability of the enemy to communicate with larger forces.

Oliva instantly recognized the seriousness of the situation; but of more immediate concern was the landing itself. The outboard motors on the eight fiberglass landing boats were not working. Two of them went out of service immediately (on one the propeller fell off and into the sea as soon as the boat was launched). One after the other the other six failed in the middle of the Bay. Although there were only 185 men in the second battalion, by 5:30 in the morning the last of the men still had not come ashore. Also left to be unloaded were the entire Fifth Battalion and most of the supplies, including ammunition, for the area. Oliva is convinced that had they had only three LCUs, both battalions and the supplies would have reached the beach by three o'clock.

At 6 a.m., the Cuban frogmen reported that they had cleared a path through the coral reefs (unreported in CIA intelligence) which had handicapped the landing efforts. At 6:25, landing craft carrying tanks and the men of the heavy weapons battalion began arriving at the beaches.

Easy Targets

A B-26 flew over. Thinking it was one of their own, the men on the beaches waved at it. Then the plane opened fire. Following it was another—and then another. Soon they were joined by Sea Fury fighters and T-33 jets. The remainder of the Heavy Weapons Battalion and all of the Sixth and Third Battalions had to land under fire.

"I saw those planes pass over our heads three times going to the beach," said José Sosa, a 51-year-old cattleman who had a son and two nephews in the Brigade. "I saw the red tongues of the flames and the machine guns shoot, shoot, shoot. Bupbup, bupbup, bupbup!"

The slow landing craft were easy targets at best but to make it worse, they were stopped 15 yards short of the beach by impassable coral. Men waded through water chest-high, carrying their weapons—including even the 4.2 mortars, weighing 640 pounds each—and boxes of ammunition on their shoulders.

When the planes passed over, they ducked under the water.

Consequently, most of the small radios were wet and could not be used that first day of fighting.

It was a nightmare. Immediately, the doctors began receiving casualties and treating men on the beach under fire.

The first attack ended with one of Castro's B-26s shot down. In the momentary lull C-46 transport planes carrying the Brigade paratroopers flew over Giron on their way inland. One of the planes dipped low to salute the invaders and as it did the men on the ground opened fire. Bullets passed through the fuselage. "What the hell's going on?" one paratrooper yelled. "They've gone crazy."

Plane Shot Down

The fifth battalion, greenest in the brigade with only a few days of training, was still aboard the Houston. Rip, an American in charge of the frogmen, went to the Houston to assist in their landing. The men were reluctant to leave.

In anger he shouted: "It's your war, you bastards. Get off!" Ten men got off and headed for the beach. From behind they heard the motors of an airplane. It was a B-26 and they, too, thought it was one of theirs. The plane attacked them as it turned toward the horizon and came back. Rip stood up and shouted: "Everybody fire at the . . . thing!" This time they hit it, and when it made a third pass it went down in flames.

More aircraft were on the way—first a Brigade B-26 to provide cover for the invaders and then three of Castro's planes, two T-33 jets and a "Sea Fury." The slower Brigade plane didn't have a chance. (The Brigade B-26s flew without tail guns to permit them to carry more fuel for the 14-hour round-trip flight from Nicaragua.)

The Houston was defenseless. Two planes came low over the mangroves and one made a direct rocket hit. There was a hollow clang and the ship started taking in water. Miraculously, the rocket had passed through the deck and on through the bottom of the ship without exploding. Laden as it was with ammunition and gasoline, the Houston would almost certainly have blown to bits had the rocket detonated. And almost all her troops were still on board!

More Disasters

A small fire broke out below decks but as Alberto Pico said, "God was with us." The water coming through the hole that the rocket had made extinguished the fire. Luis Morse, the captain, headed the stricken ship toward the coast and succeeded in grounding it 300 yards from shore. There it stayed—a broken vessel, oil oozing from its holes, a sitting target for the planes. Without weapons, some stripped to their underwear, the men jumped into the oily water and were strafed by Castro's planes. Some drowned, some were attacked by sharks. At least 28 men died in the sea. Those who got ashore were dispirited and defeated. They huddled under the trees and awaited orders from the commanders.

Minutes after the loss of the Houston a second, even greater disaster overtook the Brigade. It was shortly after 7 o'clock when a T-33 jet, diving out of the sun, made a direct rocket hit on the Rio Escondido. Those who survived the enormous blast jumped into the sea where they, too, were strafed by the planes.

It was an irreparable loss for the Rio Escondido carried the supplies for the first 10 days of fighting — ammunition, food, hospital equipment and gasoline. Also lost was the Brigade's communications trailer — the primary method of communications with the battalions in the combat zones, as well as with the flagship and the rear base in Nicaragua. Why such a vast majority of all the supplies needed for a success whatsoever was committed to one ship is a question still unanswered by the CIA.

The remaining ships, the Flagar and Barbara J., were forced to withdraw because of the air attacks. (From the Castro air force declared "non-existent" by the CIA).

The operation had called for paratroopers and heavy equipment to be dropped on the road

to the area called Central Australia at the northernmost point of the Bay of Pigs. The heavy equipment was dropped first, the paratroopers followed. They never saw their equipment again — it was lost in the swamps. In addition, an advance group was lost in the swamps, another badly missed its drop zone, with some landing behind the enemy lines. They landed under heavy fire. When they reached the ground they found one of their men dead, dangling from a tree by his parachute. Another had been shot and killed before he hit the ground.

In the confusion one unit, unable to make radio contact with headquarters, was driven back and forced to retreat, having the road to Playa Larga open. The main road to Central Australia, where paratroopers were lost in the swamp, also was open.

Lost Contact

On the eastern front the paratroopers fared better. The various units landed successfully, without strong opposition, and moved to assigned forward positions. Each of these assigned strong points was manned by 19 men armed with one 57 mm. cannon, one 30-caliber machine gun, one bazooka, an automatic rifle squad and a forward observer to direct mortar fire. These strong points bore the brunt of the first attacks on the eastern front.

At Brigade headquarters, when Pepe San Roman made the first faint contact with Oliva at Playa Larga, the report was

discouraging. It was 10 o'clock in the morning. Oliva said his situation was difficult and that his men had been in continuous combat since landing. He had lost contact with the 5th Battalion and had been unable to reach the paratroopers forward of his position.

Even with his supply lines cut, his back to the sea and no communications, San Roman and his commanders were not in despair. It was not false heroism, or naivete, but an unshakable conviction that they would not be let down; that victory therefore was inevitable. It was inconceivable that they would be stranded.

They could not know of another failure that day—the failure to alert the Cuban underground to the invasion. From the beginning, the underground had been a vital part of the CIA plan. It was to support and join the invasion, create confusion, sow discord and fashion an environment in which the populace would join the liberators. For the purpose, infiltration teams had been landed long in advance of the invasion.

Shortly afterward, one of the brigade infiltration teams received a message with the identifying code marks, "QSP," meaning very, very urgent. Immediate action was to be taken if such a message ever arrived. Decoded, the message read: "A large, well-armed force has landed in southern Las Villas province. Interrupt communications, blow bridges." The recipients were urged to "rise."

All over Cuba that day similar CIA messages arrived. But it was too late. A reign of terror had begun. In Havana, more than 200,000 were arrested. In theaters and ballparks, auditoriums and public halls, men, women and children were packed together.

"Impossible to rise," was the sardonic message one team returned. "Most patriots in jail. Thanks for your help. Closing transmission."

Invaders Stand Alone

The delay in these messages was one of the most damaging and certainly the most baffling of all the failures that day. The underground had no idea that the invasion was coming.

Now, the invaders stood alone. They were desperately short of ammunition. Before the day was out, they faced everything that Castro could throw at them—and held their positions. That they did so was due partly to the lack of leadership, morale and egregious errors of Castro's men. Partly, it was due to the quality of the Brigade's training. But principally it was due to their nerve.

On the surface, they were not particularly impressive men. One of them was Maximo Cruz, 23, dark hair, dark eyes, five-foot-five, weighing 120 pounds, quiet, not well educated. He was distinguished by his large nose and for months there had been jokes in the training camps that he would not be able to get his nose out of the way of the bullets.

Cruz told the story of what came to be known in Cuba as the "battle of the lost battalion"—the 339th Battalion of Castro militia leaders from Mantanzas. The name today carries the connotation of scandal for when the battle was ended, there had been unnecessary slaughter.

Cruz was in command of a company flanking both sides of a road through the swamps.

Mound of Dead

"My scouts came back and told me the enemy was advancing in a column," he said. "They were coming through the center of the highway, straight on it, in a close formation. These people were crazy coming that way down the hill in the middle of the road. . . . When I gave the order to fire, you could see them flying up in the air. I threw everything at them with all the weapons we had. In 10 or 15 minutes, there was a big mound of dead men all over the road."

For the first time that day, the Brigade had made contact with its air support and two B-26s made passes over the remainder of the battalion marching in the road. Rockets and bombs were dropped. The carnage was horrible. The road was a solid wall of flames. Out of nearly 900 men in that battalion, only a handful survived. This, indeed, was air support.

The planes had been supporting the Brigade for 25 minutes; and no Castro fighters had appeared. On the ground Oliva heard, by radio, one of the pilots say to the other: "Let's go because I've finished my ammunition and don't have much gasoline."

"No," the reply came back. "there's an s.o.b. in there that shot at me and I'm going to get him."

The men watched as one plane circled over Playa Larga and the other headed toward Central Australia.

"I hit him, I hit him," came the cry of the pilot.

At that moment a T-33 jet and a Sea Fury appeared.

"I've got a T-33 on my tail. Shoot at him! Shoot at him!"

The second Brigade pilot answered: "I don't have any ammunition."

"They hit me. They hit me," were the last words. Both Brigade planes were shot down.

As the sound of the battle ceased, a soldier at Playa Larga squinted into the sun toward the front. "There were crowds of vultures flying to the battlefield and it made me think how quickly the human body can corrupt itself."

Two Elements Missing

For the Brigade to hold on that day against overwhelming odds and with such slight casualties—less than 100 died that day—was a tribute to the men, also, to the invasion area. In that important respect, the plan proved to be correct: Castro's troops had no choice but to come down the highway through the swamps. With tanks, heavy mortars, cannon and bazookas the positions were relatively easy to defend. Only two elements were missing—air cover and sufficient ammunition to keep going.

Tomorrow: Jets Are Coming.

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Castro militiamen counterattack on the Playa Larga front.

Tolson _____
Belmont _____
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Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
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Sullivan _____
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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 6: 'Turn Left to Havana'

For better or for worse, the Cuban liberation forces were committed now. The ships carrying the 1,500 men of Brigade 2506 plowed toward the Bay of Pigs. Brigade attack bombers swooped in on Cuba and were met by anti-aircraft fire. Two of the B-26s were forced to land in Florida, riddled with bullets. The first five installments of "The Bay of Pigs" told of the difficulties in forming and training the brigade and of the scheming and duplicity of the CIA. It is now too late for brigade leaders to voice their many doubts.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artines, Jose Perez San Roman, Erneldo Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

"You will be so strong. You will go straight ahead. You will put your hands out, turn left, and go straight into Havana."

The speaker made a sweeping gesture with his arm that no man present that day will ever forget.

Fifteen hundred listening Cubans raised a great shout. Some had tears in their eyes.

The date was April 14, 1961, the place was Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, and Brigade 2506, after long and arduous training at a secret base in the mountains of Guatemala, was

about to take ship for a three-day cruise northward to the southern coast of Cuba.

Their mission was to land at the Bay of Pigs and establish a beachhead for revolutionary overthrow of Fidel Castro's Communist rule. They were headed for disaster--almost immediate defeat, accompanied by death, imprisonment, and torture.

But on that day, their American leaders--agents of the Central Intelligence Agency--assured them that failure was inconceivable.

"Dave," an intelligence expert for the CIA, told them that Castro "could not react for at least 72 hours." He had no big forces nearby, no communications. The landing area was isolated.

Dave also gave them this intelligence: Castro would have no tanks and no air force. Finally, there were supposed to be more than five hundred guerrillas nearby waiting to help the Brigade. On the ships were weapons for 4,000 men, and the intelligence estimate was that in the first two days 5,000 men would join the Brigade in a voluntary uprising. In addition, Brigade planes would drop thousands of weapons to the Cuban people who wanted to join the rebellion.

There was no question they would have air

superiority. Nothing was said about United States air support, or about jets. It was said that the enemy would not be able to get to the Brigade; that it would be destroyed from the air; that no trucks or troops would be able to get through the roads because all the roads would be bombed; that "every five minutes there will be a plane over all the major roads of Cuba." The Brigade cargo ships were loaded with thirty to forty thousand gallons of gasoline so its air force could begin immediate missions once the field at Giron was seized. The air missions were already planned for that moment; the operations order called for them to destroy the main railroad and highway bridges in "the zones of Havana, Matanzas, Jovellanos, Colon, Santa Clara, and Cienfuegos in order to isolate said areas from enemy operations."

Operation Pluto also included plans for a diversionary landing in Oriente Province by a commando group of 168 men, led by Nino Diaz, and a simulated attack, or "feint," in the vicinity of Santa Fe. The "feint" would be accomplished with special sound equipment that made it sound as if a great battle were being waged.

The plan sounded so good, the Cubans

were so confident that no one asked any questions.

Nothing was said to the Cubans about an alternative plan (formally approved in Washington) for use in case the invasion failed. This plan called for escape to the Escambray mountains, where the Cubans would operate as a guerrilla force.

As this is written, only one of the four leading Cubans knows that such a plan existed; he learned of it two years after the invasion.

Later, in a secret top-level administration investigation that followed in the wake of the invasion, it was learned that the CIA decided on its own, not to give the Brigade the alternative plan. The explanation was given that it might weaken the Brigade's resolve to keep fighting, that they might choose the alternative plan when the going became rough, even though the invasion still had a chance of success. The most charitable explanation that can be placed on this reckless action is that the CIA assumed such terrible responsibility with the best of intentions; it was convinced the Cubans would win and

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New York Mirror _____
New York Daily News _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Worker _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____
Date 5/22/64

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Bay of Pigs: Message on Air Strike Caused Miscalculation

Continued From Page A-1
therefore, in the classic sense the end would justify the means.

Mission Aborted

The "diversionary landing," a vital factor in Operation Pluto, never took place. In the early hours of Saturday, April 15, a reconnaissance platoon set out for the shore thirty miles east of Guantanamo in the darkness. The Cubans reported they saw militia waiting for them and stationary lights set to shine on them. They moved out to sea. The next night, the 168 commandos tried again and, after a long wait, returned to their ship. The mission, in the words of the accompanying Americans, "aborted primarily because of bad leadership."

The simulated attack, where rubber rafts were floated ashore containing radio equipment simulating the sound of battle, was, ironically, a success. Castro hurried to the Bay of Pigs when he first heard reports of an invasion there but was told it was only a feint and that the genuine landing was being made at Pinar del Rio province. He rushed there to find only rafts with radios blaring battle noises.

Castro's reaction here and the initial disorganization of his troops in the field lead to the unanswerable question: What had happened had Nino Diaz's men carried out their assignment to land in Oriente and created a genuine diversionary movement?

(No dismal thoughts of this nature disturbed the Cuban invaders as they boarded ship

in Puerto Cabezas. They lined the railings, singing, cheering, and waving gaily colored scarves as the ships steamed out to sea.)

On board the five transports and two escort ships, living conditions were bad. Men slept where they could, on deck, in lifeboats, in hammocks strung in holds loaded with ammunition and gasoline—and ate C-rations, either cold or heated by sterno lamps, and bathed with salt water. Smoking was prohibited; a stray match or spark could touch off an explosion.


Cheers and Singing

On the horizon was the comforting sight of the American Navy—several destroyers and one or two larger ships. On the first night out the men aboard the Houston watched an American submarine circling the ship.

By Saturday afternoon the entire brigade knew its mission. The officers had made their speeches, outlining the battle plan. The troops were asked to respect prisoners as fellow Cubans. The men responded with cheers and singing.

(There was additional cause for jubilation when a radio message was received, telling of the successful accomplishment of the first air strike on Cuba: The B-26 bombers, based in Nicaragua, it said, had destroyed nearly all Castro's enemy aircraft.)

That message resulted in one of the great miscalculations of the invasion. The Brigade air force report stated that 8 to 10 planes had been put out of service at the San Antonio base; 6



Adlai Stevenson shows the United Nations a picture of a bomber that landed in Florida after supposedly deflecting from Castro Cuba.

to 8 at Ciudad Libertad; and 12 planes at Santiago de Cuba—all of which would have left Castro with almost no air power. While the attack did inflict considerable damage, he actually still had four fighters, two "Sea Furies" and two jet T-33s, as well as two B-26 bombers.

Two of the B-26s, bullet-riddled by anti-aircraft fire, made emergency landings at the Boca Chica Naval Air Station airport in Key West. The world awoke to the fact that Saturday morning Cuba was under attack but American immigration authorities hustled the Cuban pilots into custody and announced they had identified themselves as defectors from Castro's air force in stolen planes.

At the United Nations, Dr.

Raul Roa, the ambassador from Cuba, supported by Valerian A. Zorin of the Soviet Union, demanded an emergency meeting to consider "the aggression" against Cuba. Roa charged that the attacks were the prologue to a large scale invasion being planned by the United States and some Latin American countries.

When he finished, Adlai E. Stevenson, the United States Ambassador to the U. N., began his reply. It was to be the most humiliating moment in his distinguished career. He was trapped by a tangle of lies. He had been assured by the State Department that the story told by the Cuban pilots was true and he believed it.

"No United States personnel participated," Stevenson declared. "No United States aircraft, of any kind participated. These two planes, to the best of our knowledge, were Castro's own air force planes."

In Washington, Pierre Salinger, the presidential press secretary, said the United States had no knowledge of the bombings except what had

appeared in news reports. At the Pentagon and State Department, there was no official comment. But, in the later words of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, "things were beginning to surface."

If President Kennedy was concerned about the "surfacing," he did not show it. Late in the morning, he left the White House and flew by helicopter to join his wife and children at Glen Ora, their rented estate in the rolling Virginia hills.

By twelve noon of Sunday, April 15, the brigade forces in the little fleet at sea were committed. It was then too late to stop the invasion. Sometime after this hour had passed, President Kennedy made one of the most difficult decisions of his administration.

Forces Committed

While he had shown no outward concern over the "surfacing" Saturday, by Sunday the situation had become more complicated. Russia and China were threatening action—if not

in Cuba, then perhaps in Berlin or Laos or Viet Nam.

The realities of the cold war, the life-and-death stakes involved, the gamble Cuba represented, the apparent success of the brigade air attack on Saturday, the President's pledge against direct American intervention in Cuba, and the assurance of his advisers that the invasion had a chance of success without such American support, led him eventually to a decision: the second air strike, scheduled for dawn Monday to coincide with the invasion, was cancelled. Retrospect or hindsight does not alter the central fact about that decision: it was consistent with the late President's policy, stated unequivocally both publicly and privately, that the Cuban affair must not be allowed to jeopardize larger United States interests.

When Richard Bissell (deputy CIA director) was informed he and an assistant, Gen. Charles Cabell, an airman, urged Secretary of State Dean Rusk to reconsider the decision. Rusk, who was acting for the President, did not agree with them. He asked if they wished to appeal directly to the President. Neither did. The order went out to Puerto Cabezas to cancel the attack.

(All unknowing of this decision, which would deprive them of needed air protection the following morning, the Cuban invaders, on that Sunday afternoon, lounged on their ships, plowing the seas to a rendezvous off the Cuban coast.)

They listened to the radio, talking, trying not to appear nervous. They fussed with their new camouflage uniforms, packs and cowboy hats and joked about their return to Cuba. Some played poker; some took sunbaths; still others talked quietly about their families. For many it was, as one soldier said, "like a Caribbean picnic." Yet the jokes and

shouts could not hide the inward nervousness. Everyone was afraid of acting afraid, and most adopted the philosophy that they were going to win or die. No one voiced doubt.

Sunday: The Nightmare Begins.

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Tolson _____
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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 5: CIA's Orders

The Cuban leaders of Brigade 2506 were still bewildered by the plans which their Central Intelligence Agency instructors called Operation Pluto. They believed the United States was going to help them, but they had no firm commitment. In fact, President Kennedy said emphatically that no American forces would be used in the invasion. At first they had been a small group training as guerrillas at the secret base in Guatemala. Then they began training as conventional troops for frontal assault, and the brigade grew to 1,500 men. They had high hopes, but not for long.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

"Frank," the mysterious American, had startling news. He imparted it early in April, 1961, to the stunned leaders of the "liberation army" being prepared for an imminent invasion of Cuba at a secret training base in the mountains of Guatemala.

There were forces in the administration trying to block the invasion and Frank might be ordered to stop it.

If he received such an order, he said, he would secretly inform Pepe San Roman, military commander of the invasion force, and

Ernesto Oliva, second in command. Pepe remembered Frank's next words this way:

"If this happens, you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisors, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners."

(Frank was the top man for the Central Intelligence Agency who had been in charge of training 1,500 Cuban refugees for the invasion since November, 1960. Obviously a man of great military skill and commanding presence, he had gained the complete trust of the Cubans.)

Frank was quite specific: They were to place an armed brigade soldier at each American's door, cut communications with the outside, and continue the training until he told them when, and how, to leave for Trampoline base (the code word for Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, where the invasion force was to board ship for the three-day passage to Cuba).

Frank then laughed and said: "In the end, we will win."

Pepe and Oliva were disturbed by this plan, but they had such faith in the Americans that

they agreed to follow it if necessary. They knew that they would have difficulty with the Brigade, because as Pepe said: "Most of the Cubans were there because they knew the whole operation was going to be conducted by the Americans, not by me or anyone else. They did not trust me or anyone else. They just trusted the Americans. So they were going to fight because they knew the United States was backing them."

Frank then called in Manuel Artime, civilian representative of the Cuban revolutionary council, and privately told him the same thing.

Artime was as stunned as the others. Frank never said who opposed the invasion—it was just "forces in the administration," or "politicians," or "chiefs above." He did say that if he received the order to stop the invasion, "I have also orders from my bosses, my commanders, to continue anyway." It cannot be determined what bosses, if any, gave Frank such instructions. But Artime, San Roman and Oliva never doubted that he was speaking for his superiors. It seemed obvious to them that the Brigade could not be transported to another unknown base, and then placed aboard ships to go to Cuba without the knowledge and assistance of a great organization, out of more than 10 secret meetings with

Frank at Base Trax came several dominant impressions. Oliva summed them up. First, the forces that would land in Cuba were much larger than the Brigade's 1,500 men. Second, the Cubans would have the complete support of the United States Government, including United States military and air support. Third, the invasion was going to take place even if Washington tried to stop it. And last, most important to the Cubans, the invasion was going to succeed and they would liberate their country.

In the next busy days, nothing more was said about putting the Americans under "arrest." When Artime later asked Frank about "the trouble in Washington," the answer was: "There is no trouble at all. We have orders for the invasion."

Just before sailing, on April 14, Frank took Pepe aside. He told him that if he were ordered to halt the invasion while the ships were at sea, he would send Pepe a radio message saying, "Come back, don't go ahead."

That meant the opposite: It was really clear they were to go ahead.

"But if I send you a message in code that says 'The quetzal—a Guatemalan bird—is on

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The Worker _____
 The New Leader _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The National Observer _____
 People's World _____
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Bay of Pigs: High Hopes Deflated at Docks

Continued From Page A-1
the branches of the tree—that means Fidel is waiting for you so you will have to come back.”

(Neither message was ever sent. The whole astounding incident was never clarified to the Cubans. Its plain implications—that the CIA was prepared to countermand even a White House decision to call off the invasion—must be recorded as an astounding indication of the extent to which this super-secret organization had advanced its operations into the policy-making field.)

Frank told the Cubans that ships and landing craft had been procured for the invasion and that their air force would include fighter planes as well as B-26s. The United States Marines, he added, would “be close when needed.”

The brigade leaders learned that they were going to have to establish and hold a beachhead until the civil government arrived, set itself up, and asked for help from the United States and other Latin American countries. There would be no problem, Frank assured them, because everything had already been arranged by the Americans. Inside Cuba, the underground was ready and a general offensive would be ordered soon. The invasion would be the final blow.


Brigade Moves Out

On April 10, one week before the invasion date, San Roman assembled the brigade for its last formation at the Guatemala base. Everyone was joking. It was raining and the men were singing the Cuban national anthem.

“It was a great spectacle,” Oliva said, “very touching. Playing music, the charanga, singing, people saying vivas.”

At 5 o'clock, the trucks moved out to transport the men to the air base at Retalhuleu. Indian peasants cheered and waved. The liberation army boarded transport planes for “Trampoline,” still not knowing their destination. They found it to be Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, where the ships were waiting.

They saw the ships, hulking old cargo vessels, unpainted and in bad condition. Enrique Ruiz-Williams, second in command of the heavy weapons battalion, had what he describes as “a cold feeling.” He didn’t feel better when he inspected



The three-landing points targeted for the Cubans in the Bay of Pigs.

the loading machines. They were rusting and in even worse condition than the ships.

“I felt a great deception when we got over to the ships,” Oliva said. “It was something we didn’t expect. That was not what we were waiting for.”

What put the “icing on the cake,” as Pepe said, were the landing craft. They were 14-foot open boats, powered by outboard motors. They had no protection. How were the Cubans to land in those?

Operation Pluto

The next morning, April 13, two wooden tables and a blackboard were set up near the pines. Soon Frank and a number of Americans arrived. The brigade staff, all the battalion commanders and their assistants, sat down at the tables and waited for the briefing. It was hot and sunny and some men wore shorts, while others took off their shirts.

Frank spoke in general terms that morning. As he spoke, he glanced from time to time at several of the Americans, as if for confirmation of what he was saying. The Cubans particularly noticed one man who appeared to outrank everyone else. He was tall and thin, with glasses and slightly graying hair. He was called “Dick.” The description of the man and his current responsibilities suggest that he might have been Richard Bissell (the CIA mastermind of the entire operation).

When San Roman told Frank his impression of the ships, he was assured that the Cubans “were going to have protection

by sea, by air, and even from under the sea.”

The Cubans understood that to mean the United States Navy.

On April 14, before the sun had risen, Oliva left his tent and walked out of the base, thinking about the mission that was about to begin. He met Artime. Both were optimistic and happy.

Copies of “Operation Pluto,” as the invasion plan was called officially, were distributed at 9 o’clock. The Cubans read:

Commencing at H-Hour of D-Day, the Brigade is to engage in amphibious and parachute landings, take, occupy and defend beachheads in the areas of Cochinos Bay and Playa Giron of the Zapata Swamps in order to establish a base from which ground and air operations against the Castro government of Cuba may be carried out.

Target Pinpointed

So it was to be the Bay of Pigs, where years ago Cuban engineers had dreamed of cutting a canal seventy-five miles to Cardenas Bay on the northern coast, shortening the route from the Pacific Coast ports and the Panama Canal to the Atlantic.

The Bay of Pigs has a width of 10 to 12 miles at its mouth and tapers gradually inland for 18 miles from the Caribbean. At its northernmost point, not far from a lake called “El Tesoro” (Treasure Lake) is Playa Larga, or Long Beach. To the west is the Zapata Peninsula. To the southeast the coastline runs

smoothly for twenty miles until it reaches the town of Playa Giron. Along the shore there is hard, rocky soil, and then for about a mile inland the land is smooth and firm. Immediately after that begins the Cienagade Zapata, sometimes called the “Great Swamp of the Caribbean,” extending sixty-five miles from east to west and twenty miles from north to south. The Zapata Swamps are covered with hardwood timber growing in a vast expanse of marshy terrain.

Enormous deposits of peat and black muck, as well as many reptiles, are found within the Zapata Swamp boundaries. Further along the coast, between the Bay of Pigs and the City of Cienfuegos to the east, is a large forest of valuable timber. Its potential for lumber has never been realized because of the sharp limestone rock, known to the Cubans as “dog teeth rock,” which juts out of the ground. The rock is so sharp that iron shoes are insufficient protection for draft animals hauling timber.

3 Landing Points

The Bay of Pigs-Zapata area had been virtually impassable before Castro built three major highways across the swamps and began transforming the area into a public vacation resort. At Giron alone (a main landing point in the invasion plan) 180 buildings, resembling American motels and able to accommodate 1,000 persons, were nearing completion by that April.

Operation Pluto, called for landings at three points—Playa Larga, called “Red Beach”; Giron, “Blue Beach,” and “Green Beach,” a point 20 miles to the east of Giron cutting the road to Cienfuegos. Giron was the center of the invasion. There, at Blue Beach, San Roman would land and estab-

lish his command post. From Red Beach to Green Beach, the Brigade would control 40 miles of Cuban coast line. The first battalion of paratroopers would “be dropped” in three places—along each road crossing the swamps. Thus the Brigade’s initial holdings would extend inland for more than twenty miles.

Oliva would land at Playa Larga with the Second and Fifth Battalions of Infantry. San Roman would land at Giron with the Sixth Battalion of Infantry, the Fourth, or Armored, Battalion, and the Heavy Weapons Battalion. The Third Battalion of Infantry was to land at Green Beach.

The invasion plan carefully allocated supplies from D-Day to D-Day plus 10; then from the tenth day after the invasion, to the twenty-first day, and on to the 30th day. On D-Day itself 72 tons of arms, ammunition and equipment, enough to support 4,000 men, would be unloaded. In the next 10 days, 415 tons more were to be unloaded, and then 530 more, and then 867.8 tons. Everything was worked out, ton by ton, day by day. The plan seemed superb.

TOMORROW: Turn left to Havana.

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 4: 'Let 'er Rip'

Three leaders of Brigade 2506 who survived the April, 1961, blood bath at the Bay of Pigs related in the first three installments how they were led to believe that their 1,500 men would have plenty of support when they invaded Cuba. But they had nothing concrete, only the veiled hints of Central Intelligence Agency instructors. No one seemed to know (or else they were unwilling to tell) who was actually planning the operation. The same confusion apparently extended to the highest government offices in Washington, as detailed in today's installment of "The Bay of Pigs."

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artima, José Peréz San Roman, Ernesto Otero and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

Soon after his inauguration on January 20, 1961, John F. Kennedy began meeting with his advisers on the problem of Cuba.

Allen Dulles, director, and Richard Bissell, deputy director of the Central Intelligence Agency, were urging action. Time was running out, they warned: if Castro were to be overthrown, it had to be done shortly. Intelligence reports indicated that even the month of May would be too late.

By then, more and more weapons and planes—Soviet MIG jet fighter planes, and the

pilots to fly them—would be arriving in Cuba from Czechoslovakia and other countries behind the Iron Curtain. The CIA was certain that an invasion would succeed if undertaken soon; but the longer the decision was postponed the smaller would be the margin of safety. Dulles and Bissell not only indorsed the plan for an invasion; they strongly advocated it.

The President asked for the opinion of his professional military men. The outline tactical plan for the invasion was sent to the Pentagon, approved at a subordinate level and then reviewed by Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Nation's supreme military authority, and Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations. On February 3 they, too, indorsed it and predicted success.

At this time the plan called for an invasion in March near Trinidad, a city of 20,000 on the southeast coast of Cuba at the foot of the Escambray Mountains.

Kennedy told the CIA to continue preparing for the invasion, but made it clear that he still might call it off. The President's doubts stemmed not only from the danger of conflict

with Russia, but also a major concern was that it might damage the relations of the United States with the neutral countries, as well as with its allies.

It was vital, then, for the American involvement to be kept both secret and at a minimum in the actual landing and fighting. The reasoning was logical—and yet, with hindsight, it contained major flaws. For, in fact, the operation had long since ceased to be secret, and the United States would have to bear the responsibility for whatever resulted.

The original target date came and went—and so did the target itself. The reason for the change was complex, a jumbled mixture of political and military considerations. When the training resumed in February, the Pentagon dispatched a special team to inspect the Brigade. The inspection was made from the 24th to the 27th of February. A report praising the combat readiness and morale of the Brigade was formally approved by the Pentagon on March 10. On the next day, the National Security Council met and considered the Cuban venture. Out of that meeting and other high-level administration conferences in the middle of March, emerged a new

landing area, and a modified invasion plan.

As one man explained the changes, "The Trinidad plan was too big, too open, too big a deal. There was a kind of schizophrenic approach to the invasion: we wanted it to work, but it had to be kept under wraps so we wouldn't be implicated."

In keeping with the political-military reasoning one more change was made; instead of landing at daybreak, as originally planned, the Brigade would storm ashore at night and present the world with a fait accompli by dawn.

By March 22 the new invasion site had been selected and the plan had taken its final form. The Brigade would land 100 miles west of Trinidad at the Bahía de Cochinos, the Bay of Pigs. The new target date was first set for April 5; then it was postponed to April 10, and then a final date was selected—Monday, April 17.

More than a dozen meetings, conferences and briefings on the Cuban invasion were held in Washington between November 29, 1960, and April 12, 1961. All the meetings with the President were attended by one or more members.

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Bay of Pigs: There Was No Opposition to Plan

Continued From Page A-1
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Perhaps the most important of the meetings took place April 4 with the President presiding in the conference room of the new wing of the State Department. Seated around the long table were Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of the Treasury Douglas Dillon, Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs Thomas Mann, Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Nitze, Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and three presidential advisers and specialists on Latin America: Adolph A. Berle, Jr., Richard Goodwin and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Dulles, Bissell, and Lemnitzer also were present.

Richard Bissell, the man who had masterminded the U-2 flights over Russia, was the first to speak. It was his final review of the Cuban operation. The Brigade would land and hold its territory until the Cuban Revolutionary Council declared itself a "government in arms" and rallied internal support to it. The situation inside Cuba was ripe for rebellion. The Brigade air force would control the skies and operate from the captured field near the Bay of Pigs. Castro's planes would be wiped out by a Brigade air attack before the invasion.

The clinching argument came when the question was asked: What would happen if the invasion failed to bring down the Castro government?

An alternative plan had been prepared for use in the event of a total disaster. The Cubans would be told that if, somehow, the invasion foundered, they would move inland to the Escambray Mountains as a guerrilla force. The Brigade leaders themselves would have the option of deciding when to use the alternative plan. And, it was agreed, a guerrilla force of nearly 1,500 men—well armed, trained, and equipped—would be more than a thorn in Castro's side, as well as a major rallying point for further action.

Given Assurances

From the beginning, the alternative plan had been a major element in the planning process. After Trinidad was eliminated as the target, the President and other important officials were repeatedly assured that the Bay of Pigs area was good guerrilla country and that the entire force could operate there. The President had also been assured that the brigade had been trained as guerrillas when, in fact, there is no evidence that the brigade received any guerrilla training after November 4, 1960. Until that date, the Cuban force consisted of only 300 men.



PRESIDENT KENNEDY



GEN. LEMNITZER



ALLEN DULLES



RICHARD BISSELL

The alternative plan, then, seemed to minimize a disaster on the beach. As the CIA put it, if the brigade can't do it one way (invasion) they will do it the other (guerrilla).

One who was there says Bissell gave the plan his unqualified support. Mr. Dulles, who already had told the President he thought the Cuban venture was going to be easier than Guatemala, spoke briefly and also backed the plan.

(In a similar venture, six years earlier, the CIA had organized an overthrow of the Communist regime in Guatemala.)

The President pointed around the table, man by man, asking for approval or disapproval.

No one opposed the invasion. "Let'er rip," one man said.

Doubters Silent

Senator Fulbright's position is ambiguous. Although the Senator had reservations, the author has been told authoritatively that he did not—as has been written—oppose the invasion at the April 4 meeting. Later, he asked for, and received, a more detailed briefing. While he remained unconvinced, he did say he had not been aware of certain aspects of the plan that gave it a greater chance of success.

It should be said, also, that Secretary of State Rusk, who also later was represented as harboring doubts, did not express them at the meeting.

On one point President Kennedy was clear: Under no conditions were American forces to be committed to the invasion. It was a firm decision, one which was impressed on everyone, whether civilian, military, CIA or Cuban politician.

The CIA, principal architect of the invasion, was not distressed by the President's decision. It was so confident of success it believed that American manpower—and airpower—would not be needed. Air cover was one of the key elements in the CIA's invasion plan—but

Cuban, not American, air cover. The CIA assumed that the Brigade would have the total domination of the sky and thus would be invincible. Its invasion plan was based on its intelligence estimate of Castro's air force. In the official operations order for the invasion that estimate read:

The Cuban Air Force is entirely disorganized and lacks experienced pilots and specialists trained in maintenance and communications. The planes are for the most part obsolete and inoperative, owing to inadequate maintenance and the lack of spare parts. The few planes that are operational are considered to be in flying condition but are not in combat condition. The combat efficiency of the air force is almost nonexistent; it has limited capability of early warning to oppose naval and air units, and could make raids against lightly armed invaders, but in general terms it is limited to the transport of troops and material, strafing attacks, and reconnaissance patrols.

Two Air Attacks

When the CIA spoke of air cover, as it did at the Washington briefings and in Guatemala, it meant sixteen World War II B-26 attack bombers. The agency was certain these lumbering, veteran planes were all that was needed to control the air, without the support of fighters; either propeller-driven or jet. To deal with Castro's air force, the CIA plan called for two bombing attacks on Cuba—one two days before the invasion, and the other the morning of the invasion. When its bombers had finished their attacks, Castro's "almost nonexistent" air force would be totally destroyed.

Only one thing seemed to worry the CIA: the President had said he still might call off the entire operation. The point of no return for the invasion was noon of Sunday, April 16.

After that it would be too late to stop—the Brigade forces would be committed.

On Wednesday afternoon, April 12, President Kennedy walked briskly into the new State Department Auditorium for his weekly press conference. The first question at the conference was about Cuba. The President in his reply, ruled out "under any condition, an intervention in Cuba by the United States armed forces."

"The basic issue in Cuba," the President said, "is not one between the United States and Cuba. It is between the Cubans themselves. And I intend to see that we adhere to that principle, and as I understand it, this administration's attitude is so understood and shared by the anti-Castro exiles from Cuba in this country."

Glowing Report

Why the President felt compelled to insist so firmly and so publicly that the United States would not use its force to aid the Cubans is not clear. The result was clear to all, however; the United States had tied its hands in advance.

The day after the press conference a cable was sent to a special emissary of the President in Guatemala, informing him of the President's statement. The emissary, a personable, professional military man then working with the CIA, was asked to reply by "emergency procedure" if in any way he had changed his evaluation of the brigade. He immediately replied:

"My observations have increased my confidence in the ability of this force to accomplish not only initial combat missions, but also the ultimate objective, the overthrow of Castro. The brigade and battalion commanders now know all details of the plan and are enthusiastic. These officers are young, vigorous, intelligent and motivated by a fanatical urge to begin battle. Most of them have been preparing under rugged conditions of training for almost

a year. They say they know their own people and believe that after they have inflicted one serious defeat upon the opposition forces, the latter will melt away from Castro, whom they have no wish to support. They say it is a Cuban tradition to join a winner and they have supreme confidence they will win against whatever Castro has to offer. I share their confidence."

A person who is able to speak with unquestioned authority said that that glowing report overcame the last of the President's doubts. The emissary was a Marine colonel with a brilliant combat record.

When the author showed Pepe San Roman (Military commander of the brigade) this passage, he commented: "This conversation never took place with me or any of my commanders. He says we knew all the details of the plan. Actually, we knew nothing."

TOMORROW: "You Will Take Us Prisoner."

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The Bay of Pigs Camp

Official secrecy still shrouds the planning that was done on the Bay of Pigs invasion, which ended in a bloody nightmare for the 1,500 men of Brigade 2506 who hit the beach to fight Fidel Castro. This book tells, for the first time, the invasion leaders' version of what actually happened. The stories told by Pepe San Roman and Manuel Artime in the first two installments are supported here by Ernesto Oliva.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

With Manuel Artime, José Pérez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.

Ernesto Oliva had just celebrated his 28th birthday when he first heard of the plan to invade Cuba and overthrow the Communist regime of Fidel Castro.

(This young Negro, who had held high office under Castro, was to become commander of the armored battalion which landed at the Bay of Pigs in March, 1961. In the inferno that followed, he was one of the last to acknowledge defeat and his heroic exploits, to be recounted in later chapters, are a testimonial to human courage against overwhelming odds.)

Early in the summer of 1960, two Cuban underground workers told Oliva in Havana that troops were being trained in a camp in Latin

American defection caused Castro more harm than did the flight of many men of greater reputation. In Miami, Oliva went through the recruitment process set up by the Frente, the Cuban work

civilian exile structure that had been created with the assistance of the CIA. Oliva was questioned and tested in various offices throughout the city.

"They asked me if I thought a guerrilla force could overthrow Fidel," Oliva recalls, and I said no, because I knew the regular army. Fidel had been too long in power and was too strong.

"They told me I was going to a secret place and from there I was going to fight Fidel. They said 800 men were there and that I would

and all types of weapons, including artillery.

"I asked what backing we had and I was answered, 'We have all the backing necessary.'

asked what the United States was going to do and they didn't answer, but I believed they had official Government backing because they had the green light of authority to operate as they did. Everybody was convinced that the United States was behind us."

(Late in August, 1960, Oliva and 12 other

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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter 3: 'The Secret Camp'

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America for the invasion, with recruiting offices in the United States, and asked him to join.

Oliva agreed. He had already decided to work against Castro. It had not been an easy decision, for Oliva was a loyal and dedicated officer, a graduate of the (Cuban) cadet school, who at that time was serving the Castro government as a general inspector of agrarian reform throughout the island.

For Oliva, a Negro, to turn against the revolution was a contradiction of everything Castro represented. The question of race was important to Fidel; he capitalized on it and profited by it.

"I really believed at the beginning that Fidel was working for the real solution of the race problem—and not as a Communist," said Oliva.

"As a colored man, I sympathized. I discovered, however, that it was just another of Fidel's moves to divide and weaken. He was using the colored people as a symbol to divide the country.

"Beyond all that, however, was the fact that as a lifelong Catholic, I could not support communism."

Oliva's final break came when, as an expert artillery instructor, he was ordered to train Cuban soldiers in the use of a number of new 105-mm. howitzers from Italy. He refused.

"I was sure," he said later, "that some day I would fight Fidel and those weapons would be used against me."

On August 15, Oliva resigned from the army to avoid being a deserter, but his resignation was not accepted. It wasn't the proper moment, he was told; Castro might think he was against the regime. With the assistance of the underground, he obtained a seat on a plane and on the morning of August 18 flew from Havana to Miami, leaving behind his wife and month-old daughter.

After he left there were recriminations. Castro's brother Raul, in an unusual move, publicly attacked the G-2—the government intelligence force—for permitting an officer to leave without a permit.

Fidel had erected what the United States called a "Cane Curtain" to isolate his people from the West. Oliva was only one of thousands who pierced it that summer, but in time his

defection caused Castro more harm than did the flight of many men of greater reputation.

In Miami, Oliva went through the recruiting process set up by the Frente, the Cuban civilian exile structure that had been created with the assistance of the CIA. Oliva was questioned and tested in various offices throughout the city.

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BAY OF PIGS

Brigade Takes Shape In Guatemalan Hills

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recruits were transported in locked trucks to a place called "The Little Farm" near Miami where they were issued khaki uniforms. They were joined by a second group of recruits, Cuban pilots and aviation mechanics. They boarded a plane at the abandoned United States military airport of Opa-Locka in North Miami. The windows were taped but the men stripped away the tape. Hours later, at dawn, they saw the waters of the Pacific and landed at the San Jose airport in Guatemala.)

Loaded into two buses, the recruits were driven inland through rolling fields of sugar cane.

They drove on, climbing higher and higher, through the tropical foliage of the Guatemala mountains. The road finally leveled off, and ahead they saw a cluster of red and yellow buildings set on the side of the mountain overlooking a deep valley. Minutes later the buses stopped in the midst of a large coffee plantation.

They Meet Carl

An American who limped approached them and introduced himself as Carl and took them to a large wooden warehouse where they found another group of their countrymen. This would be their quarters for the time being, Carl said, as he gestured toward the hammocks strung about the building. A lot of work would have to be done before their training could begin.

When the American left, the Cubans met another group of their countrymen who had come in July and questioned them eagerly: Where were the rest of the Cubans? Where was the liberation army of 800 to 5,000 men? Where were the weapons and artillery? Where was the training camp?

"They told me that higher in the mountains there was another group of men, but there were only about 100 in all," Oliva says. "They didn't have weapons, they didn't have uniforms, they didn't have good food, they didn't have water, and there were no barracks to live in. We felt very sad."

That first night, August 27, the rosary with rain

and trained to infiltrate into specific sections of each province of Cuba. Since they were going to be guerrillas they would have to become accustomed to difficult conditions, but before they could begin training full-time Base Trax had to be completed. September 19 was the date set.

(Tragedy struck in the accidental death, by a fall down a mountainside, of Carlos Santana, an idealistic young student and the most popular man in the camp. The Brigade adopted Santana's serial number, 2506, as its official designation.)

The food was bad, the rain was incessant, the living conditions were crowded, tempers were short and morale was low. But the camp was beginning to take form. On September 19, the liberation army cheered the news that "weapons were arriving."

A truck arrived with the weapons which were placed under lock and key. They had received 13 Springfield rifles, vintage World War I, and a few pistols!

Instructors Arrive

Days later about 20 men arrived in Base Trax. Europeans, Chinese, Mexicans and a few Americans, they had been brought together in some fashion by the CIA as guerrilla instructors. The Cubans called them the "Halcones" or "Hawks," after a comic strip depicting adventurers from many lands. A number of the instructors were from countries behind the Iron Curtain—Czechoslovakia, Latvia and Poland, and there was even a Russian called "Nick."

They often talked of what it was like to live inside a Communist country, but they never referred to the CIA; it was always the "group" or "organization," and sometimes the "company." Their arrival signaled the beginning of training, but it was far from the kind of training the Cubans had expected.

"The training was so bad," Oliva said. "For example, a man came to talk about Cuba to us, giving us Cuban geography, and he said Trinidad was the second largest city in Cuba. Everybody laughed out loud at him."



ERNEIDO OLIVA

Pepe named Alejandro del Valle to command the First Battalion of paratroopers, while Hugo Sueiro headed the Second Battalion of infantry. Oliva led the "bomblene," or Armored Battalion, and Roberto San Roman, Pepe's brother, was in charge of the Heavy Gun Battalion. In keeping with Frank's "skeleton" outline, the Brigade at full strength would be only 800 to 900 men. Its battalions would be the size of companies and its companies actually small platoons.

Skirmishing day and night up and down the mountains, the Brigade was being whipped into an army under the close supervision of Frank and his American instructors. Although the Cubans knew the Americans only by their first names, a sense of camaraderie quickly developed.

"Gordon," "Seabee," "Pat," "Big John," "Sonny," "Bob," "Jim" and the rest of the Americans were enthusiastic and seemed genuinely to believe in the Cuban cause. Most important to the Cubans, the Americans, unlike the "Hawks," knew their business. They were excellent instructors.

"I could never make up my mind just what was behind us," said Ramon Ferrer, whom Pepe appointed Brigade chief of staff. "I knew it was the United States but I didn't know exactly what. But when Frank and the other Americans came I knew that we were under the supervision of the American military."

Morale in the camp was high and the men responded eagerly to the training. They were happy, and so was Frank. As he watched the Brigade become more proficient, he told Pepe San Roman they were developing a unit that would "sweep Cuba."

Tells of Others

He asked God
them in their mission.

'Secret' Camp

(This was the "secret training camp," already the subject of wide gossip and speculation that it housed 5,000 men, which had been established by the Central Intelligence Agency with the assent of the Guatemala government. It was a vast coffee plantation, a self-contained city carved out of the mountains at an altitude of 5,000 feet, with a hydroelectric plant and some 2,000 Indian workers. It was owned by Roberto Alejos, brother of Carlos Alejos, the Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States, who lived in an imposing home with a swimming pool, television, two or three cars, and many servants.)

(As more recruits arrived, they showed the same surprise and disappointment at the small size of the training unit. The recruits were told that a camp was to be built 2,000 feet higher. An airstrip was being built next to the town of Retalhuleu on the plains below.)

"When we finally arrived at the camp, we found it worse than we had guessed," Oliva said. With the new arrivals, the liberation army numbered 160 men.

Base Trax, as the camp was called, was on volcanic soil that became spongy and swampy in the rains. In the distance was the towering volcano Santiaguito; it was still active. In some areas of the camp the soil was covered by six feet of volcanic ash. In that terrain and handicapped by the heaviest rainy season in years, the Cubans worked to build their camp.

Training Begins

Oliva himself, who thought he had come to train an army, began working as a carpenter. By day the men built barracks, drainage fields, and attempted to pour cement foundations in the rain. At night they began receiving military instruction from the Cuban cadre. In their first-class they met Col. Vallejo, who was in over-all charge of the camp and the training.

Col. Vallejo, a Filipino, told them he was an expert in guerrilla warfare and claimed to have been famous in the Philippines against the Japanese during World War II.

Briefly he outlined their training program: they would be divided into 12 small teams

(The Washington planners in the White House, Pentagon, State Department and CIA had, during all this period, been unable to make up their minds about the form of the invasion operation. Early in November, however, the decision was reached to drop the idea of a guerrilla operation and plan for an assault landing. The effects were felt immediately at the training camp. An American known as "Frank" took charge of Base Trax and the "Hawks" departed as silently as they had arrived.)

Energetic Start

Frank (not to be confused with Frank Bender), a florid, sandy-haired, aggressive and commanding figure, went to work energetically.

First, he inspected the men and their quarters and saw how some shared knives and forks. The men were too crowded, he said briskly, they would build more barracks immediately. After observing the lack of weapons, he said that, too, would change: Every man must have a rifle. Soon all types of weapons—all new—and ammunition began arriving at the base. With the weapons came new equipment: beds, mattresses, uniforms. A fully equipped kitchen was built. An electric plant was installed. Base Trax finally became a true military camp.

But the greatest change was in the concept of the liberation army itself. Frank had brought with him plans for creating an assault brigade. As he explained it, the brigade would be only a skeleton force, but once it went into combat it would expand rapidly because more Cubans would join it.

Of the 430 men now in the camp, 60 were separated to receive further training as guerrillas. Their mission would be to infiltrate into Cuba and prepare the way for the brigade when it landed. Carl, the American who limped, took charge of those men and they left Base Trax to receive guerrilla training in Panama.

Left behind was the Brigade, the force that would defeat Castro. From that time on it was the principal concern of the Americans.

Officers Named

Pepe San Roman was appointed Brigade commander and four battalions were formed:

"Frank" always referred to our part in the combat, or our part in the armed forces," Pepe said. "This thing was much bigger and we were just a piece there—one of the most important pieces—but he said there were many, many groups being organized like ours, and they were all going to be under us. We were only one-tenth of the force. He also talked about having the Guatemalan army with us, to help us in the rear."

The Cubans did not question Frank closely; they trusted in him and in the Americans who so obviously were behind them.

(Recruiting in Miami, meanwhile, slowed up because of rumors that as many as 20,000 Cubans were in training in Guatemala. On New Year's Day, 1961, in Havana, Castro spoke hysterically about an imminent American invasion. On January 3, President Eisenhower severed diplomatic ties with Cuba. On January 20, Mr. Eisenhower, the oldest President in United States history, stepped aside for John F. Kennedy, the youngest ever elected to that office.)

(The tension was mounting and in February, the first of the Brigade's infiltration teams landed in Cuba. It was an inauspicious beginning and a portent of the disaster to follow little more than two months later.)

These teams had been trained by the CIA in Florida, Louisiana and even in Maryland, near Fort Meade, 20 miles north of Washington, D. C., to operate in Cuban provinces and cities.

Key to Success

Composed primarily of young, intensely idealistic students, they were to prepare the way for the invasion by creating internal strife and fomenting popular uprisings. Their job was a key to the success of an invasion mounted by a small force.

A five-man team left the Florida Keys in a small boat powered by an outboard motor on January 27. When they reached the Cuban coast and flashed their lights in the prescribed manner, there was no return signal.

In a second attempt six days later, all the invaders became sick because of a defective gas pipe. They were picked up by an American patrol vessel and returned to the United States.

On the third attempt, heavy seas buffeted the ship until it capsized. The men swam ashore

practically naked, without weapons, money or radio equipment.

Other infiltration teams followed, but they encountered problems. Supplies failed to arrive on time and when they did, they often fell into the hands of the enemy. The teams set up radio nets in operation between Cuba and the United States, but they found that the CIA did not seem to trust them. Many messages sent from Cuba to the CIA never were acted upon.

Tomorrow: Let 'er Rip.

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Tolson _____
Belmont _____
Mohr _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
DeLoach _____
Evans _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____

The Bay of Pigs--Chapter Two: 'The Die Is Cast'

Yesterday Jose Perez San Roman, leader of Brigade 2506 told of the rugged training the CIA gave the anti-Castro Cubans at a secret base in Panama. The Cubans then went to Guatemala where they were trained on part of a vast coffee plantation owned by Robert Alejos, brother of the Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States.

Here is Manuel Artime's story of how Brigade 2506 was formed and the events leading to its disaster in April, 1961, at the Bay of Pigs.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Roman, Ezequiel Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

The phone rang in the Rio de Janeiro Hotel room occupied by Dr. Manuel Francisco Artime. The caller identified himself as "Jaime Castillo." The name was familiar although the voice was not.

On a speaking tour of Central and Latin America, financed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), America's super-secret espionage network, Artime had received calls from "Jaime" in each city he visited. In each country, "Jaime" had a different voice but always asked if there was anything he could do to help Artime.



Members of Brigade 2506 training in Guatemala.

This time, the caller wanted to see Artime urgently; he was in the hotel lobby and asked to come up immediately. "Jaime" turned out to be an American who spoke Spanish fluently. He insisted that Artime fly immediately to New York to meet some "friends" who wanted to talk to him. It was, he said, vital to the future of Cuba.

(The time was late in March, 1960. Artime did not know it but President Eisenhower, two weeks earlier, had authorized the CIA to organize, train and equip Cuban refugees as a guerrilla force to overthrow Fidel Castro;

Communist dictator of Cuba. Artime had been spirited by the CIA out of Cuba in December, 1959, after he had publicly defied Castro. He had, since that time, been seeking to rally support in Latin America for action against Cuba.)

"Jaime" told Artime to go to New York, to the Statler Hilton Hotel, and ask for a room reserved in the name of George L. Ringo. He flew to New York and checked in at the hotel. He had been in his room only a few minutes when the phone rang.

"Mr. Ringo?"

"Yes, I am Mr. Ringo."

But the caller was speaking in English and Artime could not understand him well. The caller hung up, and the phone rang again.

"Mr. Ringo."

This was a voice Artime understood and recognized. It was Oscar Echevarria, a friend from Cuba who had studied with Artime in college. Echevarria and another Cuban whom Artime knew and trusted, Angel Fernandez Varela, came to the room. They explained that some prominent Cubans who had opposed Batista wanted to contact Artime to see if he would join them in a common cause against Castro.

Artime said he opened his arms to them; then he asked what the Americans had to do with this. His friends told him an important American wanted to meet him now and explain that himself. They parted with an abrazo, or embrace, and Artime waited. There was a knock on the door and when Artime opened it he saw a tall man, expensively dressed, accompanied by one of his Cuban friends. The American introduced himself.

"It was the first time I heard his name," Artime said later. "I was going to hear that name until the Bay of Pigs, Frank Bender. The great Frank Bender. All right."

See BAY OF PIGS, Page A-5

New York Herald Tribune _____
New York Journal-American _____
New York Mirror _____
New York Daily News _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Worker _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____
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BAY OF PIGS

Exile Artime Told Anti-Castro Effort Was Backed by 'Company of Wealthy People'

Continued from Page 1
Manolo, Bender said, "we've got lots to talk about. I am the man in charge of the Cuban case."

Bender repeated the explanation that Artime had heard so often: The great company of wealthy people he represented had directed a large part of its money and effort toward the solution of the Cuban problem, and the defeat of communism everywhere. They had nothing to do with the American Government, Bender told him, but they did have influence. Then he asked for Artime's thoughts on the future of Cuba.

"I told him that Cuba could return to the old corrupt government," Artime said, "that a return to a military dictatorship would lead once more down the road to communism. I told him I believed we needed a genuinely democratic government. We needed social justice."

Bender apparently was impressed. He listened quietly as Artime discussed his ideas for a guerrilla uprising in Oriente Province and then Bender asked, "Why not an uprising all over the island?" Artime said he didn't have enough men or weapons for that.

"Well, Artime, what if I told you that we have men who will help you to prepare for guerrilla warfare and others who will prepare men to fight in a conventional war with army training?"

"And you will give us the weapons?"

"All the weapons you need," Bender replied. "And also we will train radio operators so you can be in contact directly with Cuba."

Bender wanted to know if Artime could get men out of Cuba to be trained for such an operation. Artime replied that he could.

"Fine," Bender said, as he got up and handed Artime a piece of paper. "Call this number whenever you need me. Just say 'To Frank Bender from Manolo' and I will come to the phone." He instructed Artime to go to Miami where more friends would be in touch with him, and said he had reserved a plane ticket for him. Artime could pick it up at the hotel. "When you leave," the American said, "Don't bother about paying the hotel bill. Just throw the key on the desk in the lobby."

'Powerful Company'

As he left the room, Bender shook hands and said, "Remember, Manolo, I am not a member of the United States Government. I have nothing to do with the United States Government. I am only working for a powerful company that wants to fight communism."

(In this manner, Artime was



Castro's peasant "militianos" remained loyal.

picked by the CIA to help organize his fellow refugees in a counter-revolutionary movement that led to tragedy in the Bay of Pigs. He was to become the civilian leader of Brigade 2506, the band of 1,500 Cubans trained at a secret base in the mountains of Guatemala.)

As a man destined to play so important a role in the counter-revolution, Artime was in many respects an unlikely candidate for history. He was then only 28 years old and he spoke no English.

His career itself was one of contradictions. The son of a Communist, he was a devout Catholic, a product of the Jesuits. Although he had a degree as a medical doctor and was trained as a psychiatrist, he had been working with the peasants to improve agricultural production. He was a revolutionary but neither lean nor hungry. He was short, stocky, black-haired and possessed a rasping voice. He also was fairly naive and trusting. He liked to express himself in sentimental verse and had a strong sense of dramatics.

As the manager in Oriente province of the National Agrarian Reform Institute (INRA), managers of Cuba, he had heard Castro personally outline a plan to communize Cuba within three years.

"It realized," Artime said, "that it was a democratic infiltrator in a Communist government."

Underground Work

He took a leave of absence and, with a group of college students, began organizing an underground movement among the peasants. When Castro's G-2 began searching for the leaders, Artime took refuge with the Jesuits in Havana. His open letter of resignation from the rebel army, addressed personally to Castro, was the sensation of the day.

After it appeared, a Jesuit priest said he would put Artime in touch with an American who could get him out of the country. Dressed as a priest and carrying a pistol hidden inside a missal, Artime walked up the steps to the American Embassy and met an American, a man he knew as "Williams."

While the American hid Artime in his own apartment, he asked many questions about Castro and Communist infiltrators. The information, Williams said, was being passed on to the

United States; he thought the government would be interested in talking to Artime.

On the night of December 14, 1959, Williams and two other Americans took Artime to a bar on the Havana waterfront where they met the captain of a Honduran freighter. The captain escorted Artime to his cabin aboard ship, moved a steel cabinet to one side, opened a trap door, and told him to get in. At midnight—an hour Artime will never forget—the ship began to move. It was raining heavily, the seas were high and lightning was flashing outside.

Artime's escape from Cuba followed what came to be the standard CIA procedure. When the freighter carrying him from Cuba docked in the bright morning sunshine at Tampa, Fla., Artime was met on the pier by a tall, white-haired American with glasses who introduced himself as "Mr. Burnett, a friend of Williams." There on the dock Artime heard for the first time the story that would be repeated again and again: Burnett did not work for the United States government, but he was employed by a large group of wealthy capitalists who were fighting communism and who had influential friends in the government and in Washington.

Quizzed Closely

Artime and Burnett left for Miami, and from that time on the young Cuban doctor was in the hands of the CIA. More "friends" of Williams and Burnett appeared in Miami. They, too, said they were interested in helping Artime get weapons for the Cuban underground, but first they had to be certain of Artime's motives.

They questioned him extensively about his life and his thoughts for the future. "After hours of interrogation in an obscure motel while another American 'friend' took stenographic notes, formal testing began: First the Rorschach ink blot test, and then they explained they were going to give him a lie detector test. When Artime strongly objected that such a test was only for criminals, the Americans assured him that they all had taken it; all the top men in the Pentagon had taken it; in the United States it was a common test. Besides, they said, they were risking, all themselves in considering giving him weapons, so even

Grudgingly Artime agreed, and the questions were asked. How many times had he seen Castro? Was he serving another country or power at that moment? Had he told the truth about the INRA meeting and Castro? Did he have any intention of harming the United States? Was he certain his father had broken with the Communists? Had his father suggested he try to come to the United States? Was Artime himself a Communist?

After the test was over, the Americans withdrew to another room. It was late at night when they returned. He remembers their words: "O.K., Artime, you are our friend and we are going to be very close friends of yours."

From the beginning, the Cuban counter-revolutionists viewed their new American friends with blind trust. Artime was no exception. He, and later virtually all of the Cubans involved, believed so much in the Americans—or wanted so desperately to believe that they never questioned what was happening or expressed doubts about the plan.

Feeling of Kinship

To Cubans, the United States was more than the colossus of the North; for the two countries were bound closely by attitudes, by history, by geography and by economics. The United States was great and powerful, the master not only of the hemisphere but of the world, and it was Cuba's friend. One really didn't question such a belief. And the mysterious, anonymous, ubiquitous American agents who dealt with the Cubans managed to strengthen that belief. As Artime himself said later:

"I don't know why, but in the bottom of my heart I believed those people would help me. I was impressed by the way they got me out of Cuba and took me through immigration with no problem at all. And I thought about that lie detector—you couldn't buy that in a ten-cent store. And besides that, it came to my mind that they were obviously more than a group of rich men. The kind of questions

Williams had still made up his mind on what to do or how to do it."

A group of top officials of the State Department, Pentagon, CIA and White House met periodically. At first their plans were based on a guerrilla operation. In August, it was suggested that the guerrilla campaign be scrapped for an invasion of two or three hundred men with tactical air support by planes piloted by Cubans. Finally, a decision was reached. It would be a plan to overthrow Castro by invasion and direct action.

On November 4, four days before the presidential election, the CIA sent a long cable to Guatemala informing its men there of the decision. The CIA ordered a reduction of the guerrilla force to a strength of sixty, "use conventional arms and training for everyone else."

The cable spelled out, from A to Z, how the change in training was to take place, employing World War II infantry assault landing tactics. It became the Bible of the training camp. From that date any talk in the camp of guerrilla warfare was regarded by the CIA as a sign of weakness.

Decision Delayed

The idea that a few hundred men would overthrow Castro in a frontal assault is all the more astonishing in view of the known facts of Castro's forces then. On November 18, for example, the State Department made public details of military aid to Cuba from the Soviet bloc. At that time, the department said Castro's army was judged to be 10 times the size that Batista's had been. And from January, 1959, to mid-November, 1960, some 28,000 tons of military supplies had been shipped into Cuba.

In attempting to reconstruct the process by which the "special group" made its decision, one impression comes through strongly: Dwight D. Eisenhower was not a major participant. Eisenhower himself had said publicly that there was no plan for an invasion while he was in office; that the only plan then was to train guerrillas.

It was clear that the final decision on Cuba would have to be made by a new administration.

On November 18, President-elect Kennedy, resting at Palm Beach after his victory over Nixon by slightly more than 100,000 votes, was visited by Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, and Richard Bissell, the chief CIA architect of the Cuban training plans, and told of the existence of the camp in Guatemala.

Immediately, he was faced with making the first of many decisions involving Cuba that would mark his brief administration.

Tomorrow: The Secret Camp

Excerpted from the book, with the permission of W. W. Norton & Co., publishers. Copyright 1964 by HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

"Fine," Bender said, as he got up and handed Arttime a piece of paper. "Call this number whenever you need me. Just say 'To Frank Bender from Manolo' and I will come to the phone." He instructed Arttime to go to Miami where more friends would be in touch with him, and said he had reserved a plane ticket for him; Arttime could pick it up at the hotel. "When you leave," the American said, "Don't bother about paying the hotel bill. Just throw the key on the desk in the lobby."

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He felt even more assured when the Americans arranged for him to leave the country and go into hiding until their plans had been completed. Arttime was flown from Miami to New Orleans, accompanied by still another American known only by his first name, given a passport, and again cleared through immigration without question.

On Christmas Eve, 1959, Arttime flew to Mexico City. In Havana Castro was warning of a Yankee invasion, and Cubans were receiving television lessons on fighting the imperialists. The year that Fidel had proclaimed as "The Year of the Revolution" was coming to an end.

Election Issue

(Arttime spent the next three months touring Central and Latin America in a CIA-financed search for support of an anti-Castro movement, although President Eisenhower had not yet approved the order authorizing the CIA to organize the invasion army. Late in March, 1960, after the interview with "Frank Bender," Arttime began active recruiting.

(It was a presidential campaign year and two young candidates for the seat to be vacated by Eisenhower had made Cuba the dominant international issue. Vice President Richard M. Nixon knew of the secret training plans but was bound by security regulations from referring to them. Senator John F. Kennedy called for support of a revolution against Castro. Castro repeatedly charged that the "Yankee imperialists" were training "mercenaries" for an invasion. On October 30, La Hora, a newspaper published in Guatemala City, printed a story about the training camp and described the preparations for an invasion as well under way.)

Many months had passed since Eisenhower had approved the forming of a liberation army but the administration

strongly. Dwight D. Eisenhower was not a major participant. Eisenhower himself had said publicly that there was no plan for an invasion while he was in office, that the only plan then was to train guerrillas.

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Tomorrow: The Secret Camp
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The Bay of Pigs--Chapter One: 'Tigers From the Sea'

On the night of April 16, 1961, a small fleet of vessels carrying 1,500 men in jungle camouflage uniforms arrived off the southern coast of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.

On one of those ships was José Pérez San Roman, familiarly known as "Pepe," the 29-year-old commander of Brigade 2506, as the Cubans called their army. San Roman ordered the Cuban flag raised, signalling the invasion.

The nightmare which followed marks a dark period in American history. Today, *The Star* begins publication, in condensed form of a new book "The Bay of Pigs" by Haynes Johnson. Based on sources hitherto unavailable, "The Bay of Pigs" lifts the protective cover of secrecy that has surrounded a disastrous defeat. This is the first of 15 installments.

By HAYNES JOHNSON

(With Manuel Artime, José Pérez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams)

Pepe San Roman first began to doubt the intelligence information when his flagship arrived at Playa Giron (one of the three beaches marked by the United States Central Intelligence Agency for landing operations).

Back in the camp at Base Trax, in Guatemala, when the invasion plan had first been revealed, "Bill," the intelligence expert (all CIA agents were known by assumed



Some of Fidel Castro's First Prisoners—AP Photo.

names only), had assured them the area would be deserted and undefended.

"He told us that Castro could not react for at least 72 hours," Pepe said. "And also that Fidel didn't have any big forces close to the place. The closest were in Santa Clara and that was far away. And from his information, they were so disorganized it would take them time to get together and come and give us a fight."

"He also said that there were no communications between Castro's troops in the area and if they saw us landing they would have to take a car and go sixty kilometers to Covadonga to telephone. He said there were no

civilians in the zone. They were constructing a resort for tourists there but it was still a very isolated area."

Now, instead of the deserted resort houses the CIA had said he would find, the shore was ablaze with lights.

At eleven o'clock, five Cuban frogmen prepared to leave the *Blagar* in two rubber rafts to place white and red lights on the beach to mark the landing zone at Giron. The frogmen, weighted down by their Browning automatic rifles and ammunition, their signal lights and black rubber suits, masks and flippers, entered their inflated rafts and silently moved toward Cuba. There was no moon to light the way. Gray, the American who had

trained them, was with them and Gray, the American, was the first to land in the invasion—despite the insistence of President Kennedy that no Americans participated in the action.

Instead of the smooth approach and sandy beach they had expected to find, it was rocky terrain with razor-sharp coral reefs offshore, poorly suited to an amphibious operation. By the time they had succeeded in placing the first landing light, it was fifteen minutes before midnight. The light flashed on the beach, from beside a concrete pier, and as it did the men aboard the *Blagar* saw other lights; a small vehicle was moving rapidly toward the beach from Giron, a half mile to the east. It was a jeep. It stopped, backed up, and turned its lights toward the sea. The frogmen, led by Gray, opened fire with their automatic rifles; but the alarm had been sounded and now a truck carrying Castro militiamen was heading toward them.

As the firing began, the lights of Giron went off. By radio the frogmen called for support from the *Blagar* and soon the shooting was intense. Near the northernmost point of the Bay of Pigs, the soldiers saw red and orange tracers lighting the sky over Giron. It was, one said later, "a very emotional moment for us, because they were the first shots fired toward Cuba."

While the shooting continued, the first landing craft edged toward the coast line carrying men of the Fourth Battalion from the Caribe. Because of the unexpected op-

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 New York Post _____
 The New York Times _____
 The Worker _____
 The New Leader _____
 The Wall Street Journal _____
 The National Observer _____
 People's World _____
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Bay of Pigs: Faulty Intelligence Shows Up Early

Continued From Page A-1

position, San Roman decided to go ashore in that boat to direct the fighting. Accompanied by Ramon Ferrer, his chief of staff, and two radio operators, San Roman boarded the landing craft. In the darkness and confusion they headed in the wrong direction. When the pilot moved back on course, the boat was caught in a spotlight from the beach and the men came under direct fire. The pilot veered sharply, landed where he could, and San Roman and the men jumped into the water and waded ashore.

Pépe, the calm and quiet soldier, yielded to the emotion of the moment when he reached the beach: He knelt, under fire, took a piece of earth and kissed it; then he organized a small beachhead and began fighting the militia. Seventy-five millimeter cannons from the *Blagar* found the range. Twice the cannon boomed out. There was no answering fire; everything was quiet, everything seemed well.


Miscalculation

Now the trouble began. It stemmed from an almost incredible miscalculation by Americans who, by record, by reputation and by experience were the unsurpassed experts at amphibious operations.

During World War II, not one assault landing had been attempted at night. Yet, in the first such landing planned by Americans, well-known coral reefs had been ignored or forgotten. Certainly the reefs were unknown to the invasion troops—until their boats struck. Some were sunk, some merely delayed. The invasion schedule was set back and surprise, the only advantage of attempting a risky landing at night, was lost.

A way had to be found through the reefs—especially a channel wide enough for the large LCUs (Landing Craft Utilities) carrying the tanks. Jose Alonso, commander of the frogmen, began working with his men to chart a path for the invaders.

While the frogmen were in the water, the Fourth Battalion began landing, cursing the darkness and the small boats. On the beach their commander, Valentin Bacallao, was ordered to Giron with part of his men and another group was dis-



Pepe San Roman (second from left) and Manuel Artime (second from right) salute as the Cuban flag is

raised on the flagship *Blagar*, signaling the beginning of the Bay of Pigs invasion on Sunday, April 16, 1961.

when San Roman attended a group meeting where he and other Cuban army officers met with Dr. Manuel Francisco Artime in an old house in Miami overlooking Biscayne Bay. Artime, 28, had been spirited out of Havana by CIA agents in December, 1959, after he had openly defied Castro and resigned from the army. He and San Roman were to share leadership of the brigade.)

Although Artime had requested the meeting, he was late. When he arrived, he was in a rush and obviously excited. He paced up and down and told them what he knew: They had an opportunity given to few men, they had a chance to liberate their country. He told of his meetings with the Americans and the promise of large-scale assistance.

Even though the Americans he had talked to claimed they had no official connection with

green eyes and walked with a limp. Artime introduced him as "Carl" and said that he would take them to their first destination.

Each man had brought a pistol.

"That's the way the thing started," said Pepe. "We trusted each other but we had confidence in the Americans."

But when Carl asked them to turn over any weapons they had, they said they had none.

A three-hour ride through the night brought them to the west coast of Florida, somewhere near Fort Myers. There, they were taken to a waterfront area where they saw a power cruiser tied up at a pier with the motor running and two Americans aboard. Again the Cubans were told they must turn over their weapons; again they said they didn't have any.

As soon as they were aboard, the cruiser headed for the open sea. The Cubans talked and

cruiser pulled alongside a wooden dock, there they saw three more Americans carrying carbines and pistols. It was one o'clock in the morning.

Carl led them from the pier to a small truck. The driver also was an American, blond, young and smiling. He said he was glad they had come. He drove them across the sand and up a small hill, and there through the orange and grapefruit trees they saw the lights from a large building shining on smaller structures scattered across what seemed to be a golf course. They had arrived at the headquarters of the Americans.

Carl said: "Now give us your guns." They gave him their guns.

Before they went to bed, Carl gave them their first briefing. He began by telling them that everything was top secret. While they were on the island they must stay away from the

—until their boats struck. Some were sunk, some merely delayed. The invasion schedule was set back, and surprise, the only advantage of attempting a risky landing at night, was lost.

A way had to be found through the reefs—especially a channel wide enough for the large LCUs (Landing Craft Utilities)—carrying the tanks. Jose Alonso, commander of the frogmen, began working with his men to chart a path for the invaders.

While the frogmen were in the water, the Fourth Battalion began landing, cursing the darkness and the small boats. On the beach their commander, Yallentin Bacallao, was ordered to Giron with part of his men and another group was dispatched to the Giron Airport. The airport was the principal objective, and at the briefing the brigade leaders had been told they would have to do some work with heavy equipment before their planes could land. Bulldozers and graders and an electric saw to cut trees had been brought from Nicaragua especially for that job.

Soon the word came back to San Roman. "The strip was ready. It was a perfect strip, very long, very nice and very clean, and there were no piles of sand as we had been told." Another, more serious difference between intelligence forecast and actuality was all too apparent: the area was not deserted—civilians who were constructing the resort houses were living at Giron with their families.

Tigers From the Sea

Soon San Roman himself was on his way to Giron to select this headquarters. Along the way an old peasant, one of the charcoal workers in the swamps, saw the Brigade passing. He shrank in terror beside the road and asked fearfully, "Who are you?" He was reassured to learn that they, too, were Cubans. With their faces painted black and their spotted camouflage uniforms, the old man thought they looked like tigers from the sea.

(Thus, in the first hour of the invasion, San Roman had occasion for alarm about the faulty intelligence supplied the invaders by CIA agents to whom they had given their complete trust. His thoughts unquestionably went back to a meeting 11 months earlier when he was first enlisted in an adventure which took him into the shadowy world where the counter-revolution was being engineered by Americans who never acknowledged their true identities. (It was on a day in May, 1960,

out of Havana by CIA agents in December, 1959, after he had openly defied Castro and resigned from the army. He and San Roman were to share leadership of the brigade.)

Although Artime had requested the meeting, he was late. When he arrived, he was in a rush and obviously excited. He paced up and down and told them what he knew: They had an opportunity given to few men, they had a chance to liberate their country. He told of his meetings with the Americans and the promise of large-scale assistance.

Even though the Americans had talked to claimed they had no official connection with the government, Artime said he was convinced they did. Already, he said, the Americans were helping him to bring men out of Cuba and to transmit messages back to the underground. At length, he outlined the help the United States was going to give: Arms, tanks, airplanes, everything they needed.

Calls for Volunteers

Only a few days before, he went on, a group of his students had left for a secret camp where they were beginning their training. The Americans had said they needed professional Cuban officers to train and lead the liberation forces. Artime urged them to volunteer. Within six months, he told them, they would have five thousand men trained and ready to move. When that time came, they would be so strong that Fidel would be overthrown in a week.

Although Artime's men and the officers in San Roman's group had been enemies in Cuba and still distrusted each other, the officers believed that such a military force as Artime had outlined would certainly defeat Fidel. Despite their personal differences, Pepe remembers that they were unanimously confident. For them it was more than a matter of faith; they knew their country's history. Small groups of men always had triumphed over larger forces in Cuba. Batista proved that, and Fidel himself—he had started with only twelve men!

(Ten of the Cuban officers decided to go to the secret camp. Those who had families knew they would not starve. The United States would pay each man \$175 a month, plus \$50 for his wife and \$25 for other dependents.)

Nevertheless Pepe San Roman found it difficult to explain to his wife. He waited until his three children were in bed and then began to talk as he and his wife sat down at the kitchen table.

"I told her that for her and my kids I had to fight Castro. And I told her I had found a way to fight him now, and it was a very sure way, and I was going to leave her for the camp, but she could be sure that in six months it would be over and we would be back in Cuba, happy with the family. I told her I wanted to go because it was my duty as a Cuban. I didn't want my kids to ask me after Cuba was free what I had done and be unable to give them a good answer. I promised it was going to be successful and that we would have a home in Cuba near her family that she loves very much."

Pepe Meets 'Carl'

On June 2, the day of their departure for the camp, Pepe San Roman for the first time met one of the Americans involved in the affair. He was a man in his 30s; obviously strong, dressed in sports shirt and slacks, but with the bearing of a professional soldier. Pepe remembers noticing that he had

"That's the way the thing started," said Pepe. "We trusted each other but we had confidence in the Americans."

But when Carl asked them to turn over any weapons, they had, they said they had none.

A three-hour ride through the night brought them to the west coast of Florida, somewhere near Fort Myers. There, they were taken to a waterfront area where they saw a power cruiser tied up at a pier with the motor running and two Americans aboard. Again the Cubans were told they must turn over their weapons; again they said they didn't have any.

As soon as they were aboard, the cruiser headed for the open sea. The Cubans talked quietly among themselves in Spanish. "We were afraid maybe they were taking us to a Fidelista boat," Pepe said. "We said if we are going to Fidel we will shoot the four Americans even if Fidel gets us. Well, we had a compass. So we saw that we were going west, always west. So we said, West, we cannot go to Cuba."

Reach Headquarters

After a tense hour the Cubans saw a long shadow ahead in the moonlight. As they drew closer they made out a wide, beautiful beach. It was very white under the full moon and they could distinguish what appeared to be a number of small cabins. The

also was an American, blond, young and smiling. He said he was glad they had come. He drove them across the sand and up a small hill, and there through the orange and grapefruit trees they saw the lights from a large building shining on smaller structures scattered across what seemed to be a golf course. They had arrived at the headquarters of the Americans.


Carl said, "Now give us your guns." They gave him their guns.

Before they went to bed, Carl gave them their first briefing. He began by telling them that everything was top secret. While they were on the island they must stay away from the shore to avoid being seen by boats and planes; they must not swim for the waters around the island were alive with sharks. They would be permitted to write one letter saying they were well and happy, but they could say neither where they were nor what they were doing. They were told that they would be given various tests, and that those chosen for the cadre would go to another secret base to learn to train others in the liberation army; the rest would stay on the island for a radio communications course.

When Carl finished, it was nearly 2 o'clock in the morning. For a moment there was silence, and then Pepe San Roman asked the question in



Brigade leaders show the effects of their invasion ordeal in these pictures taken before and after the invasion. Above is Pepe San Roman, in Guatemala in February, 1961 (left) and in prison in Havana two months later. Below is Manuel Artime in Guatemala and later after his capture in the swamps surrounding the Bay of Pigs.



ERNESTO OLIVA
Brigade Second in Command

every man's mind. "What is the United States going to give?"

"We are here to help Cuba, and if you are here for that reason we will get along well," Carl replied. Evasive as it was, Carl's answer satisfied the eager Cubans.

On Resort Island

For the next three weeks the Cubans lived in comfort in the rustic golf club. They were on the resort island of Useppa, an island a Cuban named Freddie Goudie had leased on behalf of the CIA. The papers were made out in Goudie's name and there was nothing to indicate the American involvement except for the presence of the Americans themselves.

Aside from the Cuban recruits, everyone on the island was American. After Carl, the key people seemed to be "Jimmy," a towering, black-haired man who spoke Spanish; "Walter," who had an artificial eye; and "Gordon," quiet and diplomatic. There was a psychologist with blond hair who said he was from Nashville, Tenn. and there were others whose names have been forgotten. "Max," the psychiatrist, has not been forgotten. He was genial, short, bespectacled and German. Max was in charge of testing.

Each man received a physical examination, and intelligence, psychological and general aptitude tests. As Airline had discovered months before, the lie detector was regarded as one of the most important testing devices.

The Americans always tried to give the impression that a Cuban millionaire was paying the bills, and that the United States Government had nothing to do with the operation. The Cubans figuratively winked at the claim, and privately joked about the "Cuban millionaire" and referred to him as "Uncle Sam." "At that time we were so stupid," one of the men said later. "We thought Uncle Sam was behind us. He wanted to do this secretly. That was all right because he was Uncle Sam, and he is strong."

On June 22 Carl assembled the Cubans and introduced "Dick," a tall man in his 50s, quiet and pleasant. Dick told them that the 28 men who had been chosen as the cadre would leave immediately for the next base. The others would stay until their radio course was finished and then they all would be reunited with the liberation army.

Pepé San Roman was among the 28. With the others, he was taken back to the mainland on two cruisers. When they reached the pier near Fort Myers, they were told to run to a large truck backed up to the dock with its rear doors open. The doors slammed shut and they drove off, unable to see outside.

Several hours later they got out in the middle of a deserted farm where they waited until the sun set; then they continued their trip in the closed truck. When it stopped again they saw a C-54 transport plane directly in front of them. Again they were ordered to run. They were able to catch only a glimpse of a few scraggly pines and untended fields before they got on the plane, the windows of which were masked from the outside. The engines started immediately and they took off. Eventually,

nearly 1,500 more would follow them.

Deep in a Jungle

Some six or seven hours later their plane landed in darkness, and they were herded to a waiting truck. Again the doors slammed shut and they traveled for another hour in darkness. They were herded to a waiting truck. Again the doors slammed shut and they traveled for another hour in darkness. They were deep in a tropical jungle. From far away they heard a sharp, shrill whistle. It could have been a factory—or perhaps a ship.

An American of medium height and weight, with a scar on his face, who called himself "Peter," greeted them and introduced John, Dave, Wally and the rest of their American instructors. All of the Americans were in civilian clothing. Because they had arrived so late, Peter said, they would not have to get up early that morning, but after that each day would begin at 5 o'clock. They went to bed in nearby wooden barracks, tired and excited, hopeful and fearful.

Later in the morning Peter gave them a more formal briefing. Just as on Useppa Island, everything was top secret. Then he defined the camp boundaries.

"He said that we could not go to the top of the hill that was in back of the mess hall," Pepe said. "It was off limits. And we could not go around the road. And he said that if we see anybody we shouldn't say anything. Also, he said that sometimes there were hunters in that zone, so possibly we might hear some guns fired from time to time."

Peter explained that they would be trained at the base for eight weeks, and after that they would leave to instruct the Cuban liberation army. The training would be rugged, but when they finished they would be experts in guerrilla warfare.

'Off Limits' Explored

Despite precautions, including cigarettes bearing labels from a variety of American countries; the removal of labels from the uniforms they were issued, the obvious scratching out of "USA" on their weapons, the Cubans soon discovered where they were, and in whose hands.

On Sunday, their first day off from training, Pepe San Roman, later the Cuban chief of staff, explored the off-limits territory. When he got to the top of a hill he clearly saw the Panama Canal. Not long after his discovery, the men noticed one of their instructors carrying a Panama City newspaper. In fact, they were in the United States' army jungle warfare training camp area of Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone.

The training was rugged. "We were taught how to fight as guerrillas," Pepe says. "Sometimes they would make us walk a long way through the jungle to get the feel of it—to be wet, without food and to experience danger. There was the danger of getting lost, and there were snakes. It was a very deep jungle."

The equipment and living conditions were poor, but we did not really mind. At that point we believed that we were going to train a large number of Cubans for guerrilla war, that we were going to Cuba, and that we would always have what we had then—organization and control, good control. We

know we might die in Cuba, but we are doing something organized by people who really cared. Those instructors did a good job with us. We never thought things were going to be handled the way they eventually were."

Guerrillas Tested

In the middle of August, in their seventh week of training, the men began a long, tactical field problem, with Pepe heading a guerrilla force that was supposed to attack the "army" back at the base. The mission went smoothly and everyone was pleased, especially the Americans.

As a reward for their arduous training, the Cubans were given a farewell party with beer and a big cake. In the convivial atmosphere, the Americans and Cubans drank and talked while a record player played Latin songs. As the party progressed a short, stocky American brought out a Spanish guitar and began to play flamenco. The Cubans were delighted, and rather amazed, to see an American playing their music so well. As they sang together, one of the Americans said: "Well, we'll meet in a free Cuba." Another American told Pepe they were going to a new base the next day, "where there were five thousand men and everything was ready." The next evening, August 22, 1960, they again boarded a C-54 and flew off into the night.

(The base to which they were flown was in the Sierra Madre mountains in Guatemala, part of a vast coffee plantation, called Helvetia, owned by Roberto Alejo, brother of the Guatemalan Ambassador to the United States. Months earlier, the ambassador had been approached about the massing of arms and training of Cuban anti-Castro forces on Guatemalan soil.)

The details of the final oral agreement between the CIA and Miguel Ydigoras, then president of Guatemala, never have been made public. Mr. Ydigoras has stated that the United States pledged to mediate Guatemala's claim to British Honduras territory but the United States has denied it. Whatever the terms, a bargain was made.

(When San Roman and his companions arrived in the secret training camp, they found only 160 men instead of the 500 promised by the CIA. Seven months later, as DDT approached, the number was 500.)

Tomorrow: The die is cast—Manuel Artime's dramatic story. Adapted from the book by the author, published by W. W. Norton & Co. Copyright 1964 by W. W. Norton & Co.

An Absorbing Account of Fiasco That Was the Bay of Pigs Invasion

THE BAY OF PIGS. By Haynes Johnson. W. W. Norton & Co., Inc. 368 pages. \$5.95. **Book**

Cuban exiles are the heroes and the Central Intelligence Agency is the villain in this absorbing and important work of current history.

Haynes Johnson took a year's leave of absence from the Washington Star to get and write this narrative account of the abortive attempt to invade Cuba in 1961. He interviewed many of the members of the invasion brigade in the months after the United States ransomed them from prison in Cuba. His four collaborators in the book—Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Roman, Erneido Oliva, and Enrique Ruiz-Williams—had been handpicked by the CIA as leaders of the invasion force.

With their help, he pieced together the story of the creation of the secret exile training camps in Guatemala in the Eisenhower Administration, the accelerated training under President Kennedy, the embarkation at a Nicaraguan port with Dictator Luiz Somoza bidding goodbye, the night landing on a beach unexpectedly girdled with reefs, Fidel Castro's disastrous control of the air, the sinking of a ship carrying precious supplies, three days of bitter fighting on the beach, the final defeat, and the long denouement of imprisonment and eventual release. Much of the detailed account is new.

Allegations about the CIA are numerous and serious, Mr. Johnson says the agency underestimated the Cuban air force, overestimated the readiness of the Cuban people



HAYNES JOHNSON

to revolt, reconnoitred the beach poorly, failed to tell the exiles they should move into the mountains as a guerrilla force if the invasion stalled, and failed to tell President Kennedy that the exiles' guerrilla training had been dropped long ago.

The most sensational charge is that the top CIA agent in Guatemala told the exile leaders to go ahead with the invasion even if the President tried to halt it. Three of the leaders are quoted as saying the agent, a United States Army colonel known only as "Frank," told them if necessary to take the Americans' prisoners, cut communications with the outside, and proceed with the plan.

The CIA has followed its customary pattern for dealing with criticism in dealing with this one. It refused any direct comment but immediately began benefiting from official-sounding denials attributed to well-informed sources.

"Frank" is said to have written a letter denying the story categorically. But other sources, also well-informed, say his letter told of fears that the powerful exile brigade, the strongest military force in Central America, might go ahead anyhow as an army out of control if the President tried to call a halt. The officer is said to have told of communicating those fears to the exile leaders.

Predicting something may happen can be not much different from giving it a green light, and they can have the same effect on the hearer. CIA officials were singing the same tune in Washington, warning that the invasion plan had a momentum of its own and could not be canceled without grave consequences.

Looking back at the fighting, Mr. Johnson's Cuban informants may have exaggerated their own successes. One might conclude from this account that they could have won with air support. This would neglect the wild optimism of CIA's assumption that two air strikes could have knocked out Castro's air force and that aerial bombing could cut all three of the causeways on which Castro's tanks and troops would have to cross a swamp to reach the beach.

Anyhow, as Mr. Johnson says, "The real question posed by the Bay of Pigs is not whether the Cubans would have won had they had sufficient support, but whether they could have fashioned a political triumph after their military victory."

—RICHARD DUDMAN.

Mr. Dudman is a member of the Washington Bureau of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.

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BOOKS IN REVIEW

Did CIA Mislead JFK in Bay of Pigs?

By Ray Erwin

THE BAY OF PIGS: The Leaders' Story of Brigade 2506. By Haynes Johnson with Manuel Artime, José Pérez-San Román, Ernesto Oliva, and Enrique Ruiz-Williams. W. W. Norton & Co. May 18. 368 pages. Illustrated. \$5.95.

Most new books must rely for publicity upon whatever book review space they merit or obtain. This is not true of startling revelations made in "The Bay of Pigs," by Haynes Johnson. *Washington* (D. C.) *Star*, with the aid of the four principal leaders of the abortive invasion of Castro's Cuba.

Front-Page Headlines

The book and its heady documentary evidence instantly grabbed front-page headlines. For example, the *New York World-Telegram & Sun* on May 5 had this front-page, four-column headline: "CIA Accused of Plot to Defy Kennedy in Bay of Pigs Fiasco." The story was written by Richard Starnes, the newspaper's former managing editor and now a United Feature Syndicate columnist.

Other columnists already have predicted that this blockbuster book will be partly instrumental in an expected overhauling and reorganization of the Central Intelligence Agency within a few months. Incidentally, printers' proofs of the book were submitted to the CIA well in advance of publication with a request for officials to refute serious charges therein or correct any errors. There was no denial and no comment from an agency whose policy negates denial or comment.

Eric P. Swenson, vicepresident and executive editor of W. W. Norton & Co., the publishers listed some of the revelations of the book in advance of publication in a letter to Representative Leslie C. Arends, Minority Whip:

Five Revelations

"1) In the management of the Bay of Pigs operation, the CIA in Guatemala told the leaders of the Cuban Brigade that if the President decided to cancel the operation, they, the Cubans, were to take the unresisting CIA operatives prisoner and proceed with the invasion. This preparation to countermand an

expected presidential order is of course preparation for mutiny.

"2) The CIA assured the President that it had complied with his instructions that the Cubans be given an alternative battle plan in case the original one ran into trouble. In fact, the CIA had done no such thing. On the contrary, they had told the Cubans that if they should run into trouble, the Americans were going to come ashore to support them.

"3) The CIA assured the President that no Americans would land; in fact, the first men ashore were American frogmen.

"4) The CIA assured the President, prior to the invasion, via the President's special emissary to Guatemala, that the Cubans knew all the details of the proposed invasion plan. In fact, the Cubans had been told nothing—neither the actual plan nor the one reported to the President.

"5) The CIA still claims, and so informed the President, that the plan was only to establish a beachhead in which to set up a provisional government which could then call for American help. In actual fact, the CIA orders to the Brigade were to land, travel up the swamp roads to the main highway, and turn left to Havana. They were to take Havana and Castro."

This book probably will make news, incite editorials, be a historical source, generate changes in the policies and practices of the CIA.

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Mr. Belmont _____
Mr. Mohr _____
Mr. Casper _____
Mr. Callahan _____
Mr. Conrad _____
Mr. DeLoach _____
Mr. Evans _____
Mr. Gale _____
Mr. Rosen _____
Mr. Sullivan _____
Mr. Tavel _____
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Editor and Publisher
New York, New York
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Meet the Author

The newsman-author worked from hundreds of thousands of words of recorded interviews with the Cuban leaders and hundreds of their men. His information about the key decisions in Washington are from unimpeachable sources.

Haynes Johnson was born in New York (1931), the son of Malcolm Johnson, executive of the public relations firm of Hill and Knowlton, who won a Pulitzer Prize as a *New York Sun* reporter. Haynes Johnson was graduated from the School of Journalism of the University of Missouri and earned a master's degree in American history from



Haynes Johnson

the University of Wisconsin. He was in the Army three years and worked for the *Wilmington* (Dela.) *Journal* before joining the *Star*. He took a year's leave for research among Cuban refugees in Miami for the new book.

An earlier book by Haynes Johnson was a perceptive and penetrating study of the Negro in Washington (*E&P*, Jan. 12 1963, page 36) under title of "Dusk at the Mountain" (Doubleday, 273 pages, \$4.50).

CIA Plot Revealed To Defy JFK During 1961 Cuba Invasion

THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY conspired to go ahead with the April, 1961, invasion of Cuba even if President Kennedy called off the attack at the last minute. This was revealed by four Cuban agents of the CIA, who were among the top organizers of the ill-fated attempt.

Their disclosure was reported in a new book, entitled "The Bay of Pigs" by Haynes Johnson, Washington reporter. It was published by W. W. Norton.

The CIA has remained silent on these revelations of an anti-Kennedy plot, despite the fact that it had the proofs of the book for some time before it was put on sale.

The doublecrossing role of the CIA was exposed by four leaders of invasion Brigade 2506, Manuel Artino, Jose Perez Roman, Enrique Olivia and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.

The book's revelations give emphasis to the charges in Congress and elsewhere in Washington and in the nation that the CIA has become a government above the government of the U.S., with the power to develop its own foreign and domestic policy and to carry out actions, independent of and even in defiance of the will of the Presidency and Congress.

Allen W. Dulles, an old hand at intrigue, was chief of the CIA, when this conspiracy was proposed.

According to the Johnson book, in April, 1961, on the eve of the invasion, Olivia and San Roman were ordered to a secret parley at Base Trax, a CIA training base for the invasion, in Guatemala. At this meeting, they were briefed by a CIA agent, whom the two Cuban renegades knew only as "Frank."



DULLES

there were people in the Kennedy administration who were aiming at calling off the Cuban invasion. He claimed that he, "Frank," might be ordered to cancel the invasion attempt. "Frank," then, told San Roman and Olivia that he would let them know at once secretly if he received such orders from Washington. Then, the Johnson book reports San Roman as recalling "Frank's" instructions thus:

"If this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisers, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners."

As San Roman recalled it, "Frank" gave explicit instructions as to how to proceed, detailing an armed guard to each American's door, halting communications with the outside world, until he gave the orders for leaving for the advance base for the invasion.

When the Cuban renegades

asked "Frank" who were those opposed to the invasion, he was vague, calling them "forces in the administration" or "politicians," or "chiefs above."

"Frank" gave the Cuban renegades the shock of their lives when he declared that if the Kennedy administration gave him the order to cancel the invasion, "I have also orders from my bosses, my commanders, to continue anyway."

Johnson declares in his book that the Cuban chiefs of the invasion attempt "never doubted that he ("Frank") was speaking for his superiors."

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'Bay of Pigs' Sweeps Away Myths About Cuban Invasion

Reviewed by Karl E. Meyer

An editorial writer for The Washington Post, Meyer is co-author of "The Cuban Invasion."

THE BAY OF PIGS. By Haynes Johnson. Norton, 368 pp. \$5.95.

THIS VOLUME admirably closes a gap in the public record concerning what Haynes Johnson rightly calls the most badly bungled military operation since the Light Brigade charged into Balaklava. While it doesn't wholly explain the reason why it sweeps away many of the myths that still cling to the Cuban invasion.

Johnson is a competent staff writer for The Washington Star. He and his publisher had the enterprising idea of interviewing leaders and survivors of the invading force to establish what happened while memories were fresh.

Though Johnson had a free hand in writing the book, the story he relates is endorsed by four of the prominent leaders of Brigade 2506: Manuel Artime, Jose Perez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.

This, then, is Brigade of officers' own version of the grotesque debacle on the Bay of Pigs, and as such the book will be a primary source for historians in years to come.

What is their story? In its salient aspects, it does not contradict previously published accounts. It does add devastating detail, all the more credible since the tone is calm and since the four leaders have little to gain by taking on the CIA.

And it is the CIA that emerges as the principal architect of the disaster, which had its genesis in March, 1960, when President Eisenhower authorized the agency to train a force of Cuban exiles for use against the Castro regime.

THE CUBANS were recruited in Miami and sent to camps in Guatemala, where the force grew and so did the plan. But not wholly with presidential assent. It was Mr. Eisenhower's understanding that he was authorizing only guerrilla training.

But according to Johnson, the CIA decided to drop the guerrilla approach and train an army along conventional lines — and sent out the order for this four days before the 1960 election apparently without troubling to inform the President.

That is the first depth-charge in the book. Others include:

At the end of March, 1961, after President Kennedy had taken office, an army colonel working for CIA told the Cubans that "politicians" or "chiefs above" or "forces in the Administration" were opposing the invasion.

If the invasion was not approved, San Roman was informed, "you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisors, in prison, and you go ahead with the program as we

have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners."

Contrary to explicit assurances to the President, the CIA never informed the Cuban leaders of the detailed battle plan, or of the alternative strategy devised in the event the plan misfired. Mr. Kennedy also was assured that no Americans would take part; the first man ashore was an American frogman.

These are only a few of the unsettling revelations in a tale of incompetence, egregious stupidity, and even insubordination — strong words, surely, but supported by a narrative that should be read by every member of Congress.

The tale is not without a brighter side. Though the book is manifestly sympathetic to Brigade 2506 (named after the serial number of a Cuban who died in training camp), it convincingly lays to rest the canard that the Cubans were mere cowardly mercenaries.

They fought well, they stuck together in Castro's prison until the United States paid for their release, and whatever their faults they were more victims than free agents. One vignette is especially moving — the hitherto untold story of the 22 Cubans who drifted without food or

water for 15 days until their sailboat neared New Orleans. Only 12 survived.

THE CHIEF FAULT of the book is that it fails to place the entire mad venture into historical and political context. Many anti-Castro Cubans were opposed to the entire approach implicit in the CIA scheme; their views are not represented in these pages. Nor is it fair to fault Sen. J. W. Fulbright for a supposedly equivocal stand in opposing the invasion without mentioning his memorandum to Mr. Kennedy which was hardly equivocal.

These are blemishes in an otherwise first-rate piece of reporting. The real question posed by the 'Bay of Pigs' Johnson writes, "is not whether the Cubans would have won had they sufficient support, but whether they could have fashioned a political triumph after their military victory."

On the evidence of this book, the answer must be negative. Throughout, the real offense of the CIA was that it treated all too credulous Cubans as stooges and puppets to be manipulated by shadowy masters.

It was not lack of the mythical "air cap" that doomed the invasion — it was total lack of respect for either principles or people.



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Book Says CIA Defied JFK in Cuba Invasion

A new arrange of evidence purporting to prove that President Kennedy was deceived by Central Intelligence Agency operatives during the Bay of Pigs fiasco has official Washington sizzling.

Four leaders of the 1961 invasion have revealed to a Washington newsman-author that the CIA mapped secret plans to countermand White House decisions and misled the President regarding details and objectives of the operation.

Results of a one-year investigation of the disaster appear in a book by Haynes Johnson, Washington Star reporter. "Bay of Pigs" was written with the cooperation of the four leaders of Brigade 2506—Manuel Artime, Jose Perz San Roman, Erneido Oliva and Enrique Ruiz-Williams.

Advance copies of the book, due for publication May 18 by the W. W. Norton & Co., Inc., of New York, have already produced some sharp glances by Congress in the direction of the super-secret CIA.

Johnson asserts that preparation to ignore a presidential order was made by an agent who commanded Base Trax in Guatemala, a pre-invasion training camp. The agent is identified only as "Frank," a U.S. Army colonel serving with the CIA.

In early April, 1961, according to the book, he summoned San Roman and Oliva and advised them that "forces in the administration" were trying to block the invasion and he might be ordered to stop it. Should that happen, the agent said, he would secretly inform the Cubans.

San Roman recalls the CIA instructions: "If this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were

your go ahead with the operation as we have talked about it and we will give you the whole plan even if we are your prisoners."

Then presidential orders to halt the operation were not issued, but the author concludes that the CIA "or at least its agents" was acting at times contrary to established United States policies and even contrary to the wishes of the President of the United States.

Johnson contends that the CIA assured the President that it had complied with his instructions to give the Cubans an alternate battle plan in case the original plan was unsuccessful.

It was later learned in a secret top-level administration probe that the CIA had decided on its own not to issue the second plan.

Another alleged violation of presidential instructions came in the landing itself. Describing the landing by frogmen at Playa Giron, Johnson writes: "Gray, the American who had trained them, was with them and Gray, the American, was the first to land in the invasion—despite the insistence of President Kennedy that no Americans participate in the action."

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CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR
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RECORD AMERICAN
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Date: 5-7-64
Edition: Morning
Author:
Editor: Victor O. Jones
Title: CUBAN MATTERS

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The writer says that prior to the invasion the CIA assured President Kennedy, via the President's special emissary to Guatemala, that the Cubans knew all the details of the proposed invasion plan.

The leaders now dispute this, stating they had been told nothing until the day of departure, and even then the information was sparse and erroneous.

In another blast at the CIA, the book asserts, the orders

issued to the Brigade differed from the objective stated by the CIA to the President.

That agency claimed that the plan was only to establish a beachhead in which to set up a provisional government which could then call for American help. But in the pre-departure briefing, the top CIA agent told the leaders:

"Hold the beach for 72 hours. We will be there with you for the next step. But you will be so strong, you will be getting so many people on

your side, that you won't want to wait for us.

"You will go straight ahead. You will put your hands out, turn left, and go straight into Havana."

Eric P. Swenson, vice president and executive editor of the publishing firm, asserts that proofs of the book have been read by the CIA and comments solicited.

"There has been no denial," he says.

CUBANS UNCOVER WEAPONS CACHE; U.S. SAYS IT'S OLD

Havana Charges New Plot—
Washington Asserts Arms
Were Dropped in 1961

By United Press International
HAVANA, May 5—The Castro regime announced today the discovery of an "enormous" arms cache it said had been hidden in the waters off Pinar del Rio's north coast by United States agents.

Newspapers reported that United States-made rifles, pistols, explosives and Cuban currency worth \$15,000 had been found in nine metal boxes and eight waterproof drums that were lashed together and left in the shallows, secured by a line to a tree on the shore.

According to the press, the weapons were for use of anti-Castro saboteurs, commandos and guerrilla forces.

[In Washington, qualified sources said the weapons had been dropped for the underground in 1961. It was believed that the announcement of the discovery at this time indicated that Cuba feared a new attack from the United States.]

Fisherman Gets Credit

The Cuban press said a fisherman had discovered the cache: a cache mentioned is 25 miles from the capital city of Havana, to and 100 miles from the coast.

The fisherman has proved in the manner that the weapons were made and put in the U.S.A., a Government statement said, "and transported to the place of discovery through methods customary to infiltration operations directed by Yankee espionage agencies."

The contents of the boxes and drums were listed as 15 Garand rifles, 12 Browning pistols, 4 packets of C-4 explosive, 10 antipersonnel mines, 16 packages containing 260 time detonators and a package containing \$15,000 Cuban pesos in denominations of 5, 10, and 20 pesos.

The source of these arms and materials for uprisings, terrorism and sabotage along with their unmistakable North American origin and the method of infiltration employed shows the responsibility and direct participation of the Government of the United States in this new act of subversive nature, and open interference in Cuban affairs," the communique said.

Special Manufacture Seen HAVANA, May 5 (AP)

The newspaper reports on the discovery of the arms cache that characteristics of the cache indicated that a great part had been made "exclusively" espionage and subversion agencies of the Government and that they are available only to agents chosen by the United States to realize its aggressive plans.

"Although these criminal activities have been systematically happening," one report said, "the new fact has special importance as it has happened at a time when piratical, irresponsible actions of the United States Government endanger the peace."

The "piratical, irresponsible actions" were taken to mean the reconnaissance flights made over Cuba periodically since the missile crisis in the fall of 1962.

Premier Fidel Castro has declared Cuba will use all means at her disposal to stop the flights. President Johnson's Administration has announced the flights will continue as a precaution against another secret missile build-up.

U.S. Sees Invasion Fears

By TAD SZULC

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 5—Fears of an impending attack from the United States were believed today to have motivated Havana's announcement of discovery of a cache of arms and explosives.

Qualified sources indicated that the cache, which the Cuban regime said was intended to spread sabotage, had been actually dropped for the underground early in 1961.

The State Department had no comment on the charges. But, informed quarters said, the Castro regime may have found it timely to make it appear that the arms constituted a new shipment and incorporate the accusation in its mounting campaign to make the United States again appear as an aggressor.

The opinion here is that Dr. Castro has his eye on the May 20 date that Manuel Ray, a leading anti-Castro leader, set publicly late last year for a landing in Cuba and a revolutionary campaign.

Mr. Ray, who was Minister of Public Works in the

Castro regime in 1959, was a member of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, which was nominally the group leading the invasion in 1961. He subsequently resigned from the council and later organized his own group, the Revolutionary Junta.

Qualified quarters here described as "extremely interesting" the fact that the Cuban announcement today spoke of sabotage, guerrilla subversion and terrorism.

It was surmised here that the Castro regime had used the discovery of the old cache as a means of activities by the Ray group to lead the population to believe they were facing a new United States conspiracy.

Informed sources said that the arms cache appeared to be one that had been dropped for use by the now defunct "Revolutionary Unity" group and the "Movement of Revolutionary Recuperation," which were in 1961, operating around Pinar del Rio.

Specialists said that the method of hiding arms and explosives underwater, near coastal pick-up points, was abandoned at least two years ago.

The weapons and explosives described by Havana are of standard types and have been used in assisting the anti-Castro

tro underground both before and after the 1961 invasion. They can be purchased directly by anti-Castro groups on the flourishing clandestine arms market in the United States in the Caribbean.

In the view of officials here, some of the Castro regime's apparent nervousness may relate to his unclear relationship with the Soviet Union.

Highly qualified informants said that the Soviet Union had in the last several months withdrawn from the island radar tracking equipment installed in 1963 for use with ground-to-air missiles.

This equipment, they said, is particularly difficult to jam from the outside and can be used to track low-flying aircraft. However, it was said, the radar that remains in Cuba has the required capability to track high-flying aircraft, such as the U-2 plane, and is as efficient as the equipment that was in operation during the 1958 crisis.

The opinion of experts was that the Soviet Union took out the more elaborate equipment because it was considered unnecessary.

However, it was said, the Castro regime may have represented the move, particularly if it fears a new attack.

Recent reports have also said that the withdrawal of Soviet

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New York Herald Tribune
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New York Mirror
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The Wall Street Journal
The National Observer
People's World
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troops from Cuba is continuing at a slow but constant rate and that the best estimate is that 2,000 to 4,000 Soviet military personnel remain.

Meanwhile, official sources here denied allegations in a recent book about the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. The book said that agents of the Central Intelligence Agency had ordered the commander of a rebel brigade to proceed with the attack that April even if the Kennedy Administration counter-

manded the plans at the last moment.

An account, which said the orders were issued at a training camp in Guatemala, appears in "The Bay of Pigs" by Haynes Johnson, written in cooperation with four commanders of a rebel brigade.

The book said that the C.I.A. operative, identified as "Frank," had told the brigade commanders that if President Kennedy should order the invasion halted, the Cubans should "imprison"

the C.I.A. personnel in the camp and try to proceed on their own.

However, sources here said that even if such orders had been given by individual agents—and they said that the agent identified as "Frank" had denied it—the orders had no basis in any directive from Washington. Also, it was said, the Cuban rebels would not have been in a position to get themselves from the Guatemalan camps to Cuba without United States assistance.

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(BAY OF PIGS)

NEW YORK--THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS THE CHIEF ARCHITECT OF THE BAY OF PIGS DISASTER AND DECEIVED AND BETRAYED THE LATE PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IT WAS CHARGED TODAY IN A BOOK WRITTEN BY A WASHINGTON REPORTER.

THE BOOK, "THE BAY OF PIGS" BY HAYNES JOHNSON OF THE WASHINGTON STAR, WAS WRITTEN IN COLLABORATION WITH CUBAN INVASION COMMANDERS MANUEL ARTIME, JOSE PEREZ ARMAN, ERNEIDO OLIVA AND ENRIQUE RUIZ-
WILLIAMS. THE BOOK WILL GO ON SALE MAY 18.

JOHNSON QUOTED THE BRIGADE COMMANDERS AS SAYING THE CHIEF CIA INSTRUCTOR AT THE BASE TRAX, THE SECRET INVASION TRAINING CAMP IN GUATEMALA, TOLD THEM SHORTLY BEFORE THE INVASION WAS LAUNCHED THAT THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION MIGHT ORDER THE INVASION HALTED AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR.

THE INSTRUCTOR, KNOWN ONLY AS "FRANK," TOLD THE MEN THAT IN EVENT OF CANCELLATION THEY WERE TO "MAKE SOME KIND OF SHOW, AS IF YOU WERE PUTTING US, THE ADVISORS, IN PRISON, AND YOU GO AHEAD WITH THE PROGRAM AS WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT IT, AND WE WILL GIVE YOU THE WHOLE PLAN, EVEN IF WE ARE YOUR PRISONERS." THE BOOK SAID. FRANK SAID HIS CIA SUPERIORS WOULD GIVE INSTRUCTIONS ON HOW AND WHEN TO UNDERTAKE THE INVASION EVEN THOUGH IT WAS CANCELLED.

ERIC P. SWENSON, EXECUTIVE EDITOR OF W.W. NORTON & CO., PUBLISHERS OF THE BOOK, SAID PAGE PROOFS OF THE BOOK WERE SENT TO THE CIA TWO MONTHS AGO WITH COMMENT INVITED. HE SAID THE CIA OFFERED NO COMMENT.

JOHNSON ALSO CHARGED THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S INVESTIGATION OF THE 1961 FIASCO REVEALED THAT THE CIA DELIBERATELY FAILED TO TELL THE BRIGADE COMMANDERS ANYTHING ABOUT AN ALTERNATIVE EMERGENCY PLAN DRAWN UP ON THE SPECIFIC ORDERS OF THE PRESIDENT. THE PLAN CALLED FOR DISPERSAL OF THE INVASION BRIGADE IN THE MOUNTAINS TO CONDUCT GUERRILLA WARFARE IN CASE THE LANDING WAS UNSUCCESSFUL.

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NEW BOOK MAKES A DISTURBING CHARGE

Did CIA Masterminds Prepare to Spin JFK at Bay of Pigs?

By RICHARD STARNES



FOUR Cuban leaders of the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion have reported that Central Intelligence Agency personnel gave them detailed instructions to go ahead with the attack even if President Kennedy ordered a last-minute cancellation.

All four charged that a CIA agent in charge of training the assault brigade told them on the eve of invasion that there was some reason to believe the President might call off the attack, and if that happened the Cubans were to make "prisoners" of the CIA agents and go ahead with the invasion as scheduled.

This charge leveled in a book written by Haynes Johnson, a respected Washington newsman, in collaboration with the leaders of the ill-starred Brigade 2506—Manuel Artur, José Pérez San Roman, Ernesto Oliva and Enrique Ruiz Williams.

The book (*The Bay of Pigs*, published by W. W. Norton & Co.) is the product of a year's research. Proofs of the book were early made available to the CIA, but have elicited no reply.

"They asked to see it," Mr. Johnson said, "and we sent it to them. I told them if they could show me where anything in the book was wrong, I'd correct it." Up until yesterday, by which time the book was on sale in Washington bookstores, the CIA had remained mute.

At "Base Trax," a not-so-secret CIA training facility in Guatemala, "Pepe" San Roman and Oliva were summoned to a secret briefing in April, 1961, just prior to the brigade's scheduled departure for a forward invasion staging area. They were briefed by a CIA operative they knew only as "Frank." This is the shocking proposal they assert Frank made to them:

"... There were forces in the Administration trying to block the invasion, and Frank might be ordered to stop it. If he received such an order, he said he would secretly inform Pepe and Oliva. Pepe remembers Frank's next words this way:

"If this happens you come here and make some kind of show, as if you were putting us, the advisers, in prison, and you go ahead with the program, as we have talked about it, and we will give you the whole plan, even if we are your prisoners."

Frank was quite specific, they were to place an armed Bri-

gade soldier at each American's door, cut communications with the outside, and continue the training until he told them when, and how, to leave for Trampoline (advance) base. Frank then laughed and said: "In the end we will win."

The book continues that the CIA's plan "disturbed" Pepe and Oliva, but they agreed to go ahead with it because they trusted the Americans who had trained, equipped and financed them. The book added:

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Frank then called in Artime and privately told him the same thing. Artime was as stunned as the others. Frank never said who opposed the invasions—it was just 'forces in the Administration,' or 'politicians,' or 'chiefs above.' He did say that if he received the order to stop the invasion, 'I have also orders from my bosses, my commanders, to continue anyway' ..."

Artime, San Roman and Oliva "never doubted that he was speaking for his superiors. It seemed obvious to them that the Brigade could not be transported to another unknown base, and then placed aboard ships to go to Cuba without the knowledge and assistance of a great organization."

Thus, the book charges, did the CIA issue detailed instructions to the Cuban invaders to violate Mr. Kennedy's orders, should he have decided to call off the invasion.

The book, which is carefully annotated and indexed, and which bears the unmistakable stamp of thoro research, makes these additional disclosures of the CIA's role in the disaster at the Bay of Pigs:

The battle plan, drawn up by the CIA and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was based on fatally defective intelligence data. Underwater terrain was incorrectly mapped, Castro's air power was woefully underestimated, as was his ability to react swiftly to invasion. President Kennedy had been assured that Americans would not take part in the actual landings, but American frogmen were the first ashore.

Brigade 2506 fought bravely against insuperable odds, but Mr. Johnson's well-documented history makes it clear that defeat and humiliation were inevitable. The survivors were, of course, held for nearly two years in Castro prisons until the United States ransomed them. "The Bay of Pigs," which is certain to become an important historical source book as well as a taut, suspenseful narrative, is the distillate of hundreds of thousands of tape-recorded words with the freed survivors of the tragically maladroitness invasion. It has the clear ring of historical authenticity.

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THREE YEARS AFTER THE BAY OF PIGS, HERE IS THE FIRST FULLY DOCUMENTED STORY OF A KEY EVENT IN THAT DISASTER: THE ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

by ANDREW ST. GEORGE

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Parade Magazine
The Washington Post and Times Herald
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This week will mark the anniversary of the ill-fated disaster at the Bay of Pigs. It is exactly three years since Fidel Castro's regime threw back an exile-manned, U.S.-supported attempt to invade Cuba.

The story of that debacle has been repeatedly discussed since. It has been the subject of Congressional and executive investigations and of partisan political recrimination.

Yet one of the most important details of that Cuban defeat has not previously been revealed. It is an event that may have been the whole key to the Bay of Pigs tragedy, and its occurrence—or failure to occur—had a profound effect on the invasion itself and on subsequent history. And although it has not publicly been acknowledged, long and painstaking investigation by this reporter has documented this event.

Carried out on the highest levels of Cuba's revolutionary government, it was an attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro. And it came within a cat's whisker of success.

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This plot, of course, was not the first against Castro's life, nor has it been the last. One of the records of which the bearded revolutionary leader is least proud is the number of times he has been the target of nearly successful assassination attempts.

Before detailing that most important plot, let's look



Plotter of Castro assassination attempt, Sori Marin (in glasses and uniform) stands next to leader at parade.

at a few others. The most recent try came just before the celebrations in Havana last January commemorating the victory over Batista. U.S. security boats intercepted two speedboats crammed with anti-Castro conspirators and hundreds of *petacas*, plastic bombs to blast Castro from his reviewing stand.

The U.S. government, worried about the Caribbean aftermath of a successful assassination, is not happy about such attempts. But American nervousness has not been able to do too much about it. Some of the attempts have come so close to success that Castro has

been left with the apprehensive wariness of a lone fox in a hunting preserve.

An early try at an ambush was engineered by the sinister Col. Johnny Abbes, formerly intelligence chief of the Dominican Republic. Abbes, working on orders of Dominican strongman Rafael Trujillo—himself the victim of assassination—hired a swashbuckling American adventurer, Alex Rorke, son-in-law of New York's famed restaurateur, Sherman Billingsley, to pilot a speedboat that landed eight men before dawn in eastern Cuba. The plan was to ambush Castro on his way to speak at a service at the Santiago cemetery.

Through a pouring rain, Trujillo's Tommy gun team spotted Castro's chief bodyguard, Capt. Alfredo Gamonal, in the second jeep of a caravan.

The killers assumed Castro was in the back seat, and their bullets chewed up Gamonal, the superintendent of cemeteries and the jeep driver. Castro, riding in the next-to-the-last jeep, was unhurt.

"He may have nine lives," Abbes told Rorke, who returned to Ciudad Trujillo complaining of Castro's charmed life. "But if so, I'll try a tenth time."

Abbes acquired an apartment in Havana overlooking the CMQ television studios, where Castro appeared frequently to deliver his nation-wide harangues. Another American adventurer, a one-time top competition sharpshooter, was retained by Trujillo on a down payment of \$25,000 and the promise of a cool million if he managed to score a clean hit on his moving target.

The marksman said he could do it, but demanded a special weapon—a bench-adjusted telescopic carbine with a nondeflecting muzzle silencer.

SAVED BY TRUJILLO

"Dominican ordnance experts immediately went to work to produce the rifle," former Dominican State Security Minister General Arturo Espaillat recalls. "The weapon was completed and en route to Cuba, when Trujillo canceled the project. . . He was afraid of Washington's fury. I really think that Fidel would be dead today if the plot had not been called off."

Prior to that attempt, another American, Alan Robert Nye, a 31-year-old Chicagoan, was convicted in Havana for conspiring to kill Castro. Fee: \$100,000. Although a Cuban court had signed, sealed and delivered the order for his execution, Nye was allowed to leave the country for the U.S.

There have been far too many of these attempts to detail here; although men like Alex Rorke, and Paul Hughes, a former American Navy jet pilot, have lost their lives because of them, Castro cannot rest easy.

Before embarking on an airplane trip, he usually inspects the plane from tip to tail. During the warm-up, he once spotted flames belching from the engine exhaust. Castro ordered the ignition cut and both pilots back into the cabin, where they explained for a half-hour that burning exhaust was normal and that it did not prove the plane booby-trapped.

During his visit to New York to attend the United

Nations in 1960, Castro's food problems were magnified by his methods of selecting restaurants. A brace of bodyguards was ordered to go out and buy food from a restaurant—but never from the hotel kitchen or from the restaurant nearest the hotel. On each occasion, Castro would call out a number to his two messengers—say, "Three!" or "Five!" which meant they had to count off three or five restaurants before they could enter the next one, thus having presumably eluded the potential poisoners.

His security chief also carried sensitive white mice

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Conspirator Alan Robert Nye of Chicago was found guilty of trying to kill Fidel Castro, then allowed his freedom.

—“to detect assassination attempts by radiation or nerve gas,” chief bodyguard Gamonal explained.

But the only security measure Castro really has faith in is the one he learned in his two years of guerrilla warfare: never let anyone know where you'll show up next. In the Sierra Maestra, when Castro and his little band were making their revolution against Batista, no one but Fidel knew exactly where the day's march route would end.

The habit persisted. When he made his first visit to Moscow, he left Havana and returned to it as secretly as an enemy infiltrator. No one in Cuba knew when to expect the Premier home. When his Russian airliner finally landed, there was nobody to welcome him except some startled airplane mechanics. Grinning, Castro borrowed a coin, dropped it into the nearest pay phone to let Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticos know he was back.

But it was the assassination attempt just before the Bay of Pigs that was the most significant of all. It involved several senior commanders of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces as well as key civilian leaders.

The Central Intelligence Agency, which had received absolutely reliable reports that a conspiracy to assassinate Castro was developing among his top lieutenants, decided to contact the plotters, because the U.S. was already training its own anti-Castro

force in Guatemala. CIA agents discovered the conspiracy had a wealthy contact man in Miami, a former sugar cane grower, Alberto Fernandez.

With CIA's tacit approval, Fernandez bought a converted subchaser, the *Texana III*, and had it outfitted with concealed deck armaments, 50-cal machine guns, two 57-mm. recoilless rifles and a pair of small speedboats with muffled interceptor engines.

OPERATIONS BEGIN

Now began one of the most daring and extraordinary secret intelligence operations ever attempted. Shuttling in the dark of night between Marathon Key and the north coast of Cuba, the *Texana III* was the link between the Cuban conspirators and the U.S.

Its two deck boats skimmed up to shore less than a dozen miles from Havana to pick up their unusual passengers: Cuban rebel *comandantes* in full uniform and government functionaries carrying brief cases.

Before the sun came up, the travelers were in U.S. waters, where they held quick conferences with American agents, sped back to Cuba the next night.

The tricky and hazardous process went on for a couple of months, and the U.S. learned more and more about the murder conspiracy headed by cool, brainy Comandante Humberto Sorri Marin, a hero of the Castro revolution. Other top-level men involved astounded the Americans: Secret Police Chief Aldo Vera; Comandante Julio Rodriguez, deputy commandant of the San Antonio de los Baños air base; several Navy flag officers; the military superintendent of Camaguey Province; the president of the Cuban Sugar Institute; and the undersecretary of finance. They were determined to act early in 1961. The plot was to kill both Castros and touch off a general uprising.

Convinced that, regardless of what the U.S. did, the conspirators meant business, the CIA decided to capitalize on the plot without actually participating.

Dominican plotter Col. Johnny Abbes arranged at least two nearly successful attempts to assassinate Castro.



in it. Officials readied the landing forces to go ashore at the same time. Agents began a series of secret meetings in Havana with the conspirators to coordinate their plans.

Then, just before the target date, there occurred one of those impossible mistakes nobody ever believes. A crucially important secret conference was being held with most of the top conspirators. They met in a house of known safety in Havana's Miramar suburb on a tranquil street, Calle Onze. It was a large, yellow, somnolent building, lived in and owned by a respectable retired sugar engineer and his wife.

In the front patio, the engineer played gin rummy with his wife and led by many points. In the back of the house, the plotters gathered around a heavy refectory table covered with street maps, pinpointing the massive incendiary attack against the crowded downtown district of "Old Havana," which was to touch off the uprising. *The Texana III* had already shipped in hundreds of *petacas*.

Several blocks away, a militia security patrol stopped in front of another house, then entered to search it. A nervous woman in a back room fled from a rear door with her small daughter. She ran beneath garden walls and ducked into the rear entrance of the large yellow house of the engineer, an old friend.

The street was deserted. But one militiaman watched as she ran to the yellow house. So, under the blazing sky of a spring afternoon, in Miramar, the security unit walked down the street to that yellow house, that sleepy, yellow house. . . .

The pity of it was that the nervous woman who ran did not have to. The security police were on a routine search. She was suspected of nothing; if she had remained, nothing would have gone wrong.

The 11 key figures of the Sori Marin conspiracy were caught in a single sweep. The four men who had been sent in by the CIA might have gotten away; they were all Cubans and carried such perfectly forged papers that two were subsequently shot under their assumed names.

But Sori Marin had no chance whatever. As the *militianos* burst into the room, his pistol leaped into his hand. But the security men's snub-nosed Czech Tommy guns chattered and Sori Marin crumpled as he tried to crash through a window.

And it was all a mistake. The militia walked in by mistake. The woman ran away by mistake.

TOO LATE TO STOP INVASION

Washington, working with fragmented information, decided it was too late to halt the invasion troops staging for departure in Guatemala. There was no way to know just how badly the conspiracy had been crippled; there was a possibility that many of its members had not been identified and would thus be able to carry out the plans.

It was a forlorn hope. April 17, at dawn, the first of the invasion troops splashed through the surf onto



Cluster of bodyguards surround assassination-conscious Castro (back to camera) at a recent parade in Havana.

Giron Beach. April 17, at dawn, the seven top conspirators, led by Sori Marin, wounded, and supported by his guards, but still wearing his uniform, were executed in Havana. Within the next few hours they were followed to the wall by the captured CIA men. The rest, the slaughter at the Bay of Pigs, is history.

U.S. security and intelligence agencies are now more worried about the possibility of a successful assassination. For Washington—which once gave tacit support to Sori Marin—now feels that a real explosion involving Castro could trigger the most unpredictable chain reaction of the coming year, a chain reaction that conceivably could turn into World War III.

The current approach was pointed up in a quiet sort of way the day Allen Dulles—whose own job as head of the CIA ended a short time after that ill-starred invasion—appeared in public for the first time to talk about it on *Meet the Press*.

"Mr. Dulles," the moderator asked, "in launching the Bay of Pigs invasion, you were obviously expecting a popular uprising to support it. Yet none occurred. How could you have been so wrong?"

"A popular uprising?" Mr. Dulles puffed on his pipe. "That's a popular misconception—but no, I wouldn't say we expected a popular uprising. We were expecting something else to happen in Cuba... something that didn't materialize."

As this is written, U.S. intelligence is still expecting it to happen, but the expectation has now turned to a nervous and gnawing worry.

■ While Castro was making his revolution, Andrew St. George spent more time with him in the mountains than any other American journalist. They were close friends—Castro once awarded him a medal, ordered him released when he was arrested. Since Castro's open avowal of Communism, however, St. George has maintained close contact with anti-Castro Cuban groups.

TV views

Cuban History Lesson

by Ben Levine



TWO NBC White Papers on Cuba, one on the Bay of Pigs invasion, and one on the missile confrontation, gave us a good lesson in history.

Chet Huntley, the commentator, presented a convincing picture of what the U.S. officials in charge of the invasion hoped to accomplish and why they failed.

We learned that the exiled adventurers who were trained in Guatemala and were thrown hastily into the Bay of Pigs (hastily because the Guatemalans themselves wanted them out) were given false promises by the CIA.

They were told the people in Cuba would rally to them. The CIA knew better.

They were told the U.S. Air Force would give them air cover. This, also, the CIA knew was false.

★ THE PLAN, we learned, was to be as follows:

The Cuban jets were to be destroyed by a surprise B-26 attack in the style taught us by

the Japanese at Pearl Harbor.

Then the invaders were to set up a beachhead. If they could hold it for 72 hours, they would be recognized as a government and get official U.S. Army and Navy and Airforce aid.

The plan failed, we were told, because three Cuban jets escaped, and because the armed Cuban people wiped out the beachhead before it could solidify.

★

WE SAW the Cuban people being armed to meet the invaders, Castro was giving arms, said Chet Huntley "to everyone he could trust." Castro trusted an awful lot of Cubans.

The CIA, on the other hand, put its trust in hardly any Cuban. They told lies to their Cuban trainees about the U.S. air cover. They didn't trust their Cuban saboteurs in Camaguey, said Huntley, because these groups were considered too left-wing. And they didn't trust the Cuban leaders of the counter-revolution, whom they locked up in a N. Y. hotel room the day the invasion was launched.

And they didn't even trust

Adlai Stevenson who as U.S. ambassador to the UN was passing on the CIA's falsehoods to the world.

A good title to this first NBC White Paper on Cuba would have been "Who Do You Trust?"

★

IT WAS A DRAMA with as happy an ending as we could wish. Americans in particular ought to hail a fellow-citizen of the world like Castro who dared with the House Un-Americans only 90 miles away and without the benefit of the Fifth Amendment or the First, to assert his belief in the future of communism.

And Castro dared even more. He applied the laws of his country to Standard Oil. This, as the NBC White Paper emphasized, was his cardinal sin, yet Cuba

came through smiling.

This was the main history lesson of the TV show.

Yet some people never learn. The adjoining article by Mike Newberry tells us how the U.S. is training invaders in Panama against all Latin American nations even as they were trained in Guatemala against Cuba.

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The Washington Daily News _____
The Evening Star _____
New York Herald Tribune _____
New York Journal-American _____
New York Mirror _____
New York Daily News _____
New York Post _____
The New York Times _____
The Worker P-7 _____
The New Leader _____
The Wall Street Journal _____
The National Observer _____
People's World _____
Date 2/16/64

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Another Rehash On Bay Of Pigs

The Central Intelligence Agency was so thoroughly chewed up in the NBC television special the other night about the Bay of Pigs invasion that the spy agency may have come out ahead after all.

It was hard to see and hear the CIA denounced so vigorously by the Cuban exile leaders without feeling resentment against the detractors and sympathy for the U.S. agents who are denied a chance to speak in their own defense by the nature of their job.

The fact is that somebody had to run the show, and the exile leaders, then as now, had proved themselves incapable of providing anything remotely resembling unified leadership.

We don't know what NBC hoped to prove by all this, except that the Bay of Pigs was a disaster, as everyone has known for nearly three years.

With the exception of some combat action pictures on the beach, Americans, and certainly Miami-ans, neither saw nor heard anything they hadn't seen and heard many times before.

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6-A

MIAMI NEWS

MIAMI, FLORIDA

(BEING FOLLOWED)

Date: 2/6/64

Edition:

Author:

Editor: WILLIAM C. BAGGS

Title: CIA

Character:

or

Classification: MM 62-3573

Submitting Office: MIAMI, FLA.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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DATE 7-17-94 BY SP4/BAH

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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

NBC Show Blasts CIA

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Mr. Casper.....
Mr. Callahan.....
Mr. Conrad.....
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Mr. Evans.....
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Mr. Sullivan.....
Mr. Tavel.....
Mr. Trotter.....
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Miss Holmes.....
Miss Gandy.....

By AGNES ASH

Miami News Radio and TV Editor

Last night the Torch of Freedom in Bayfront Park must have dimmed a little as Cuban exiles relived the Bay of Pigs invasion through a program presented on Channel 7.

Titled, "Cuba: Bay of Pigs," the documentary was narrated by NBC's Chet Huntley and produced by Fred Freed.

The first part of the program traced the forming of the invasion forces in Guatemala during the Eisenhower administration. Here the show was confusing because it did not follow the chronological order in which the military activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the policy statements of the Eisenhower administration occurred.

It was not clear, until later in the program, that Richard Nixon, in his campaign speeches, declared the United States would have no part of military action against Fidel Castro.

Meanwhile, Eisenhower had already approved the establishment of training bases in Guatemala. Nixon knew the go sign had been given to CIA officials to form a Revolutionary Council.

The show was a devastating indictment of the CIA. It implied, through statements by Cuban leaders that CIA officials had mistrusted the very leaders they had hand-picked to head the Revolutionary Council.

It pointed up the fact that the CIA did not give the signal for guerrillas, inside Cuba, to complete acts of sabotage to assist the invaders.

The suffering of the ~~vain~~ Brigade fighters and their futile but brave struggle against Castro's tanks and heavy artillery were vividly portrayed.

Navy cruisers were shown standing idly by in neutral waters just in sight of the fighting on the beach.

It was obviously no token landing and easy surrender, if NBC films are completely accurate.

The NBC program stated that the Nation was not paying much attention to the preparation for the invasion. That all news sources were focused on the U-2, Gary Powers incident while the brigade was training in Guatemala.

This was not entirely accurate as any one who lived in Miami during 1960 knows very well.

The Miami papers, (particularly The Miami News) were full of stories concerning the invasion, preparation although these facts were never confirmed by the CIA.

In the final analysis the NBC program was a good one, especially when it depicted Adlai Stevenson avidly and sincerely denying the fact that bombers which blew up much of Castro's air force were in no way connected with the U.S. government.

The CIA was illustrated as dictatorial and almost stupidly wrong in its judgment. It was pictured as an organization that trusted nobody - even keeping the leaders of the Revolutionary

Council under house arrest on the eve of the invasion.

The program was not well balanced. The CIA can't tell its story. It can't answer the accusations by Cuban leaders because of national security. Chet should have gone a little easier on the CIA. History may still prove that organization to have been perfectly right in its decisions.

The next segment of The Bay of Pigs will be called "Cuba's

The Missile Crisis." It will be Sunday at 10 p.m. on Channel 7. These shows are part of a series of "NBC White Papers."

Clip

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MIAMI NEWS

MIAMI, FLORIDA

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Date: 2/5/64
Edition:
Author:
Editor:
Title: CIA
Character:
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Classification: MM 62-3573
Submitting Office: MIAMI, FLA.

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
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UPI-58

(CUBA)

WASHINGTON--GOV. NELSON ROCKEFELLER DISCLOSED TODAY HE ONCE OUTLINED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY A PLAN TO "RETRIEVE THE DISASTER OF THE BAY OF PIGS" AND ESTABLISH A FREE CUBAN GOVERNMENT.

"HE WAS EXTREMELY COURTEOUS, BUT TO MY KNOWLEDGE NOTHING WAS EVER DONE IN RELATION TO IT," ROCKEFELLER SAID IN A COPYRIGHTED INTERVIEW IN U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT.

ROCKEFELLER SAID HE WENT TO SEE KENNEDY THE WEEK AFTER THE ABORTIVE 1961 CUBAN INVASION ATTEMPT WITH A PLAN DEVELOPED WITH THE HELP OF "VERY CLOSE POLITICAL AND GOVERNMENTAL FRIENDS OF MINE IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE."

ROCKEFELLER DID NOT DISCLOSE DETAILS OF THE PLAN BUT SAID HIS VIEW NOW IS "I THINK WE HAVE GOT TO ISOLATE THIS COMMUNIST INFECTION FROM THE REST OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE."

HE REITERATED HIS PREVIOUS CRITICISM OF THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION'S ACTION IN 1961 AND IN "LEAVING CUBA AS AN ARMED COMMUNIST FORTRESS" AFTER THE 1962 BLOCKADE.

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Bay of Pigs Held Possible

U. S. Break

By Lon Savage

M.D. Education Editor

The United States may have been lucky, in a way, when the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba failed; the publisher of the Times of Havana said here last night.

Moreover, Clarence W. Moore told the George Wythe High School Parent-Teachers Association, the United States now appears to be doing just about all it can concerning the Cuban problem.

The United States missed its chance to avert the Communist takeover in Cuba in early 1959 immediately after the Castro revolution, he said.

Moore is publisher of the South Pacific Mail at Santiago, Chile; the Montevideo at Montevideo, Uruguay; and the Times of Havana, which was forced to close in Havana. The Times is now published as a weekly in Miami. He also is a former FBI agent and, United States foreign officer. A Michigan native, he is brother of Paul C. Moore of 5118 Evelyn Blvd., president of the George Wythe P-TA.

The Times was cited, while still in Havana, for its stand against Castro by the Inter-American Press Association, he said.

If the Bay of Pigs invasion had succeeded, Moore said,

the United States would have been instrumental in killing a Cuban hero, since Fidel Castro was popular in his country then.

"We didn't kill him," Moore said. "He killed himself."

"I'm certain that economically, Cuba is falling apart," he added. In Havana, "there simply isn't anything to buy."

In fact, he said, "I'm not so sure we're not fairly wise to let Russia support Cuba for a while. It's a wonderful showcase of what communism can do." His sarcasm drew a laugh from a crowd of about 150.

As for United States policy toward Cuba, he said, "I buy it. I don't find anything too much that could be done that's not being done."

Cuba's failures, he said, may help the United States win Latin America.

"We read we're losing the Western Hemisphere," Moore said. "I submit we've never had Latin America. But now I maintain we have a chance to win Latin America, and the thing that will help us win in Cuba."

"Had we not had Cuba in 1959, we might have had Brazil in 1960 or Venezuela in 1961," he said.

Cuba's standing in Latin America was demonstrated

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

1 RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH
RICHMOND, VA.

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Date: 4-26-63
Edition:
Author: LON SAVAGE
Editor: VIRGINIUS DABNEY
Title:
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(Staff Photo)

Clarence W. Moore

"Wonderful Showcase"

at Punta del Este, he said. "No country voted with Cuba on any single measure."

The United States missed its chance in early 1959, he said, immediately after the Cuban revolution. He thought this country should have given Cuba every possible aid to make the revolution a success — "to make the Cuban revolution our revolution."

"We should have filled that country up with tractors and

experts whether they liked it or not," he said.

Instead, he said, the answer in Washington was: "But this may be communism. We've got to wait and see..."

Because of the delay, he said, Cuba finally "fell over" into the Communists' hands in late 1959.

"If there can be a single cause of the Cuban revolution," he said, "I think it is in the failure of democracy."

The Cuban leaders, the wealthy and the literate left the provinces for the provincial cities; then left those cities for Havana and, if they were wealthy enough, left Havana to travel in Europe and the United States. In the United States, he said, "wealth carries responsibility; in Cuba, it carried irresponsibility."

There are many misconceptions about the revolution in this country, he said.

The revolution was not a peasant revolution, he said, but a revolution of the upper and middle classes against an evil — and the evil was Batista.

It was not a revolution caused by poverty, he said. "Cuba was probably the wealthiest and most literate nation in Latin America... and it was a middle class nation."

Cubans were not opposed to

Americans, he said. "Cuba owed its wealth to the United States... The Cubans loved the Americans... There isn't a thing the United States has to apologize for in its history with Cuba."

Moreover, he said, Cubans "had a great feeling for democracy and a great hatred for communism. This was the state of things when Castro came in."

Moore said he still does not think there is a Communist threat in Latin America. "I think there's a threat from lack of democracy — entirely a different thing... communism in the Western Hemisphere in my opinion has been an abject failure."

Communists have spent more money to win Latin America than the United States has, he said, without notable success.

As for Castro, he said, "I personally don't think he's a Communist" despite his reported statements. In college, Moore said, Castro studied Mussolini and Hitler. "I think he's a totalitarian... He's attracted by power... He could just as well have turned to the right as to the left."

The matter of Castro's being or not being Communist, he said, is "academic... I do not think it's frightfully important."

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(BODY)

JACKSONVILLE, FLA.--THE MOTHER OF ONE OF THE FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS KILLED IN THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION SAID TODAY SHE WOULD LIKE TO GO TO CUBA AND "BRING BACK MY SON'S BODY FOR A DECENT AMERICAN BURIAL."

"IF RILEY SHAMBURGER'S BODY IS THERE, THEN MY SON'S MUST BE ALSO," SAID MRS. GEORGE GRAY OF JACKSONVILLE, MOTHER OF WADE G. GRAY OF THE BIRMINGHAM, ALA. AREA. "MY SON AND SHAMBURGER WERE FLYING TOGETHER AND DIED TOGETHER."

GRAY AND SHAMBURGER WERE FLYING WITH TWO OTHER BIRMINGHAM AREA MEN WHEN THEIR PLANE CRASHED ON OR ABOUT APRIL 19, 1961. THE OTHER MEN HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THOMAS RAY AND LEE F. BAKER.

"I HAVE TWO OTHER SONS WHO LIVE IN THE BIRMINGHAM AREA AND WHO WANT TO GO WITH ME TO CUBA TO GET WADE BACK," MRS. GRAY SAID. THE MOTHER SAID SHE HAD "WRITTEN DOZENS OF LETTERS" TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND TO FLORIDA CONGRESSMEN "BUT THEY DON'T SEEM TO BE ABLE TO DO ANYTHING."

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CLIP AN 11-CASTO AOT 11-11-63 CIA

CAPITAL REPORT: By FULTON LEWIS, JR.

The Bay of the Greased Pig

WASHINGTON, April 16. — Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. won a Pulitzer Prize for history at age 28. He is advised here to acquaint his boss, the President, with the case of Major General Arthur St. Clair, for there are lessons to be learned.

St. Clair was sent into the wilderness by President Washington in 1791, with orders to bring an end to a series of Indian raids along the Ohio-Indiana border.

On November 3, 1791, St. Clair was ambushed by Indians who wiped out nearly half his contingent of 1,400 troops.

Several months later, in the Spring of 1792, Congress named a special committee to investigate fully the humiliating, disastrous defeat. The committee demanded of President Washington all relevant papers and reports.

For several days the President and his Cabinet mulled over the request, well aware of the important precedent they would set. In the end, they agreed to cooperate fully with Congress. After a thorough investigation, the investigators discovered that mismanagement and a breakdown in supply lines had led to the defeat.



Taylor refused to budge. He did not say that disclosure of the information would violate security. He said instead that it would "result in another highly controversial divisive public discussion which would be damaging to all parties concerned." He acted on instructions from President Kennedy, who calls the case "closed."

To date, there is one official version of the disaster, that given by Attorney General Robert Kennedy to the Knight Newspapers and to "U.S. News and World Report" in January. That version is hotly disputed.

Several people in the know have labeled untrue Robert Kennedy's assertion that air support was never promised to the rebels. An Alabama pilot, Albert Persons, who was involved in the invasion, said air support was promised, then withdrawn: "The results, of course, were disastrous."

The complete story is not and cannot be known until President Kennedy takes a leaf from history and learns, as did George Washington, that frankness is the best policy.

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MORE THAN 170 YEARS later, the Congress of the United States is interested in another military fiasco, the Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961. But the present Administration has declined to cooperate and has refused to give Congress any information about the invasion. The truth about this military flop has been running around the capital like a greased pig—no one can catch it.

Congressional leaders have attempted without success to question General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, about the Bay of Pigs. Taylor, points out Congressman Gerry Ford, should know more about the invasion than anyone else. At the President's request Taylor directed a top-level investigation into all phases of the operation. He had the cooperation of every branch of government.

On Feb. 7, Congressman Ford, ranking Republican on the House Defense Appropriations Subcommittee, asked Taylor about the invasion. He received no response.

Ford explained that he was only trying to do his job: "To get the facts, study them, and help pass laws and appropriate funds for the government's operation."

The Washington Post and Times Herald
The Washington Daily News
The Evening Star
New York Herald Tribune
New York Journal-American
New York Mirror
New York Daily News
New York Post
The New York Times
The Worker
The New Leader
The Wall Street Journal
The National Observer
Date

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CLIP PROGRAM OF ANTI CASTRO ACTIVITY - CIA (U)

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UPI-67

(PILOT)

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HAVANA--HAVANA NEWSPAPERS SAID TODAY THE CUBAN RED CROSS WILL RETURN TO HIS FAMILY THE BODY OF PILOT RILEY W. SHAMBURGER, ONE OF FOUR AMERICANS KILLED IN THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION. THE PRESS REPORTS ADDED THAT THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT HAD INVITED THE MOTHER OF THE PILOT, MRS. RILEY W. SHAMBURGER SR. OF BIRMINGHAM, ALA., TO COME TO CUBA TO IDENTIFY THE REMAINS OF HER SON. (IN BIRMINGHAM, MRS. SHAMBURGER BECAME HYSTERICAL ON HEARING THE HAVANA REPORT. A NEIGHBOR SAID THE MOTHER "WOULD NEVER ACCEPT" THAT HE HAD BEEN KILLED. "SHE'S JUST IN A TERRIBLE STATE," THE NEIGHBOR SAID.


(SHAMBURGER WAS FLYING WITH THREE OTHER BIRMINGHAM AREA MEN WHEN THEIR PLANE CRASHED ON OR ABOUT APRIL 19, 1961. THE OTHER MEN WERE LATER IDENTIFIED AS WADE C. GRAY, AN ELECTRONICS TECHNICIAN; THOMAS RAY AND LEE E. BAKER.

(SHAMBURGER, A TEST PILOT, WAS APPARENTLY AT THE CONTROLS OF THE PLANE WHEN IT WENT DOWN DURING THE ILL-FATED INVASION. THEY WERE FLYING A C46 CARGO PLANE WHEN ONE ENGINE WENT OUT.)

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CLIP ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES CIA (U)

ANNIVERSARY APPRAISAL

The Total Disaster

That Was the Bay of Pigs

By BEM PRICE
and THEODORE A. EDIGER
Associated Press Staff Writers

For the waiting, watchful Cuban troops of Prime Minister Fidel Castro, the sudden appearance of the United States warship in the glare of the Cayo Guano light was the final tipoff.

Cayo Guano is at the head of the Bay of Pigs and southeast of Havana.

Obviously, the long awaited invasion was about to begin. Cuban radios began drumming out the alert order in Morse code:

"Place yourself on a work status. Urgent."

And so the invasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs by 1,500 armed opponents of Fidel Castro on April 17, 1961—two years ago next Wednesday—was doomed.

The now known facts indicate that it was a failure from the outset.

Assertions of U. S. Betrayal

Bitter survivors of that ill-fated expedition, claiming betrayal by the United States, assert:

A United States Navy aircraft carrier operating under the code name "Santiago" was within 20 miles of the invasion beach with jets and propeller driven fighters aboard painted with the blue identifying stripe of the anti-Castro brigade.

While some of these airplanes were airborne during the critical assault phase, none attacked. Qualified sources in Washington identify this carrier as the USS Boxer.

There was ample, though unused, gun support available

among the United States warships within sight of the landing beach. These ships—a cruiser, at least one frigate and several destroyers—had escorted the invaders' convoy from Nicaragua to Cuba.

Until the landing craft actually started ashore there had been no final selection of a beach-head area—and no reconnaissance either.

Began in May, 1960

Neither the invaders' mission nor immediate objectives had been defined. They just hoped the United States would straighten things out once they got ashore.

The whole business began in earnest in May, 1960. It set in motion a train of events the end of which is not yet in sight—and it was costly.

It cost the lives of 81 of the invaders, not including four American flyers who piloted two B-26 light bombers, and resulted in the wounding of 60.

It cost \$45 million to execute, the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, reportedly told a Senate committee.

It cost upwards of \$53 million to ransom the invasion survivors from Cuban prisons.

It has cost \$75 million to date to support 200,000 Cuban refugees whose homeland is now closed to them because the invasion failed.

It cost the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which masterminded the operation, a considerable portion of its reputation for competence.

Our Image Tarnished

And it tarnished the image of the United States as a Nation of high moral persuasion in its conduct of international

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coming as it did within a year of the U-2 spy plane affair with the Soviet Union.

Just when the invasion scheme was hatched first is not yet clear, but it apparently began germinating sometime early in 1960 shortly after Mr. Castro began expropriating United States-owned properties in Cuba.

By August 24, 1960, Mr. Castro was charging that the CIA was organizing adherents of the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, in Guatemala for an invasion of Cuba.

And Mr. Castro was at least partially right, for the organization had begun in May — and there were some Batista followers in the group.

After a series of diplomatic humiliations in which the movements of United States Ambassadors to Cuba Philip Bonsal were restricted to a small area of Havana and all but 11 United States Embassy employees ordered to leave, former President Eisenhower severed relations with Cuba on January 4, 1961.

The Rumors Roll Out

Now reports of military activities began flowing out of the gossipy refugee colony in Miami with the persistence of truth.

These reports—later confirmed—said anti-Castro refugees were training in Guatemala; paratroopers and pilots at the 5,000-foot-long airstrip at Retalhuleu; infantry at Trax, La Finquita and Garrapatinango.

During January, 1961, unmarked planes began making frequent night flights from long unused airfields at Clewiston and Opa-Locka, Fla. As it turned out, they were carrying volunteers to Guatemala.

And it was in January that four

members of the Alabama National Guard, all former pilots of the World War II light bomber, the B-26, were recruited.

These men were paid \$2,250 a month each, plus \$200 monthly for expenses, so their survivors reported.

In all, apparently, about 21 pilots were hired to train Cubans. Gov. Orval Faubus of Arkansas disclosed just this year that most came out of his State's Air National Guard.

The Man Who Hired Pilots

The Alabama flyers were hired by a man who identified himself as Alex E. Carlson of the Double Check Corp., of 1045 Curtis Parkway, Miami Springs, Fla.

Double Check was formed May 12, 1959, by Mr. Carlson with a capital of \$500 to engage in a wide variety of business activities. After the invasion Mr. Carlson said he was simply acting as an employment agency for an unidentified Latin American concern.

While the United States pilots were taking their Cuban counterparts in tow, the infantry was being trained under the over-all direction of a man identified by the refugees as a Filipino who went by the name of Col. Vallejo.

There were American officers, too, men known by the cover names of "Frank," "Jimmie" and "Charles."

From May, 1960, to November, the anti-Castro Cubans were given guerrilla training. In November the training was shifted to straight World War II infantry tactics.

After the invasion Gen. Lemnitzer and Mr. Eisenhower said the operation was intended primarily as a guerilla reinforcement. Mr. Eisenhower said that

when he left office January 20, 1961, no firm plan for the employment of the refugee Cuban force had been determined.

Castro Knew It Was Coming

This fact goes to the heart of the mission, what the invaders were supposed to accomplish and how.

Guerillas would need neither air cover nor tanks, trucks nor jeeps. Regular troops for a stand-up battle with Mr. Castro would.

Throughout the training period, Mr. Castro's radios were trumpeting charges of an impending invasion. Mr. Castro even had motion pictures of the refugees in training.

By now it was April, 1961, and the preliminaries began.

On April 2, bombs exploded in the Cuban Army's magazine publishing plant and in a government-owned soft-drink plant.

April 5: Fire destroyed a sugar warehouse.

April 7: Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, head of the Cuban Revolutionary Council in Miami, predicted a Cuban uprising.

April 8: A large water main was blown up and sections of Havana were left waterless for 48 hours.

April 10: Mr. Castro abruptly clamped a radio blackout on all invasion scare talk.

April 12: A bomb exploded in the Havana railway station, injuring no one.

April 13: Fire destroyed a paper warehouse and a department store.

April 13: Mr. Castro concentrated 45,000 heavily armed troops in Pinar del Rio Province.

Two things are apparent: (1) Mr. Castro knew an invasion was about to take place, though uncertain as to precisely where or when, and (2) in all the sabo-

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tage operations none was directed toward military objectives—roads, bridges, fuel and ammunition dumps, airfields or motorized equipment.

On April 15, three rocket-firing B-26s struck at three Cuban air bases, two just outside Havana and the third at Santiago de Cuba.

The planes were to have knocked out Castro's air force, consisting of United States-made T-33 jet trainers, British Seafuries and B-26 bombers.

They failed, but there was no followup air strike on April 16—and no news either.

Now it was April 17. All day Havana Radio played soothing music, interspersed with soap operas and a lecture on how young lovers should behave.

From time to time, however, the programs were interrupted by urgent orders for all militia to report to their duty stations.

Radio Silent on Invasion

Throughout April 18 Havana Radio was exasperatingly silent on the subject of the invasion though the previous night it had appealed for blood donors.

Diplomats and correspondents from Iron Curtain countries reported on April 19 that Cuba had been attacked by planes and troop-carrying ships.

Late that same day, Havana Radio said Mr. Castro had reported an invasion attempt and was now mopping up survivors. This was followed by the grim announcement that two Americans and seven Cubans had been executed as United States agents.

On April 20, Havana Radio announced the invasion attempt had been crushed. Meanwhile, a dragnet was out for anyone suspected of harboring the slightest anti-

Castro sentiments. In Havana alone, some 200,000 were rounded up and stuffed into any place with a wall around it.

Any possible sympathy uprising was thus crushed at the outset. What had happened?

On April 10-11, the brigade had sailed from Puerto Cabezas on Great Corn Island, Nicaragua, a tiny port to which they had been ferried from Guatemala.

Guatemala could not, assert truthfully that the invasion had not been staged from her soil.

Dagoberto Darias, 49, once wealthy Cuban businessman and a coffee expert, was chief officer of the Rio Escondido, one of the ships in the invasion force. In an interview in Miami, Mr. Darias said:

"We left Puerto Cabezas on April 12. Five Liberty-type transport vessels, the Rio Escondido, Atlantico, Caribe, Houston and Lake Charles. The Lake Charles was the 'Operation 40' (code name for the command ship) ship. It remained behind and was to land later for mop-up operations.

Two Small Boats

"Aboard the transports were two small boats, the Blagar with 14 machine guns and the Barbara J. with nine. These were small converted coasters.

"Seven landing craft were present for the invasion—three LCU's (landing craft, utility) and four LCVP's (landing craft, vehicle-personnel). Also 30 outboard motor-communication launches, six aboard each (Liberty) ship. Also five tanks.

"The landing craft with the tanks aboard were escorted to a point near the Cuban coast by an American-type ship. I only saw its silhouette. That was the evening of April 18.

"We could see the lights of Cayo Guano. There, at what was called our convoy point, an American cruiser was visible in the tower light.

"Why that spot in front of the tower was selected for the cruiser, I don't know. Nor do I know why the general site was selected for the invasion.

"It was not until about four in the morning that a landing place was found. It was difficult for there was a violent sea.

Enemy Prepared

"But by the time the small landing beach was decided upon, the enemy had time to get ready for us. I don't know why the spot wasn't selected beforehand.

"The Houston went in first. It was received by artillery fire directed from the Bay of Pigs airfield. There was a cross fire which was marvelous....

(The Houston with the communications gear aboard was damaged and beached.)

"... When disembarkation began it was under an aerial battle between our planes and Fidel's.

"Then Seafuries hit the wooden bridge of the Rio Escondido. Our ship blew up and sank in five minutes... we swam to the Blagar.

"On April 18 we received a radiogram from the American aircraft carrier 'Santiago,' telling us that at 2:30 p.m. that day we would get air support from six P-51 planes (World War II fighters)....

"At 2:30 we saw two planes cross. A minute later two others went towards Cuba. Immediately afterward the first two planes returned... the others followed.

"From that moment we knew the war was lost for us and that

we had been the victims of a great betrayal.

"We had 16 planes. It took them three hours to fly from Puerto Cabezas. They would fight for about three quarters of an hour and then fly back for supplies. Then they would come back. It was most gruelling. I had a friend, Joaquin Varela, who went 46 hours without sleep.

Paratroopers Take Airstrip

"On April 19 when the Cuban pilots were played out, four Americans stepped in to relieve some of them. The Americans in two B-26s were the ones from Alabama who were shot down. They were killed."

As for the paratroopers, there were 185 of them, Mr. Darias said, and they captured the Bay of Pigs airstrip, but couldn't hold it because of strafing from Mr. Castro's aircraft.

Were the Cuban invaders ever promised air cover? Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, brother to the President, said in a magazine interview this year that at no time had the United States ever promised military air support.

The key work is "military," that is, uniformed pilots in United States marked planes.

Dr. Enrique Ilaca, one of those captured and ransomed, said:

"We were told there would be air cover. Not officially. But it might as well have been official. We all knew the United States had a hand in the matter. We were transported to the training area in United States planes. We were trained by Americans. Our weapons and planes were American. What else could our conclusion be? We are not morons. No one wanted to commit suicide."

Straight-Ahead Attack

The invading troops were landed on Giron Beach, which is approached by land via a single road, flanked on both sides by impassable marshes and mangrove swamps. There was only one way to attack and that was straight ahead into Mr. Castro's 45,000 men.

By the morning of the 19th, the men were giving up the hopeless fight. They were out of ammunition and Mr. Castro's planes dominated the air.

Of the 16 planes in anti-Castro operation, eight were shot down and the remainder arrived back in Nicaragua full of holes.

Mr. Ilaca reported that the invaders managed only to progress from the beachhead to a road junction designated as "Central Australia." This was 10 to 12 miles inland.

That was that. It was a total disaster.

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On April 24, White House Press secretary Pierre Salinger read Washington newsmen a statement in which President Kennedy accepted "... full responsibility for the events of the past few days."

On June 28, 1961, Mr. Kennedy told a news conference he was considering changes in the intelligence setup. Some revisions were later made though how extensive they were is unknown.

Since the invasion, the top echelon of the CIA at the time has retired: Allen Dulles, director; Air Force Gen. C. P. Cabell, deputy director, and Richard M. Bissell Jr., deputy director for plans.

It was a gradual process spread over a year. There was no hint that their departure had anything to do with the Bay of Pigs disaster.



Members of Castro's militia in action in the Treasure Lagoon zone southeast of Havana on the day of the Bay of Pigs invasion. The photo came from Cuban government sources.—AP Photo.

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CLIP PROGRAM 17 ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITY
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The Battle of Playa Giron

By JESUS COLON

THE FOLLOWING are excerpts from a statement by the Cuban government on the attempted invasion of Cuba in April, 1961:

On April 17, at 2:30 a.m., a brigade of mercenary troops numbering approximately 1,500 men, trained, armed and directed by the government of the U.S. and proceeding from Puerto Cabezas, began landing on the southern coast of Las Villas province in the area known as Cienaga de Zapata (the Zapata Swamps). The mercenary fleet was composed of five armed merchant vessels, two LCI boats of the type used by the U.S. Navy but modified and armed, three LCU barges for transport and unloading of heavy equipment, tanks and armored trucks, and four LCVF barges for landing of troops. The brigade was made up of five infantry battalions, one heavily armed battalion (with mortars, bazookas and anti-tank cannons), one tank company, one parachute battalion, one underwater demolition team, and an air force consisting of 16 B-26 bombers, eight C-46 and six C-54 transports.

The plan was to cut off the area of operations from its surroundings, to fortify it, to establish a provisional government there, to begin a war of attrition and to create conditions leading to a civil war facilitating the direct intervention of imperialism. Their operations

were supported by 16 B-26 bombers painted with the colors and insignia of the Cuban Air Force in order to surprise our troops.

On the 19th, enemy C-54 planes dropped supplies to the mercenaries to make up for losses suffered by the sinking of the supply vessel Blagar. The Cuban Air Force destroyed five armored trucks and the air strip and water tank at Playa Giron.

DURING the same day the enemy withdrew its tanks to the immediate vicinity of Playa Giron and reinforced this area with a battalion withdraw from Playa Larga. In the morning hours an enemy C-46 plane had tried to evacuate the General Staff of the mercenary forces but Cuban planes put it to flight.

Finally, at 5:30 p.m., April 19, the Cuban Armed Forces took Playa Giron, seizing a great number of enemy weapons. Of the defeated and demoralized enemy troops some were able to escape by sea, some surrendered on the spot and the rest fled to the nearby woods and swamp where they were quickly rounded up. The prisoners were treated in a humane manner from the first day.

Thus, the criminal attack sponsored by U.S. imperialism was smashed in less than 72 hours.

To understand the "ideals" that the invaders fought for is enough to examine the brigade's composition and to take

a look at the property they tried to recover. The invading brigade included:

- 100 landowners
 - 24 large proprietors
 - 67 landlords
 - 112 big businessmen
 - 194 ex-soldiers and "thugs" of the Batista dictatorship
 - 179 sons of the wealthy
 - 35 industrial magnates
- All together, they tried to recover the following:
- 835,000 acres of land
 - 9,686 houses and apartment buildings
 - 70 factories
 - 10 sugar mills
 - 3 banks
 - 5 mines
 - 12 cabarets and bars and much other property.

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FBI Had to Look the Other Way Before Pigs Bay

By DAVID KRASLOW

WASHINGTON (CDN)—The Federal Bureau of Investigation must find the crackdown on Cuban exile raiding activity a bit ironic.

The story has yet to be told and much of it probably never will be known. Involved were secret discussions, arguments might be a better word at the highest levels of government. It is doubtful that a complete record—if indeed any record—has been preserved.

In the last months of the Eisenhower administration—during the Summer of 1960—the United States began to recruit and train Cuban exiles for action against the Fidel Castro regime. The concept was rather vague. It did not harden until after President Kennedy took office in January, 1961.

The task fell to the Central Intelligence Agency. It financed Cuban exile groups. It supported "basic" training camps in the United States.

Americans who lived near one such camp in a rural area south of Miami could hear drill orders barked over a loud-speaker. They reported seeing young Cubans in marching formation.

There was a shooting incident during that Summer of 1960. Some American youths tossed firecrackers into the camp. Thinking they were being attacked by Castro supporters, the Cubans came running with carbines blazing. One of the American youths was wounded.

Federal officials quietly urged local authorities to let the incident slide by.

The FBI was not happy. It has major responsibility for enforcing the neutrality act, which makes it a crime for anyone to aid, prepare, or participate in a military expedition from the United States against a foreign state with which this country is at peace.

The FBI knew what was going on. It knew the neutrality act was being violated. It knew the violations had the blessing of the CIA. FBI agents

made their reports to Washington.

The CIA-sponsored activity on U.S. soil became a concern of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Atty. Gen. William Rogers. How could persons doing the bidding of an arm of the U.S. government be prosecuted for violating a U.S. law? What were the implications for agents sworn to uphold the law and for a free society as a whole of an official policy of selective enforcement of the law?

Whatever the justification, these were the facts, and the facts added up to a serious moral dilemma for Hoover and Rogers.

(When Fulgencio Batista was in power and Fidel Castro fought him from outside Cuba and later from the Sierra Maestra, there were numerous neutrality act prosecutions of Cuban nationals in the United States. Both Batista and Castro supporters were arrested.)

Hoover and Rogers made their arguments at Cabinet-level and White House discussions. The argument was made to find a location outside the country for such CIA acts.

These discussions were behind the shift of Cuban exile training to Central America.

Now the government is getting tough with Cubans for violating a law in 1963 that they were invited to violate in 1960.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

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BOSTON TRAVELER
Boston, Mass.

CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Boston,
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RECORD AMERICAN
Boston, Mass.

Date: 4/10/63
Edition: Morning
Author: David Kraslow
Editor: Victor O. Jones
Title: FBI Had To Look
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Character:
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Classification: 80-

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CLIP PROGRAM 23 ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITY

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(PIGS BAY)

WASHINGTON--CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY DISCLOSED TODAY THAT REPUBLICANS ON THE HOUSE DEFENSE APPROPRIATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE TRIED TO CONDUCT THEIR OWN INQUIRY INTO THE ILL-FATED CUBAN BAY OF PIGS INVASION, BUT FAILED TO FIND OUT MUCH.

THE GOP MEMBERS, LED BY REP. GERALD FORD OF MICHIGAN, WERE ESPECIALLY INTERESTED IN A PRESIDENTIAL INVESTIGATION WHICH WAS MADE OF THE EVENTS IN CUBA DURING 1961.

PRESIDENT KENNEDY APPOINTED A FOUR-MAN BOARD, INCLUDING HIS BROTHER ROBERT, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, TO MAKE THE INQUIRY. HOWEVER, ITS REPORT HAS NEVER BEEN MADE PUBLIC.

GEN. MAXWELL TAYLOR, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, ALSO WAS A MEMBER OF THE GROUP BEFORE HE ASSUMED HIS PRESENT POST.

WHEN REPUBLICANS BEGAN TO QUIZ HIM ON THE SUBJECT DURING RECENT CLOSED-DOOR HEARINGS, TAYLOR REFUSED TO DISCLOSE ANY DETAILS OF THE BOARD'S FINDINGS ON GROUNDS OF "EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE." HE SAID HE WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN MUM UNLESS HE RECEIVED "FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS FROM THE PRESIDENT."

REP. WILLIAM MINSHALL, R-OHIO, ASKED TAYLOR IF HE THOUGHT "AT THIS LATE DATE ANY BREACH OF SECURITY WOULD COME ABOUT IF WE HAD A FULL DISCLOSURE OF WHAT TOOK PLACE AT THE BAY OF PIGS."

"I THINK IT WOULD BE HIGHLY UNFORTUNATE TO OPEN UP THIS QUESTION," TAYLOR SAID.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Sen. Sparkman Demands Truth on CIA Cuban Role

By DANIEL MASON

SEN. JOHN SPARKMAN (D-Ala) last Saturday demanded a "full disclosure" of the Central Intelligence Agency's activities in the Bay of Pigs fiasco of April 19, 1961. In a taped TV program, Sparkman, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, charged that Allen W. Dulles, former CIA head, "had misjudged the spirit of the Cuban people" in telling the mercenaries that "the Cuban people would rise up and support them."

Sparkman then continued: "When the Cuban refugees landed there, instead of the Cuban people rising up to support them and to meet them, they were met by militia, Cuban militia, and they were never able to get an effective foothold."

A day earlier Sen. George S. McGovern (D-SD) warned in the Senate, "We have had too many who are willing to shed the blood of our soldiers in an invasion of Cuba."

McGovern, surprise victor in the 1962 elections, attacked the entire concept of the Bay of Pigs invasion, charging:

"We had no more legal right to undertake air cover or any other military aggression against Cuba than the Russians would have in invading Turkey. We have offensive nuclear weapons, not 90 miles from Russian territory but in Turkey on the Soviet border, capable of pulverizing Russian cities in a matter of minutes."

"The Cuban invasion, originally conceived in the previous administration, was a tragic mistake both in conception and execution, for which President Kennedy has bravely taken the

blame. Why compound the error by probing the ruins of a mistaken venture, and then calling for a repeat performance?"

Noting the recent Gallup poll which revealed that the nation overwhelmingly opposed a Cuban invasion, McGovern declared:

"The people understand better than some political figures that such an effort misses the real nature of the challenge before us."

Responsibility of Washington for the invasion attempt was underscored by Sen. George A. Smathers (D-Fla) when he admitted on the Senate floor March 15:

"This plan for the invasion of the Bay of Pigs had not been some new development of the new administration because we know that, as a matter of fact, these men were gathered and sent to Guatemala for training in 1960, before the change of administration."

Smathers warned Congress on new action against Cuba:

"When we talk about strong measures today, particularly when we imply force even though we may not say it, we are in reality talking about a direct confrontation of the military forces of the Soviet Union, unless we first are successful in getting these forces out of Cuba. Such a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States forces we have not had thus far in our history."

He made clear that an invasion of Cuba, even if the Cuban nation had to fight alone, would be disastrous for the U.S. declaring:

"How many casualties, American casualties, would it cost to subdue Cuba?"

"I have no access to contingency plans but we hear figures such as a month and 100,000 casualties. I gather that our military planners see no quick, glorious charge up San Juan hill now. Rather they envision a long

grueling and bloody war waged in the most exhausting and savage tradition of the 20th century world wars."

And he added: "How do we know that the war to liberate Cuba will not really touch off the total thermonuclear conflict which each of us prays daily will not occur. Soviet Defense Minister Malinovsky says it will. Can we assume he does not mean it?"

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KUP'S COLUMN

As if the bombing of his King Arthur Pub wasn't trouble enough, Arthur Lieberman also suffered the loss of 17 cases of liquor. Thieves made off with the haul during the confusion over the weekend.

ATTY. GEN. ROBERT KENNEDY'S visit here Tuesday was in keeping with a policy he established when he took office — to visit district U.S. attorneys and FBI offices in the field for firsthand briefings on organized crime and subversive activities. He has made similar visits in some 30 cities since taking office. Kennedy never mentions Jimmy Hoffa by name, "because he's under indictment," but the attorney general doesn't mind pointing to the box score: 108 indictments against Hoffa and top teamster union officials, 48 convictions, 7 acquittals, the rest pending.

YOUNG KENNEDY ALSO CLEARED UP some misunderstanding about his statement concerning air cover for the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, which caused such a furor. He repeated that no "U.S." air cover was ever intended, either by the Eisenhower or Kennedy administrations, despite statements to the contrary by former Vice President Nixon and others. The attorney general pointed out that he did not, in his speech, include "volunteer" air cover. Quote and unquote from UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson: "The American ship of state is the only vessel that ever leaked from the top!"

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38 CHICAGO SUN-TIMES
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

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Editor: JOHN G. TREZEVANT
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UPI-199

(RELEASE AT 6:30 P.M. EST)

ADD 2 CUBA, WASHINGTON

SEN. JOHN J. SPARKMAN, D-ALA., CALLED ON THE ADMINISTRATION TO REVEAL ALL THE DETAILS ABOUT THE DEATHS OF FOUR AMERICAN FLYERS IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

IN A RADIO INTERVIEW, SPARKMAN SAID THE DEATH OF THE ALABAMA FLYERS CONTINUED TO BE A SUBJECT OF CONTROVERSY "BECAUSE THE WHOLE STORY HAS NOT BEEN OFFICIALLY TOLD."

SPARKMAN SAID DISCLOSING THE DETAILS WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY.

"WE ALL KNOW THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS INVOLVED IN THE INVASION," HE SAID. "IN FACT, I THINK THE COUNTRY KNEW MONTHS BEFORE THAT THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS INVOLVED."

AS EARLY AS 1960, SPARKMAN SAID THE CIA TOLD THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE THAT IT WAS HELPING THE CUBAN EXILES BUT WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN THE RAID.

SPARKMAN SAID THAT RECENT TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE SHOWED THAT AT NO TIME WAS AIR SUPPORT PROMISED FOR THE INVASION AND IT WAS MADE CLEAR TO THE CUBANS THAT THE AMERICAN AIR FORCE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE.

SPARKMAN SAID "THERE OUGHT TO BE GREATER DISCLOSURE" AND SAID THE NEED FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CIA WAS AMPLE REASON FOR A CONGRESSIONAL WATCHDOG COMMITTEE.

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UPI-86

(MCGOVERN--CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SEN. GEORGE MCGOVERN, D-S.D., SAID TODAY "SELF-STYLED
 EXPERTS" SHOULD STOP ADVOCATING "AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA" AND
 CONCENTRATE INSTEAD ON DEFUSING THE "SMOULDERING BLOCKBUSTER"
 OF POVERTY AND BACKWARDNESS IN LATIN AMERICA.

THE FORMER FOOD FOR PEACE DIRECTOR, IN HIS FIRST SENATE SPEECH,
 SAID THE UNITED STATES HAD "NO MORE LEGAL RIGHT TO UNDERTAKE
 AIR COVER OR ANY OTHER MILITARY AGGRESSION AGAINST CUBA THAN THE
 RUSSIANS WOULD HAVE IN INVADING TURKEY."

MCGOVERN SAID PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD "BRAVELY TAKEN THE BLAME"
 FOR THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION FIASCO. "PROBING THE RUINS" AND
 "CALLING FOR A REPEAT PERFORMANCE" WOULD ONLY COMPOUND THE ERROR,
 MCGOVERN ARGUED.

"WE HAVE HAD TOO MANY POST-MORTEMS OVER THE ILL-CONCEIVED BAY
 OF PIGS INVASION, WHICH MIGHT HAVE DAMAGED OUR STANDING IN THE
 HEMISPHERE MORE IF IT HAD SUCCEEDED THROUGH AMERICAN MILITARY
 INTERVENTION," HE SAID IN HIS PREPARED SPEECH.

CALLING FOR EFFORT TO SUPPORT THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS IN LATIN
 AMERICA, MCGOVERN SAID THERE HAVE BEEN "TOO MANY WILLING TO
 SHED THE BLOOD OF OUR SOLDIERS IN AN INVASION OF CUBA, AND NOT
 ENOUGH COURAGEOUS AND THOUGHTFUL MEN GIVING THEIR ATTENTION TO THE
 REAL PROBLEMS" OF LATIN AMERICA.

THE "REAL BOMBSHELLS" OF THE AREA, HE SAID, ARE FUSED TO
 CONDITIONS OF POVERTY, MISERABLE SHELTER, ILLITERACY, FEUDAL
 CONDITIONS, ONE-CROP ECONOMIES AND "UNJUST TAX STRUCTURES."

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UPI-237

(CUBA)

MILWAUKEE, WIS. -- AMERICANS FLYING IN THE 1961 BAY OF PIGS INVASION OF CUBA CURSED U.S. NAVY CARRIERS FOR NOT SENDING AIR COVER WHILE THEY WERE UNDER ATTACK BY CASTRO AIR AND GROUND FORCES.

A FORMER CUBAN FLIER MADE THIS STATEMENT TODAY IN AN INTERVIEW WITH ROBERT W. WELLS, A MILWAUKEE JOURNAL REPORTER.

"YOU S.O.B.'S, WHY DON'T YOU SEND THE PLANES," TIMOTEO A. CABRERA, 38, A FORMER CUBANA AIRLINES PILOT QUOTED AMERICAN FLIERS AS SAYING IN RADIO PLEAS TO A NAVY CARRIER WHILE THE PILOTS WERE UNDER ATTACK. B. APPROX 1925

CABRERA, WHO CAME HERE RECENTLY FROM MIAMI IN SEARCH OF WORK, IS A WIDOWER AND HAS TWO YOUNG SONS STILL IN CUBA.

AMERICANS IN CHARGE OF THE NICARAGUAN BASE FROM WHICH THE PLANES TOOK OFF "KEPT ASSURING US WE WOULD GET AIR COVER," HE SAID. "THAT LAST DAY (APRIL 20) THEY SAID THEY'S JUST RECEIVED A CABLE FROM WASHINGTON RELEASING FIGHTER PLANES FROM A CARRIER."

AFTER THE INVASION WAS OBVIOUSLY A FAILURE, CABRERA SAID THE AMERICAN IN CHARGE CALLED THE FLIERS TOGETHER.

"HE DIDN'T HAVE ANY EXPLANATION OF WHY THE PROMISED AIR SUPPORT DIDN'T COME," CABRERA SAID. "EITHER HE DIDN'T KNOW OR HE COULDN'T SAY. I DON'T KNOW IF HE WAS THE ONE WHO FOOLED US OR IF IT WAS SOMEONE ELSE."

CABRERA, WHO FLEW A TRANSPORT PLANE DROPPING AMMUNITION AND MEDICINE TO THE INVADERS, SAID HE SAW SIX AMERICAN FLIERS TAKE OFF IN THREE B-26 BOMBERS THE NIGHT OF APRIL 18. HE SAID HE HEARD THAT TWO OF THE PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN, KILLING FOUR OF THE SIX.

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Racists Boast They Lent Pilots for Bombing Cuba

By DANIEL MASON

THE SOUTHERN white supremacists last week claimed the dubious honor of having provided the pilots who bombed and strafed the Cuban people during the shameful Bay of Pigs invasion attempt, April 19, 1961. Boasting loudly about this was Arkansas Gov. Orval Faubus, who, at the same time, attacked the people in the rest of the nation for having refused to become a part of this disgraceful episode in American history.

Already infamous for his role in the attack on Negro children during the school integration fight, Faubus asserted that pilots from the Arkansas National Guard had been secretly recruited to fly combat missions after the Kennedy administration had failed to get volunteer aviators from the North.

He declared that federal officials had taken a plane from the Arkansas National Guard with the excuse that it had to be taken out of service. He fur-

ther claimed that later the same plane, now armed with cannon, was seen in Nicaragua by Arkansas guardsmen.

"We have a dozen National Guardsmen in Nicaragua," Faubus said, "and some of them flew combat. This whole thing is a disgrace in American history. They tried to recruit some men in the North and couldn't do it, so they came down South, where they still have some patriotism and got volunteers among the National Guard."

Faubus did not explain how the Arkansas National Guardsmen got down to Nicaragua, who sent them, or why they were there.

If Kennedy needed any lesson to show him how foolish his policy of capitulation to the Southern white supremacists really is the Arkansas governor provided it for him. Faubus, expressing obvious pleasure, declared:

"If this thing doesn't beat him (Kennedy) in 1964, nothing will."

In N.Y. last Friday night the

twice-rejected Richard M. Nixon apparently still did not realize why the American people do not want any part of him. Speaking on the Jack Paar show, over NBC-TV, Nixon made an ominous call for an oil blockade of Cuba, removal of Soviet "troops" from the island republic, violation of Cuba's sovereignty by on-site inspections and denial of aid to countries which dared to have dealings with the legally constituted government of Cuba.

This appeared to be the answer of the ultra-Right and the Republican leadership to the warning uttered by President Kennedy in his press interview in Washington last Thursday. Kennedy said that "to deny the oil would require, of course, a blockade, and a blockade is an act of war, and you should be prepared for it."

"You should not be under any impression that a blockade is not an act of war, because, when a ship refuses to stop, and then you sink the ship, there is usually a military response on the country involved."

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Racists Boast They Lent Pilots for Bombing Cuba

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UPI-46

(CUBA)

WACO, TEX.--A MEMBER OF THE UNSUCCESSFUL BAY OF PIGS INVASION FORCES TOLD THE WACO ROTARY CLUB YESTERDAY THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT "LACKS THE GUTS" TO REMOVE THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT FROM CUBA.

DR. ORLANDO M. HEROS SAID THE U. S. GOVERNMENT HAS NO WAY OF KNOWING THE SOVIET UNION HAS REMOVED ITS MISSILES FROM CUBA. HEROS SAID THERE WERE 40,000 RUSSIANS, CZECHS, POLES AND YUGOSLAVS STILL IN CUBA.

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Poll Shows 64% Against A U.S. Attack on Cuba

By Fred Halstead

MARCH 5 — In spite of the unprecedented barrage of anti-Cuba propaganda hitting the U.S. public since last fall, a majority of the American people are opposed to an invasion of Cuba. More are opposed now than were before the Cuban crisis, according to the Gallup poll published Feb. 26.

When asked if the U.S. should "send our armed forces into Cuba to help overthrow Castro," 64 per cent said no. Only 20 per cent said yes, and 16 per cent had no opinion. The same question had been asked last October just before Kennedy's brink-of-nuclear-war speech. At that time 63 per cent said no, 25 per cent yes, and 13 per cent had no opinion.

Similar sentiments have been reported by newsmen across the country. It is clear there is considerably less hysteria about Cuba in the country as a whole than there is in Washington. Senator Wayne Morse (D-Ore.) declared on the Senate floor Feb. 18 that he suspected the CIA was responsible for many of the hysterical allegations by Congressmen that tiny Cuba is a military threat to the mighty U.S.

Morse revealed that the editor of the Cuban counter-revolutionary magazine, *Bohemia Libre*, had offered him "a sensational collection of photographs" on the "Cuban military buildup." Said Morse, "One must assume that other members of Congress have been offered not only pictures, but countless allegations as well by the Cuban refugees, their political organs and their publicity organs."

Morse said the fact that the CIA subsidizes these organs "raises the suspicion that the taxpayer's money is being used to promote a particular policy favored by the Agency." Morse also reported that *Bohemia Libre* has recently ceased

publications. According to the Feb. 8 *Washington Daily News*, "reports from Miami's Cuban colony are that the Central Intelligence Agency had been subsidizing it, and a couple of weeks ago, got tired." Among reasons cited for the CIA's dumping of the magazine was: "that if the actual size of the CIA's subsidy of *Bohemia Libre* got into the hands of Congress, it would embarrass the Kennedy administration — and the CIA — just about as thoroughly as the Bay of Pigs disaster itself."

Senator Morse expressed alarm

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... The U.S.-Cuban Situation

(Continued from Page 1)

at the extent to which the Cuban counter-revolutionary activity has inflated the CIA. He said: "In effect the CIA exercises police-state powers . . . I cannot reconcile some of the activities of the CIA with the maintenance of precious rights of freedom to the American people."

Morse, himself, however, supports Washington's campaign to crush the Cuban Revolution. It is this campaign, carried out in violation of international law, U.S. law, and the rules of simple human decency, that is strengthening the police-state apparatus and creating an atmosphere of frustration, hysteria, and cynicism within government circles.

Another example of this is the affair of the four American flyers, whom Senate Democratic leader Mike Mansfield admitted last week had been killed flying combat missions in the April, 1961, Cuban invasion.

The papers around Birmingham, Ala., then carried stories of four Birmingham women whose husbands had disappeared shortly before April, 1961 and who have each been receiving checks of \$225 every two weeks since then. The husbands had all worked for the Hayes Aircraft company of Birmingham, and had been recruited for "secret" duty by an agency in Florida called Double Check.

Interviewed by newsmen, the women revealed that their husbands had left around Jan., 1961, on what the women were told was some kind of secret government work. In late April, 1961, a lawyer

representing Double Check informed them that their husbands had been killed on April 19 — a date coinciding with the Cuban invasion.

The women are angry because people say their husbands were soldiers of fortune, who went for the money. One of the widows, Mrs. Wade Carroll Gray, said her husband received a \$1,900 per month salary on the secret job.

The mother of one of the flyers, Mrs. Riley W. Shamburger Sr. is not sure her son, Riley Jr., is dead and insists on an honest statement of what happened to him. She said she has written the CIA and President Kennedy. In her letter to Kennedy, she quoted him as saying after the invasion that no Americans were involved. "If no Americans were involved," she asked, "where is my son?" "But he evaded my question," Mrs. Shamburger said. So did the CIA.

Vowing she won't give up until she gets the truth she declared: "They take your boy away and never let you know what happened. Some people have even said he sold out to the Cubans. This thing is not fair. It makes me so mad."

The U.S. government is reduced to subterfuge; hiring private agencies to recruit mercenary soldiers, cruelly keeping the relatives in the dark, because it is involved in a business so dirty and illegal that it cannot be formally admitted. There is no glory for the Americans it has sent into battle. The attempt by Washington to crush the Cuban Revolution drags the U.S. ever deeper into moral decay.

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Va. Guard Officer Allegedly Rejected Offer to Fly in Bay of Pigs Invasion

RICHMOND, March 8 (AP) — At least one Virginia Air National Guard pilot rejected an offer to fly in support of the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961, it was reported today.

The unidentified pilot was offered \$2250 monthly for 60 days plus \$200 per month in expenses, a source said.

The source said no mention was made of combat flights during the invasion. Instead, the pilot was to fly gun-running missions but the locale wasn't specified.

The man making the offer didn't identify himself.

Meantime, Maj. Gen. Paul M. Booth, Virginia's Adjutant General, said no guard pilots participated in support of the invasion.

Booth said, however, he couldn't say whether the Cen-

tral Intelligence Agency had sought to recruit any guard pilots.

Rumors of the offer to fly the gun-running missions circulated among a select group of air guardsmen in Virginia during the period immediately following the Cuban invasion, it was reported.

The Virginia ANG development came to light in a report Thursday night which said that guard pilots from Virginia, Alabama and Arkansas were sought by the CIA to take part in the invasion.

"We stay in close contact with the air group and I have heard nothing of this," said Booth.

(A report of the pilot's story appeared in yesterday's editions of the Washington Star under the byline of Brian Kelly, a staff reporter. Kelly also is public information officer of the 192d Tactical Fight-

er Group of the Virginia Air National Guard. Kelly said that in his capacity as a public information officer he had "no information about the report and no official verification.")

Pilots from Virginia, Arkansas and Alabama were approached because guard units in those states were the last to fly the B26 bombers used in the invasion, the report said.

"We had converted to jets by that time (of the invasion) but it is true we were the last to fly the B26," said Booth.

Other sources said CIA agents approached a number of National Guard flyers in Virginia, Arkansas and Alabama, seeking men who had experience with B26s.

The CIA in Washington declined to comment.

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UPI-70

(PIGS BAY)

CHICAGO--ALABAMA PILOT ALBERT C. PERSONS SAID TODAY THAT UNITED STATES CARRIER-BASED PLANES WERE PROMISED AND THEN WITHDRAWN AT THE LAST MOMENT IN THE CUBA BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

PERSONS MADE THE STATEMENT IN THE SECOND OF TWO DISPATCHES BY HIM PUBLISHED IN CHICAGO AMERICAN.

PERSONS, WHO SAYS HE WAS ONE OF 18 AMERICAN PILOTS WHO TOOK PART IN THE CAMPAIGN, SAID ALSO THAT THERE WAS A 48-HOUR LAG BETWEEN THE FIRST AND SECOND AIR STRIKES IN THE INVASION ATTEMPT.

"THIS DELAY WAS ORDERED FROM WASHINGTON," HE WROTE. "IT HAS NEVER BEEN REVEALED WHO ORDERS THESE WERE, NOR WHAT PURPOSE WAS EXPECTED NEVER BEEN REVEALED WHO ORDERS THESE WERE, NOR WHAT PURPOSE WAS EXPECTED TO BE ACCOMPLISHED. THE RESULTS, OF COURSE, WERE DISASTROUS."

PERSONS SAID SIX AMERICAN PILOTS TOOK PART IN THE THIRD AND LAST STRIKE AND FOUR OF THEM LOST THEIR LIVES. BEFORE THE FINAL STRIKE, HE SAID, "A REQUEST WAS MADE TO WASHINGTON FOR SUPPORT FROM CARRIER-BASED AIRCRAFT."

"THIS REQUEST WAS GRANTED," PERSONS SAID. "THE PROMISE WAS CONFIRMED AND RECONFIRMED. HERRERA (CUBAN PILOT GONZALO HERRERA) AND THE AMERICAN PILOTS WHO TOOK OFF ON WEDNESDAY MORNING DID SO WITH THE FULL ASSURANCE THAT UNITED STATES NAVY AIR SUPPORT FROM CARRIERS IN THE AREA WOULD BE AVAILABLE."

"THE ORDER WHICH PROMISED THIS AIR SUPPORT WAS RESCINDED WHILE THE AIRCRAFT WAS EN ROUTE FROM PUERTO CABEZA TO THE BAY OF PIGS..."

"IT IS KNOWN WHO PROMISED THIS AIR SUPPORT. IT IS KNOWN WHO RESCINDED THE ORDER. IT IS KNOWN WHO ORDERED THE 48-HOUR STAND-DOWN FOLLOWING THE FIRST AIR STRIKE ON SATURDAY. IT IS KNOWN THAT CONTROL OF THE MILITARY OPERATION WAS TAKEN OVER IN WASHINGTON AT THE LAST MINUTE FOLLOWING WHICH THE FAILURE OF THE MISSION AT THE BAY OF PIGS WAS INSURED."

PERSONS SAID MAJ. GEN. GEORGE REID DOSTER OF THE ALABAMA NATIONAL GUARD, IDENTIFIED AS TACTICAL AIR CHIEF OF THE 1984 MAR 14 1963 PIGS OPERATION, "DID NOT PARTICIPATE...ON ORDERS OF ANY HIGHER COMMAND."

"GEN. DOSTER, AS FAR AS THE PERMANENT MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT IS CONCERNED, IS A CIVILIAN," PERSONS WROTE IN THE AMERICAN. "IT WAS AS A CIVILIAN THAT GEN. DOSTER CONTRIBUTED HIS TALENTS TO THE EFFORT TO OUST CASTRO FROM CUBA."

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'Reckless' Cuba Talk Scored by Mansfield

Senate Democratic Leader Mansfield today said congressional critics of President Kennedy's handling of the Cuban situation have engaged in "reckless inflaming of public emotions."

He was referring primarily to Republican inquiries into the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion in April, 1961.

As a part of these inquiries, Republicans recently called attention to the death of four American flyers who were employed by the anti-Castro forces at the Bay of Pigs. Senator Mansfield last week confirmed this report.

But today he told the Senate it was not a new disclosure he had ferreted out of the White House. He said he got his information from a newspaper story published on May 5, 1961, under a Birmingham (Ala.) dateline, disclosing the same information that Republicans have recently heralded as a new revelation.

Critics Chided

The Democratic Leader suggested that "those who have a penchant for playing CIA chief or Secretary of State" should know what they are about. He suggested that lawmakers who want to "play sleuth" should try to find out what is wrong with the economy and get on with their legislative business.

Senator Mansfield said that "no wever discouraging this political prowling over the dead may be," he has no objection

to discussion of foreign policy matters in the Senate.

But he said members of Congress do have an obligation to consider their words and speak in a wise and constructive manner on foreign affairs.

Dirksen Replies

In a brief reply to the Democratic leader, Senate Republican Leader Dirksen insisted that he had been "most circumspect" in referring recently to the deaths of the four flyers. He said he had made no attempt to pre-judge anything but thought all the facts should be placed on the record.

Senator Dirksen said he did not ask anyone for confirmation of the story at the time and was not a party to any conference at the White House where this may have been discussed.

He also reminded Democrats it was Attorney General Robert Kennedy who revived discussion of the Bay of Pigs invasion earlier this year in an interview during which he said United States air cover was not promised the anti-Castro invaders.

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UPI-96

(PIGS BAY)

WASHINGTON--THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SAID TODAY IT HAD ESTABLISHED THAT NO NATIONAL GUARD MEMBERS OUTSIDE OF ALABAMA TOOK PART IN COMBAT OPERATIONS DURING THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION IN 1961.

A SPOKESMAN SAID THE IMPLICATION WAS CLEAR THAT "SOME FIRM" HAD RECRUITED THE FOUR ALABAMANS NOW KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN KILLED IN THE CUBAN OPERATION. AT LEAST ONE OF THE FOUR WAS A MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER ANY NATIONAL GUARDSMEN HAD TAKEN PART IN NON-COMBAT ASPECTS OF THE INVASION, SUCH AS TRAINING OR OTHER PREPARATIONS.

THE DEPARTMENT PREVIOUSLY HAD STATED FLATLY THAT NO U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL TOOK PART IN THE INVASION.

THE SPOKESMAN SAID THIS MEANT PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY. GUARDSMEN ARE ON ACTIVE DUTY ONLY WHEN CALLED UP FOR EMERGENCIES AND DURING THEIR TWO WEEK SUMMER TRAINING CAMP SESSION.

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ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
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 DATE 7-17-96 BY SP4BFA/AT

UPI-67

ADD 6 CUBA, WASHINGTON
 SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD ACCUSED SENATE REPUBLICANS
 OF "PANIC POLITICS" AND OF "PROWLING OVER THE DEAD" IN RAKING OVER NEWS
 THAT AMERICAN PILOTS DIED IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

HIS SHARP ATTACK WAS AIMED GENERALLY AT SENATORS WHO HE SAID HAVE
 DISCUSSED CUBA "WITHOUT RESTRAINT" -- BUT PARTICULARLY AT SENATE GOP
 LEADER EVERETT DIRKSEN WHO BROUGHT UP DISCUSSION OF THE LOST PILOTS.

MANSFIELD TOLD THE SENATE HE HAD "CONFIRMED" DIRKSEN'S PUBLIC
 STATEMENT THAT FOUR CIVILIAN PILOTS LOST THEIR LIVES IN THE ILL-FATED
 INVASION EFFORT BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN PUBLISHED ALMOST TWO YEARS EARLIER
 IN THE NEW YORK TIMES.

HE SAID CRITICS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S CUBA POLICY PERMITTED
 THE IMPRESSION TO "GAIN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CREDENCE" THAT
 "THIS TRAGIC NEWS HAS BEEN SUPPRESSED BY THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION."

"IS THIS THE SORT OF THING THAT HELPS THE NATION?" HE ASKED.
 "OR IS IT A GLARING EXAMPLE OF IRRESPONSIBLE POLITICS -- OF PANIC
 POLITICS AT ITS WORST?" HE ASKED.

MANSFIELD SAID THE REDISCUSSION OF THE LOST FLIERS FROM
 ALABAMA, WHO APPARENTLY CRASHED IN THE CARIBBEAN, WAS A "CRUEL THING
 TO DO" TO THEIR FAMILIES AND WAS A "RECKLESS THING TO DO TO FOREIGN
 POLICY."

HE ADDED: "IT SEEMS TO ME THEY OWE AN APOLOGY TO MR. KENNEDY,
 EVEN MORE, THEY OWE AN APOLOGY TO THE PEOPLE OF THE NATION."

THE MONTANA DEMOCRAT CALLED FOR "RESTRAINED" DISCUSSION OF THE
 CUBAN PROBLEM, WITH CONSTRUCTIVE SUGGESTIONS, FROM WHICH HELP FOR
 THE PRESIDENT MIGHT EMERGE.

BUT HE DENOUNCED WHAT HE CALLED "POLITICAL PROWLING OVER THE DEAD"
 AND A "RECKLESS FLAMING OF PUBLIC EMOTIONS." HE SAID THOSE
 WHO DO THIS SHOULD "AT LEAST ACKNOWLEDGE WHAT THEY ARE ABOUT."
 TO CONTINUE IN THIS FASHION, HE SAID, IS TO "TOY WITH THE LIFE
 OF OUR NATION."

MANSFIELD SAID HE SEES "NO NATIONAL PURPOSE" SERVED BY LOOSE
 DISCUSSION OF CUBA AND THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

DIRKSEN RAISED THE BAY OF PIGS ISSUE WHEN HE SAID A GOP POLICY
 COMMITTEE INVESTIGATION OF THE 1961 INVASION EVENTS HAD DISCLOSED
 THAT FOUR AMERICAN FLIERS HAD DIED FLYING FOR THE CUBAN REFUGEE
 FORCES. HIS REPORT ON THE BAY OF PIGS INCIDENT IS EXPECTED TO BE MADE
 NEXT WEEK.

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ADD 7 CUBA, WASHINGTON

MANSFIELD SAID THERE HAS BEEN DISCUSSION OF CUBA BUT THAT "LITTLE HAS BEEN DISPASSIONATE AND LESS HAS BEEN CONSTRUCTIVE." POLICIES HAVE BEEN TRIED INSTEAD THROUGH "PRESS RELEASES," HE CHARGED. "THE SIZE AND ATTENTION OF THESE HAS BEEN 'JUDGE AND JURY.' SUCH ACTIVITY, HE SAID, IS 'NOT HELPING' BUT 'HURTING' BOTH THE COUNTRY AND THE PRESIDENT. HE APPEALED FOR SENATORS TO HELP THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND TO HELP THE NATION IN SO DOING."

REFERRING TO DIRKSEN'S STATEMENT, MANSFIELD SAID THE BAY OF PIGS SUBJECT HAS BEEN "PRESSED AND PRESSED--AND TO WHAT END?"

"ARE WE GOING TO GET A CLEARER SOLUTION IF WE KNOW EVERY GRUESOME DETAIL OF THIS MATTER?" HE ASKED. "WHAT NATIONAL PURPOSE IS SERVED BY THIS MACABRE FIXATION?"

MANSFIELD SAID THE EARLY STORY ON THE LOST FLIERS WAS PUBLISHED IN THE NEW YORK TIMES ISSUE OF MAY 5, DATED MAY 4, 1961 "ONE YEAR AND NINE MONTHS AGO."

HE URGED THOSE WHO HE SAID HAVE A "PENCHANT TO PLAY CIA CHIEF, OR SECRETARY OF STATE," TO TEND TO THEIR LEGISLATIVE CHORES.

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ADD 8 CUBA, WASHINGTON

ANSWERING MANSFIELD, DIRKSEN SAID HE BROUGHT UP THE SUBJECT ONLY AFTER ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY REOPENED IT "AFTER IT HAD Languished FOR 20 MONTHS."

BUT ONCE BROUGHT UP, HE SAID, HE FOUND THERE WAS A "TREMENDOUS PUBLIC INTEREST" IN IT.

"I DO NOT LIKE TO SEE A GAP IN CURRENT HISTORY THAT MAY SOME DAY BE REFERRED TO AS THE BAY OF PIGS GAP," DIRKSEN SAID. "LET'S LAY THE WHOLE RECORD OPEN."

HE NOTED THAT THE SENATE PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE HEADED BY JOHN C. STENNIS, D-MISS., ALSO WAS INVESTIGATING THE INCIDENT. DIRKSEN SAID HE WOULD NOT ATTEMPT TO "PREJUDGE" THE CASE "UNTIL THE APPROPRIATE GROUP OF THIS BODY CAN GO INTO IT FURTHER."

DIRKSEN SAID HE MENTIONED THAT FOUR AMERICAN FLYERS WERE KILLED ONLY AFTER ANOTHER SENATOR, WHOM HE DID NOT NAME, ACCUSED REPUBLICANS OF "CRYING OVER SPILLED MILK."

"I SAID THAT SPILLED MILK IS ONE THING AND SPILLED BLOOD IS ANOTHER," DIRKSEN SAID. HE THEN COMMENDED MANSFIELD FOR CONFIRMING THAT FOUR AMERICANS HAD BEEN KILLED IN THE INVASION.

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UPI-90

(PIGS BAY)

CHICAGO--AN ALABAMA PILOT AND EDITOR SAID TODAY HE WAS ONE OF 18 AMERICAN AIRMEN WHO "RESPONDED TO A PERSONAL INVITATION" TO TAKE PART IN THE CUBAN BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

ALBERT C. PERSONS, IN A DISPATCH IN CHICAGO'S AMERICAN, SAID FIDEL CASTRO HAD 48 HOURS' ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE INVASION AND WAS THUS "ALLOWED ALL THE TIME HE NEEDED TO SUCCESSFULLY DISPERSE AIRCRAFT, TANKS AND TROOPS."

THE AMERICAN, IN A SEPARATE STORY, NAMED BRIG. GEN. G. REID DOSTER OF THE ALABAMA AIR GUARD AS THE MAN IN CHARGE OF TACTICAL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE INVASION. THE NEWSPAPER SAID DOSTER WAS IDENTIFIED AS TACTICAL AIR CHIEF BY RETIRED MAJ. GEN. DAVID W. HUTCHINSON OF OKLAHOMA CITY.

DOSTER, THE AMERICAN SAID, REFERRED THE NEWSPAPER TO PERSONS, 47, A FORMER WORLD WAR II PILOT AND NOW MANAGING EDITOR OF THE WEEKLY BIRMINGHAM EXAMINER.

PERSONS, IN A DISPATCH BANNERED IN TODAY'S AMERICAN, SAID THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WAS NOT TO BLAME FOR THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO AND "HAS BEEN FORCED TO ACCEPT THE SCAPE GOAT ROLE IN SILENCE."

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PERSONS SAID ALSO THAT:

--"MIRO CORDONA, WHO HAS BEEN WIDELY QUOTED AS SAYING HE WAS HELD INCOMMUNICADO BY THE CIA AND NEVER INFORMED WHEN THE INVASION WAS TO BE LAUNCHED, WAS ACTUALLY IN GUATEMALA FOR A LAST-MINUTE PEP TALK TO HIS TROOPS--WHO WERE EVEN THEN BEING AIRLIFTED TO NICARAGUA WHERE INVASION TRANSPORTS LAY AT ANCHOR OFF PUERTO CABEZA."

--PRESIDENT KENNEDY REPORTEDLY VETOED A PLAN TO SAVE THE INVASION FROM FAILURE BY THROWING U.S. TROOPS INTO THE OPERATION. THE U.S. WOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN A "CASUS BELLI," PERSONS SAID, BY A FAKE BOMBING OF THE GUANTANAMO NAVAL BASE.

--THE PRESIDENT NEVER MADE A DECISION TO WITHDRAW U.S. AIR SUPPORT FROM THE INVASION FORCES "FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH SUPPORT WAS NEVER A PART OF THE ORIGINAL PLANNING OF THE OPERATION."

PERSONS SAID HIS ROLE WAS CONFINED TO NON-COMBAT ACTIVITIES DURING THE INVASION. HE WAS RECRUITED BY A TEST PILOT WHO ASKED HIM "IF I WOULD BE INTERESTED IN A JOB--LASTING FROM 30 TO 90 DAYS; A JOB WHICH WOULD BE HAZARDOUS; WHICH WOULD INVOLVE SOME 'SHOOTING'; WHICH WOULD BE OUTSIDE THE CONTINENTAL LIMITS OF THE UNITED STATES IN THIS HEMISPHERE; AND WHICH, AS HE PUT IT, WOULD BE 'IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST'."

PERSONS SAID HE AND THE OTHER RECRUITS WERE BRIEFED TWICE BY FOUR MEN WHO GAVE ONLY THEIR FIRST NAMES AND "REPRESENTED THEMSELVES AS BEING WITH A COMPANY UNDER CONTRACT TO ONE OF THE CUBAN EXILE GROUPS."

PERSONS SAID THE FOUR AIRMEN WHO DIED WERE KILLED APRIL 19, 1961, "IN A VAIN EFFORT TO STEM THE TIDE OF ADVANCING CASTRO FORCES ALERTED FIVE DAYS EARLIER."

THE AMERICANS "WERE HIRED TO REPLACE INEXPERIENCED CUBAN AIR CREWS," PERSONS SAID. HE WROTE THAT "THE FIRST TWO AIR STRIKES WERE MADE BY CUBAN CREWS. SUBSEQUENT EVENTS PROVED THESE FIRST MISSIONS WERE NOT COMPLETELY EFFECTIVE. A LAST MINUTE DECISION TO USE AMERICAN PILOTS ON THE THIRD AND FINAL STRIKE CAME TOO LATE TO SAVE INVASION TROOPS...."

WHEN FAILURE OF THE INVASION APPEARED SURE, PERSONS SAID, ONE OF THE AMERICAN PILOTS PROPOSED A PLAN TO BRING THE UNITED STATES INTO THE CONFLICT.

AIRCRAFT WITH CUBA MARKINGS WOULD "STRAFE RUNWAYS AND DROP A FEW BOMBS ON AREAS INSIDE THE NAVAL BASE AT GUANTANAMO. ALL PERSONNEL, NATURALLY, WOULD HAVE BEEN REMOVED FROM THESE AREAS AHEAD OF TIME."

PERSONS SAID "I WAS TOLD THAT THIS PROPOSITION WAS PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. I CANNOT, OF COURSE, CONFIRM THIS. IF SO, HE TURNED IT DOWN."

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 DATE 7-17-96 BY SP4 BJS/STP

UPI-213

(BAY OF PIGS)

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.--A RADIO STATION SAID TODAY "AT LEAST EIGHT AND
 POSSIBLY 12" LOCAL MEN PARTICIPATED IN THE ABORTIVE BAY OF PIGS
 INVASION IN 1961 INCLUDING FOUR WHO WERE KILLED.

ELVIN STANTON, NEWS DIRECTOR OF STATION WSGN, SAID HE HAD "PERSONAL
 KNOWLEDGE OF EIGHT BIRMINGHAM AREA MEN INVOLVED AND THERE WERE
 INDICATIONS THAT POSSIBLY 12 WERE INVOLVED.

STANTON SAID HE LEARNED "FROM UNDISCLOSED SOURCES THAT THOSE
 PARTICIPATING WERE PAID WITH FUNDS THEY CLAIMED CAME FROM THE CENTRAL
 INTELLIGENCE AGENCY."

AT LEAST FIVE LOCAL MEN WERE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED INVOLVED. RILEY
 SHAMBURGER, WADE C. GRAY, THOMAS RAY AND LEE BAKER WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE
 BEEN KILLED WHEN THEIR PLANE CRASHED. ALBERT PERSONS, A BIRMINGHAM
 NEWSPAPERMAN, SAID HE WAS ONE OF 18 AMERICANS WHO TOOK PART IN THE CUBAN
 INVASION.

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
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UPI-107

ADD PIGS BAY, LITTLE ROCK (UPI-102)

FAUBUS SAID THE ARKANSAS AIR GUARD FLIERS WERE "SWORN TO SECRECY."
 HE SAID AT LEAST A DOZEN ARKANSAS GUARD FLIERS WERE IN NICARAGUA
 TO FLY FOR THE INVASION AND "SOME" DID FLY. HE SAID THAT AS FAR AS HE
 KNEW, NO AIRMEN FROM ARKANSAS WERE CASUALTIES, BUT ONE PLANE FROM
 ARKANSAS WAS SHOT DOWN.

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(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Fliers Paid by Latin Including Four Lost Over Cuba

BY DOM BONAFIDE
Chief Latin America Correspondent

The Miami counsel for an organization which recruited pilots for combat missions against Fidel Castro—including four Birmingham, Ala., airmen killed in the 1961 Cuban invasion—said Monday it was privately supported and financed by a "Central American anti-Castro group."

Alex E. Carlson, attorney for Double Check Corp., 145 Curtiss Pkwy., Miami Springs, also said "it was possible" the group received assistance from the Central Intelligence Agency.

"But I don't know for certain. It was merely reported to me that it received aid," Carlson said.

Carlson said "several" U.S. airmen had been enlisted by American recruiters employed by Double Check to fly anti-Castro missions. He declined to say how many were recruited or to disclose the identity of the sponsors of Double Check.

He said his clients asked him to set up a corporation shortly after Castro assumed power in January 1959 and to act as counsel.

"To my knowledge," Carlson said, "neither the U.S. nor any other governments were involved. I know personally that a lot of rich exile Cubans contributed."

He said the four Birmingham airmen crashed in the Caribbean on April 19, the final day of the three-day invasion operation, while flying in a C46 aircraft. It is believed that the plane, normally used for cargo ferrying, had been converted for low-level strafing duty.

"The last we heard from them they were losing altitude and one engine was out," Carlson said. "Some wreckage was later found."

He said that "after all hope had been abandoned" the Central American group authorized Double Check to set up a professional trust fund from which to make twice-a-month payments of \$225 to the widows of the four dead fliers.

(In Washington, Sen. Everett M. Dirksen (R., Ill.) said a Senate committee will be asked to determine the source of the checks, now issued by the Bankers Trust Co. of New York.)

Carlson said Double Check remains in existence but is inactive. Records in the secretary of state's office in Tallahassee showed Double Check paid a

\$30 capital stock tax last Jan. 23.

Carlson denied that the mysterious Central American group was the anti-Castro Democratic Revolutionary Front (now called the Cuban Revolutionary Council) headed by Dr. José Miró Cardona. It was under the banner of the Revolutionary Front that the invasion was launched.

"It (the Central American group) was associated in some way with the Front but it was smaller," Carlson said.

Carlson, who speaks Spanish and attended the University of Concepcion in Chile for one year as a scholarship student, said he did not believe his background had anything to do with his appointment as counsel for Double Check.

"It is just that my office is near the airport and I do a lot of airline work," he said.

He said he had disclosed almost all the information about the four dead airmen in 1961 and that the present furor is politically motivated.

He was not divulging more data, he said, because it would breach lawyer-client relationship. The U.S. government had not instructed him as to what he could say, he said.

Tallahassee records showed that Double Check was incorporated on May 14, 1959, as a "brokerage" company. Current officers were listed as Carlson, president; Earl Sanders, vice president; Margery Carlson, secretary-treasurer, and Wesley R. Pillsbury, resident agent.

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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

Date: 3/5/63

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(MM 105-1742)

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Submitting Office: Miami

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UPI-213

(CUBA)

MIAMI--A MIAMI ATTORNEY SAID TODAY THAT "AFTER ALL HOPE WAS ABANDONED," A CENTRAL AMERICAN ANTI-CASTRO GROUP SET UP A TRUST FUND FOR FOUR BIRMINGHAM, ALA., WOMEN WIDOWED IN THE CUBAN INVASION.

THE TRUST FUND GAVE THE FOUR WOMEN \$225 EACH EVERY TWO WEEKS AFTER THEIR AIRMEN HUSBANDS WERE KILLED APRIL 19, 1961, THE LAST DAY OF THE ILL-FATED ATTACK AT THE BAY OF PIGS.

ALEX E. CARLSON, ATTORNEY FOR THE CENTRAL AMERICAN GROUP, SAID A NUMBER OF FLIERS WERE RECRUITED TO FLY COMBAT MISSIONS AGAINST CASTRO DURING THE INVASION.

THE ATTORNEY WOULD NOT IDENTIFY THE CENTRAL AMERICAN GROUP, AND HE SAID HE HAD NO INFORMATION THAT THE GROUP WAS AIDED BY ANY GOVERNMENT. HE DID SAY HE KNEW OF SEVERAL WEALTHY CUBAN EXILES WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROUP.

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UPI-81

ADD 1 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-55)
 MEANWHILE, SENATE GOP LEADER EVERETT DIRKSEN CHARGED THAT
 SOMEBODY HAD BEEN PUTTING "GENTLE PRESSURE" ON POSSIBLE WITNESSES
 WHO MIGHT BE CALLED IN A NEW INVESTIGATION OF THE BAY OF PIGS
 INVASION FIASCO.

THE ILLINOIS REPUBLICAN DECLINED TO AMPLIFY HIS ASSERTION BUT
 APPEARED CONFIDENT THAT HIS OWN REVIEW OF THE INVASION WILL BE
 EXPANDED INTO A FORMAL SENATE COMMITTEE INQUIRY.

"THERE HAVE BEEN SOME INDICATIONS OF GENTLE PRESSURES ON PEOPLE
 WHO WOULD BE SUMMONED BEFORE A COMMITTEE IN DUE TIME," HE TOLD A
 NEWS CONFERENCE.

THE GOP LEADER SAID HE WAS GLAD TO SEE SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER
 MIKE MANSFIELD CONFIRM HIS OWN REPORT THAT FOUR CIVILIAN AMERICAN
 FLIERS HAD DIED IN THE APRIL 1961 CUBAN INVASION EFFORT. DIRKSEN
 SAID THAT, UNLIKE MANSFIELD, HE HAD NOT BEEN TOLD PREVIOUSLY
 THAT THE FOUR AMERICANS HAD BEEN KILLED. MANSFIELD SAID HE HAD
 BEEN GIVEN THE INFORMATION ON A CONFIDENTIAL BASIS.

DIRKSEN REFUSED TO DISCLOSE WHAT SENATE COMMITTEE HE WOULD SEEK
 TO HAVE PICK UP HIS INVESTIGATION. HE PLANS TO SUBMIT HIS OWN REPORT
 TO FELLOW REPUBLICANS PROBABLY NEXT WEEK AND ADDED:

"I EXPECT TO SEE IT LAND IN THE HANDS OF A COMMITTEE OF DEMOCRATS
 AND REPUBLICANS FOR THOROUGH EXAMINATION, USING SUBPOENA POWERS IF
 NECESSARY, SO IT WILL NOT BE IMPEACHED AS A PARTISAN DOCUMENT."

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Bobby Started It

The Kennedy administration has only itself to blame for the political controversy aroused by the revelation that four American airmen were shot down during the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs invasion.

It was the President's brother, Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy, who contended in January that the United States never had planned to provide air cover for the Cuban invasion attempt. Therefore, he said, it was an error to charge that President Kennedy had withdrawn the air cover.

Prompted by Bobby's interview, the Senate Republican leadership began its independent investigation of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, reviving the dormant issue.

The Republican charge that four Americans died in the invasion attempt has been verified by Majority Leader Mansfield (D-Mont.). GOP Leader Dirksen (Ill.) has said that he will make public the full story. We hope this will prompt the Kennedy administration to give its side. The public is entitled to as complete a picture as possible of what really happened and the extent of U.S. participation, even though the super-secret CIA planned the invasion.

So far as we know now, the men were not flying an air cover provided by U.S. Armed Forces. Instead, they apparently were American fliers who were employed to train Cuban pilots, navigators and radio operators and who volunteered to fly combat missions because of the exhaustion of the Cuban pilots.

So Bobby Kennedy's contention that the United States never had promised air cover for the invasion does not seem to have been disproved. But the deaths of the four Americans certainly does raise a question about Bobby's additional contention that the President had made it clear that "American manpower, American air power and American ships would not be used." Planned or not, American manpower certainly was used.

In our opinion, however, it would be unfortunate if this story were seized upon to try to force the Kennedy administration into unwise military actions against Cuba.

Like all Americans, we regret the loss of the lives of the four airmen in the invasion attempt. But, as a self-proclaimed spokesman for the four contended, "These men knew what they were getting into. If they came back they had a nice nest egg."

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

12B Detroit News
 Detroit, Mich.

Date: 2/27/63
 Edition: Final 4 Star
 Author:
 Editor: Martin S. Hayden
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UPI-148

ADD 4 CUBA, WASHINGTON

A REPUBLICAN CONGRESSMAN ACCUSED THE ADMINISTRATION TODAY OF PRESSURING INTO SILENCE AMERICANS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

REP. WILLIAM C. CRAMER, R-FLA., SAID THE SAME TYPE OF PRESSURE WAS APPLIED TO THE FAMILIES OF THE AMERICAN FLYERS ABOARD A B26 HE CLAIMED WAS SHOT DOWN IN THE WANING HOURS OF THE INVASION.

THE FLORIDA CONGRESSMAN ASKED THE ADMINISTRATION TO MAKE PUBLIC THE FULL FACTS ABOUT THE INVASION AND RELEASE THE NAMES OF ALL AMERICANS WHO WERE KILLED.

CRAMER SAID THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY REFUSED TO FURNISH HIM WITH NAMES TODAY. HE ADDED THAT THE CIA ALSO REFUSED TO CONFIRM OR DENY THAT FOUR AMERICANS REPORTEDLY LOST WHILE FLYING A CARGO PLANE WERE REALLY FOUR ABOARD THE B26 WHICH WAS SHOT DOWN.

"THE REFUSAL OF THE CIA TO EVEN DISCUSS THE MATTER," HE SAID, "RAISES GRAVE DOUBTS ABOUT THE IDENTITY, THE CIRCUMSTANCES, OR THE ACTUAL NUMBER OF AMERICANS KILLED INCIDENT TO THE INVASION."

CRAMER SAID AMERICAN FLYERS WERE REPORTEDLY KILLED ON WHAT HE CALLED SUICIDE MISSION BECAUSE OF INEPT PLANNING WHICH INCLUDED THE REMOVAL OF TAIL GUNS ON THE B26S.

"THIS," HE SAID, "MADE THESE PLANES SITTING DUCKS FOR THE COMMUNIST FIGHTERS."

CRAMER SAID IT WAS A NATIONAL DISGRACE THAT THE DEATH OF THE FLYERS WAS SUPPRESSED "AND THAT THEIR PART IN THIS FIGHT FOR FREEDOM...IS BEING PURPOSELY DISCREDITED."

"THE PLANTED STORIES THAT THEY WERE ONLY SOLDIERS OF FORTUNE, INTERESTED ONLY IN THEIR PAY," CRAMER SAID, "IS A DESECRATION OF THE HEROIC SACRIFICES OF THESE HEROES WHO GAVE THEIR LAST FULL MEASURE OF DEVOTION TO FIGHTING FOR ALL OUR FREEDOMS."

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UPI-176

(AMERICANS)

BIRMINGHAM, ALA.--A BIRMINGHAM WOMAN SAID TODAY HER SON WAS ONE OF FOUR AMERICANS WHO DISAPPEARED DURING THE ABORTIVE BAY OF PIGS INVASION IN 1961 AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY HAD "JUST EVADED THE QUESTION" WHEN SHE SOUGHT MORE INFORMATION ABOUT THE MEN.

MRS. RILEY W. SHAMBURGER, SR. SAID HER SON, MAJ. RILEY W. SHAMBURGER JR., AN AIR NATIONAL GUARD OFFICER, AND THREE OTHER BIRMINGHAM AREA MEN WERE ABOARD A CARGO PLANE THAT LEFT AN UNIDENTIFIED SOUTH AMERICAN AIRFIELD ON THE DAY OF THE INVASION. THE PLANE, A C46, WENT DOWN APRIL 19, 1961, THE DAY OF THE INVASION AND MRS. SHAMBURGER SAID HER EFFORTS SINCE THEN TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THE MEN'S FATE MET WITH NO SUCCESS.

SHE SAID SHE WROTE PRESIDENT KENNEDY:

"IF NO AMERICANS WERE INVOLVED (IN THE INVASION) WHERE IS MY SON?"

"I TRY TO HAVE HOPE AND TRY TO CLING TO IT. YOU KNOW THE

GOVERNMENT NEVER HAS NOTIFIED US. SOME LAWYERS CAME OUT AND TOLD US ABOUT IT," SHE SAID.

SHE APPARENTLY REFERRED TO A PRIVATE ATTORNEY FROM MIAMI, WHO DECLINED TO IDENTIFY HIMSELF, WHO TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE HERE IN MAY OF 1961 THE FOUR MEN WERE HIRED BY "PRIVATE SOURCES."

"WE'VE HEARD SO MANY THINGS SINCE THEN TO MAKE US THINK THEY WERE ALIVE," SHE SAID. SHE DECLINED TO ELABORATE.

ON THE PLANE WITH SHAMBURGER WERE THOMAS W. GRAY, CO-PILOT; LEE F. BAKER, ENGINEER; AND WADE C. GRAY, RADIO OPERATOR. GRAY IS FROM NEARBY PINSON WHILE THE OTHERS LIVED IN BIRMINGHAM.

THE MEN, WITH SHAMBURGER PILOTING, ALLEGEDLY LEFT SOUTH AMERICA WITH THE CARGO WITH STRICT ORDERS NOT TO BREAK RADIO SILENCE UNLESS ABSOLUTELY NECESSARY.

MRS. SHAMBURGER SAID SHE HAD BEEN TOLD, APPARENTLY BY THE UNIDENTIFIED ATTORNEYS, THAT THE PLANE WENT DOWN ON THE DAY OF THE INVASION WHEN ITS ENGINES FAILED.

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UPI-205

ADD AMERICANS, BIRMINGHAM (UPI-176)
(ACTING WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY ANDREW T. HATCHER SAID THE WHITE
HOUSE MAIL ROOM WAS CHECKING FOR ANY CORRESPONDENCE FROM MRS.
SHAMBURGER.)

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U/I-231

ADD AMERICANS BIRMINGHAM (UPI-205)

LATER THE WHITE HOUSE SAID THE GOVERNMENT "UNFORTUNATELY" COULD NOT GIVE MRS. SHAMBURGER MORE INFORMATION ON A REPORT THAT HER SON WAS ONE OF FOUR AMERICAN FLIERS KILLED IN THE ABORTIVE 1961 CUBAN INVASION.

ACTING PRESS SECRETARY ANDREW T. HATCHER, COMMENTING IN RESPONSE TO MRS. SHAMBURGER'S CHARGE THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY "JUST EVADED THE QUESTIONS" WHEN SHE APPEALED TO THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE FOR MORE DETAILS ABOUT HER SON, SAID:

"MRS. SHAMBURGER WROTE TO THE PRESIDENT THE LATTER PART OF 1962. THE LETTER WAS ANSWERED BY BRIG. GEN. GODFREY MCHUGH, AIR AIDE TO THE PRESIDENT. AT THE DIRECTION OF THE PRESIDENT THE GENERAL EXTENDED THE PRESIDENT'S HEARTFELT SYMPATHY AND EXPLAINED THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAD, UNFORTUNATELY, NO INFORMATION TO ADD TO THAT WHICH HAD BEEN CONVEYED BEFORE."

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UPI-220

(PILOTS)

MIAMI--CUBAN PILOTS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE ABORTIVE 1961 CUBAN BAY OF PIGS INVASION SAID TODAY THAT SEN. EVERETT DIRKSEN'S REPORT THAT FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS WERE KILLED IN THE ATTACK IS NOT NEW. THEY REPORTED IT HERE A MONTH AGO.

A UNITED PRESS INTERNATIONAL STORY FROM MIAMI LAST JAN. 22 QUOTED THE FOUR CUBANS--GONZALO HERRERA, GUSTAVO VILLOLDO, ALFREDO CABALLERO AND JULIO GONZALEZ REBULL--AS SAYING THE AMERICANS, IN TWO B-26S, WERE SHOT DOWN ON APRIL 19, 1961, THE THIRD DAY OF THE INVASION.

THE NAMES OF THE AMERICANS WERE NOT KNOWN BECAUSE ALL AMERICANS CONNECTED WITH THE INVASION USED PSEUDONYMS OR NICKNAMES SUCH AS "JOE," OR "BOB," THEY SAID.

ALTHOUGH DIRKSEN SAID HE DID NOT HAVE MORE DETAILS, THE CUBANS GAVE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION LAST JAN. 22 IN THEIR INTERVIEW WITH UPI HERE.

HERRERA SAID HE FLEW IN FORMATION WITH THE TWO B-26S WHICH WERE LOST. THE OTHERS CORROBORATED HERRERA'S REPORT.

HE SAID CUBAN PILOTS HAD BEEN AUTHORIZED TO CALL BY RADIO TO A U.S. AIRCRAFT CARRIER STATIONED NEARBY THE INVASION AREA "IN CASE OF ANY EMERGENCY." THE NAME OF THE CARRIER WAS NOT KNOWN.

"WE MADE VARIOUS CALLS BUT THEY WERE IGNORED," HERRERA SAID.

"ONE OF THE AMERICAN PILOTS CALLED THE CARRIER SUDDENLY SAYING HE WAS BEING ATTACKED BY ONE OF THE CASTRO AIR FORCE T-33 JET TRAINERS AND THAT ONE OF HIS MOTORS WERE AFIRE AND HIS AMMUNITION WAS GONE," HERRERA CONTINUED.

"TEN SECONDS LATER THE OTHER B-26 ALSO CALLED THE CARRIER FOR HELP. HIS CALL WAS PUNCTUATED BY THE EXPLOSION OF HIS PLANE. THEN THE FIRST PLANE WHICH HAD CALLED PLUNGED INTO THE SEA IN FLAMES."

HERRERA, ALSO FLYING A B-26, SAID HE SUBSEQUENTLY FLEW TO NICARAGUA ALTHOUGH HIS PLANE HAD BEEN HIT 37 TIMES BY BULLETS AND ONE OF HIS MOTORS WAS KNOCKED OUT. HIS CALLS, EN ROUTE TO THE MYSTERY CARRIER, ALSO WENT UNANSWERED, HE SAID.

OTHER PILOTS HERE WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE INVASION, SAID IT WAS "WELL KNOWN" THAT FOUR AMERICAN FLIERS WERE KILLED IN THE INVASION. BUT THEIR NAMES WERE A MYSTERY.

ONE PILOT TOLD UPI TONIGHT THAT HE ALSO FLEW A B-26 ACCOMPANIED BY AN AMERICAN WHO GAVE HIS NAME ONLY AS "BOB" AND RECORDED SAID HE WAS A VETERAN OF THE KOREAN WAR. THE CUBAN, 18 FEB 28 1963 DID NOT WANT TO BE IDENTIFIED, SAID HE NEVER SAW THE AMERICAN AGAIN AFTER THEY RETURNED TO NICARAGUA AND KNOWS NOTHING MORE ABOUT HIM "EXCEPT THAT HE WAS MY COMPANION DURING THE INVASION ATTACKS."

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UPI-41

(DIRKSEN-CUBA)

WASHINGTON--SENATE GOP LEADER EVERETT DIRKSEN SAID TODAY HE HAS INFORMATION THAT FOUR AMERICAN PILOTS, PRESUMABLY CIVILIAN, WERE KILLED IN THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION ATTEMPT.

DIRKSEN TOLD NEWSMEN THE INFORMATION WAS DEVELOPED BY THE GOP STAFF INVESTIGATING THE 1961 CUBAN INVASION AND, HE ASSUMES, IS KNOWN TO GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

DIRKSEN DECLINED TO ELABORATE ON THE INFORMATION BUT INDICATED HE WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY IN A SPEECH HE WILL MAKE, PERHAPS LATER THIS WEEK, AND IN A REPORT TO SENATE REPUBLICANS. HE ANNOUNCED SEVERAL WEEKS AGO HE WAS ASSEMBLING DATA ON THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION IN THE INTEREST OF HISTORICAL ACCURACY AFTER ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY MADE A STATEMENT ON THE MATTER.

DIRKSEN SAID HE FELT CERTAIN THE REPORTED DOWNING OF FOUR U.S. PILOTS HAD BEEN "VERIFIED" BY HIS STAFF. HE SAID HE COULD NOT SAY MORE AT THIS TIME, BECAUSE THIS INFORMATION WAS BUT PART OF THE DATA HE IS ACCUMULATING FOR HIS REPORT.

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UPI-54

ADD DIRKSEN-CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-41)

DIRKSEN SAID LATER HE PLANS TO REPORT FIRST TO FELLOW REPUBLICANS, PROBABLY AT THEIR REGULAR WEEKLY LUNCHEON MEETING NEXT TUESDAY, THEN DELIVER HIS SENATE SPEECH.

THE U.S. PILOTS TO WHOM DIRKSEN REFERRED WERE DESCRIBED AS UNDER CONTRACT TO THE CUBAN REFUGEE FORCE WHICH WAS REPULSED BY CASTRO'S GROUND AND AIR UNITS WHEN IT MADE ITS BEACHHEAD EFFORT AT THE BAY OF PIGS IN APRIL 1961.

THE ILLINOIS REPUBLICAN HAS TAKEN ISSUE WITH THE CONTENTION OF SOME DEMOCRATS THAT THE BAY OF PIGS DEBACLE IS "SPILLED MILK" ABOUT WHICH NOTHING NEEDS TO BE DONE. DIRKSEN SAID TODAY THERE IS "SPILLED BLOOD" INVOLVED AND THAT THE WHOLE RECORD SHOULD BE ACCURATELY PRESENTED BECAUSE THE CUBAN SITUATION WILL BE "WITH US FOR SOME TIME TO COME."


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UPI-217
(PILOTS)

WASHINGTON--SENATE DEMOCRATIC LEADER MIKE MANSFIELD TONIGHT
 CONFIRMED A GOP REPORT THAT FOUR CIVILIAN AMERICAN PILOTS WERE
 KILLED IN THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

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U11-218

ADD 1 PILOTS WASHINGTON

THE MONTANA DEMOCRAT SAID IN A STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. FLIERS, FLYING AS VOLUNTEER SUBSTITUTES FOR EXHAUSTED CUBAN PILOTS, "LOST THEIR LIVES" IN THE BATTLE FOR THE CUBA BEACHHEAD.

MANSFIELD'S STATEMENT WAS ISSUED FOLLOWING THE CLAIM OF SENATE GOP LEADER EVERETT M. DIRKSEN THAT HE HAD INFORMATION TO THE EFFECT THAT FOUR CIVILIAN U.S. PILOTS HAD DIED IN THE BAY OF PIGS EFFORT.

THE CONFIRMATION ALSO CAME AFTER CUBA, IN A NOTE DELIVERED BY THE CZECHOSLOVAKIAN AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED STATES, DENIED ATTACKING AN AMERICAN SHRIMP BOAT LAST WEEK. THE NOTE, IN REPLY TO A U.S. PROTEST OF THE INCIDENT, ALSO RAISED NEW CHARGES OF U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST CUBAN FISHING VESSELS.

MANSFIELD GAVE NO SOURCE FOR HIS INFORMATION, OTHER THAN TO SAY IT WAS HIS OWN STATEMENT. BUT THERE WAS LITTLE DOUBT THAT HE WAS MAKING PUBLIC INFORMATION MADE AVAILABLE TO HIM BY GOVERNMENT SOURCES.

HIS STATEMENT SAID:

"ON SUNDAY, FEB. 3, A STORY BY ALBERT C. PERSONS, HEADLINED 'U.S. FLIERS DIED AT BAY OF PIGS,' APPEARED IN THE BIRMINGHAM, ALA., EXAMINER.

"IT IS KNOWN THAT A FEW EXPERIENCED AMERICAN AIRMEN WERE EMPLOYED TO TRAIN CUBAN PILOTS, NAVIGATORS AND RADIO OPERATORS.

"BECAUSE OF THE EXHAUSTION OF THE CUBAN PILOTS, SEVERAL OF THESE AMERICANS VOLUNTEERED TO FLY COMBAT MISSIONS. APPARENTLY A DECISION WAS MADE ON TUESDAY NIGHT, APRIL 18, 1961, BY THOSE DIRECTING THE OPERATION TO ACCEPT THIS OFFER. ON THE FOLLOWING MORNING, SEVERAL PLANES WERE ATTACKED AND FOUR OF THESE AMERICANS LOST THEIR LIVES."

THE CUBAN DENIAL OF ANY ATTACK ON THE U.S. SHRIMP BOAT WAS DELIVERED AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT BY CZECHOSLOVAKIAN AMBASSADOR MILOVAN RUZEK, WHO HANDLES CUBAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN WASHINGTON.

2/25--N926PES

4 U. S. Flyers Killed in Cuba, Dirksen Says

Senator States All Were Shot Down At Bay of Pigs

By JACK BELL

Associated Press Staff Writer

Senate Republican Leader Dirksen said today he has uncovered evidence that four American flyers were killed in the abortive 1961 invasion of Cuba.

Senator Dirksen said in an interview he has completed a one-man inquiry into the Bay of Pigs disaster and is ready to turn his findings over to Senate investigators.

Other than to report the belief that four American lives were lost, he declined to discuss the evidence he has assembled. Some of it came from participants in the invasion and some from United States military personnel operating in the area at the time.

The Republican leader said the four flyers were shot down in invasion planes which did not carry United States markings. He gave no details but presumably they were in B-26 bombers downed by jet trainers inherited by Fidel Castro from the overthrown Batista regime.

To Talk With Stennis

News stories at the time mentioned that one United States civilian flier might have been shot down. This report later was labeled erroneous.

Senator Dirksen said he plans to discuss his findings with Senator Stennis, Democrat of Mississippi, chairman of the Senate's Preparedness Subcommittee.

A subcommittee inquiry into the current military strength of Soviet-dominated Cuba is expected to get under way this week. Senator Stennis has indicated he regards the 1961 invasion as "spilled milk" to which the group would not be justified in devoting much time at this point. Senator Dirksen disagreed.

"It seems to me it becomes a matter of some importance when even four American lives are lost," he said.

Scott Claims He Warned

Senator Dirksen and other Republicans have contended that Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy opened the whole matter up to investigation with a statement that no United States air cover had been promised the invaders.

Senator Goldwater, Republican of Arizona, accused Mr. Kennedy of trying to make a "readjustment of facts" to lay a major share of the blame for the invasion's failure on the Republican administration of Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Senator Scott, Republican of Pennsylvania, contended on a television program yesterday that he and other Republicans had warned in advance what would happen in the Bay of Pigs.

Senator Clark, Democrat of Pennsylvania, who appeared on the program with Senator Scott, said his colleague was engaging in "Monday morning quarterbacking."

"All of your talk about the Bay of Pigs was after the event," he told Senator Scott. "It was hindsight."

He went on to say that by advocating drastic action against Cuba now, Senator Scott was "trying to do some Friday afternoon quarterbacking... and you don't know the signals."

"On the contrary," Senator Scott replied, "what we said before the Bay of Pigs was that there should be, if necessary, an invasion of Cuba. We have never advocated an invasion since the President lost that one."

Urges Ultimatum

Senator Scott went on to urge an ultimatum to the Russians to get their troops out of Cuba. He said the United States should get its Latin American neighbors to join in a "total Western hemisphere blockade" of Cuba.

Senator Dirksen's decision to push ahead with the Bay of

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Pigs inquiry was in line with his reported warning to President Kennedy last week that Republicans intend to continue to "pummel" him about Cuba.

As for Senator Scott's suggestion that the United States get its Latin American neighbors to join in a hemisphere blockade of Cuba, the chairman of the Organization of American States said last night he thought the OSA would support another blockade.

OAS Chairman Gonzalo J. Facio noted that the organization voted unanimously last October to support the United States quarantine on offensive arms shipments to Cuba.

He said the OAS could take "defensive action" against Cuba, "but the United States is the only one which can judge when to take (direct) action." He added, "In matters of cold war, the OAS can only play a secondary role." Mr. Facio expressed his views in a television interview (NBC—Meet the Press).

Labor Council Concerned

In Miami Beach, the AFL-CIO executive council called for an end to "partisan political criticism" of President Kennedy's policies in dealing with Cuba.


The council released a statement yesterday saying valid exchange of opinions is part of the democratic process but "the intense partisanship injected into the debate over Cuba by some opponents of the administration" had to be viewed with concern.

The council's statement urged bipartisan support for Mr. Kennedy's "courageous and capable" foreign policy leadership and said his pressure on Moscow to withdraw Soviet troops from Cuba has begun to show results.

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UPI-83

ADD 2 DIRKSEN-CUBA, WASHINGTON
 A DEFENSE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID HE HAD NOT BEEN ABLE TO
 SUBSTANTIATE DIRKSEN'S REPORT. HE SAID HE WAS "NOT AWARE" OF
 ANY AMERICAN DEATHS IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION BUT SAID HIS "CHECK
 IS NOT COMPLETE."

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UPI-204

(ARTIME)

WASHINGTON--MANHATTAN ARTIME, A LEADER OF THE RECENTLY RELEASED CUBAN
 INVASION BRIGADE, TODAY DENIED MAKING A STATEMENT ATTRIBUTED TO
 HIM ABOUT THE CONTROVERSIAL AIR COVER ISSUE.

ARTIME WAS QUOTED AS SAYING THAT "NO U.S. AIR SUPPORT HAD BEEN
 PROMISED" TO THE INVASION BRIGADE IN THE CURRENT ISSUE (FEB. 1) OF
 A NATIONALLY CIRCULATED NEWS MAGAZINE (TIME).

WITHOUT REFERRING TO THE MAGAZINE BY NAME, ARTIME SAID:
 "SINCE MY RETURN FROM THE CASTRO PRISONS I HAVE MADE NO
 COMMENT OF ANY KIND TO ANY NEWSPAPERMAN REGARDING (THE AIR COVER
 PROBLEM) NOR ANY OTHER RELATED TO THE LANDING."

ARTIME SAID SUCH AN ISSUE WOULD BE USEFUL ONLY IF IT HELPED
 "THE CAUSE OF THE LIBERATION OF CUBA AND THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE
 WORLD."

"I WANT TO MAKE IT CLEAR," HE SAID, "THAT UNTIL NOW I HAVE MADE
 NO STATEMENT ABOUT THE MATTER."

BOTH PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY SAID
 RECENTLY THAT NO U.S. AIR SUPPORT WAS PROMISED TO THE BRIGADE.

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UPI-178

ADD 1 PIGS BAY WASHINGTON (UPI-105)

REP. RALPH HARVEY, R-IND., JOINED COLLEAGUES SEEKING A CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION OF THE ILL-FATED INVASION ATTEMPT IN CUBA'S BAY OF PIGS TWO YEARS AGO.

IN A BRIEF SPEECH PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BEFORE THE HOUSE, HARVEY QUOTED A LETTER FROM JACK GORE, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER OF THE FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA., NEWS. GORE, IN A FRONT PAGE EDITORIAL JAN. 24, ACCUSED THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OF "TRYING TO MANAGE HISTORY," AND TOOK ISSUE WITH ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY'S STATEMENT THAT NO AIR COVER EVER WAS PLANNED FOR THE INVADERS.

"IT HAS ALWAYS SEEMED STRANGE TO ME THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND HIS BROTHER WOULD GO SO FAR OUT ON A LIMB TO RANSOM THE CUBAN PRISONERS, AND NOW MORE OR LESS PROMISE THEM A G-I BILL OF RIGHTS, UNLESS THEY HAD A GUILTY CONSCIENCE ABOUT PULLING BACK THE AIR COVER WHICH HAD BEEN PROMISED AND WHICH, IF IT HAD BEEN USED THEN, COULD WELL HAVE SAVED THE WHOLE SITUATION," HARVEY QUOTED GORE'S LETTER.

"SINCE ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN CHOOSE TO KEEP BRINGING UP THE MATTER, IT IS ONLY PROPER TO SEE IF THE TRUTH CAN BE LEARNED ABOUT THE CUBAN FIASCO BEFORE TOO MUCH HISTORY IS FALSELY RECORDED," HARVEY SAID.

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UPI-105

(PIGS BAY)

WASHINGTON--THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND CONGRESS ARE CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF MAKING PUBLIC SECRET 1961 TESTIMONY BY SECRETARY RUSK AND OTHER OFFICIALS ON THE DISASTROUS "BAY OF PIGS" INVASION OF CUBA.

PRESS OFFICER LINCOLN WHITE SAID TODAY THE STATE DEPARTMENT WAS CONSULTING ON THE MATTER WITH THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE ON LATIN AMERICAN AFFAIRS HEADED BY SEN. WAYNE MORSE, D-ORE. THE INVASION ATTEMPT OCCURRED APRIL 19, 1961, AND RUSK GAVE HIS TESTIMONY THE FOLLOWING MONTH.

WHITE SAID THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER RELEASE OF SOME OF THE TESTIMONY WOULD BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST.

OTHER OFFICIALS SAID THE QUESTION WAS RAISED BY MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE WHEN RUSK TESTIFIED LAST FRIDAY ON CUBAN DEVELOPMENTS.


IT WAS SUGGESTED THEN, IT WAS SAID, THAT RECENT PUBLIC DEBATE OVER THE EXTENT OF THE AIR COVER PROMISED BY THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER ASPECTS OF THE AFFAIR MIGHT MAKE IT ADVISABLE TO RELEASE SOME OF THE TESTIMONY IF THIS COULD BE DONE WITHOUT HARM.

RUSK WAS UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE SAID THE STATE DEPARTMENT WOULD BE GLAD TO LOOK INTO THE MATTER AND GIVE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ITS RECOMMENDATIONS.

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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'Come Back, Come Back,' They Shouted

By VIRGINIA PREWETT

The revived controversy over U. S. promises of air support at the Bay of Pigs invasion is causing many Latin Americans—and not a few North Americans—anxiety over the role of the recently freed Cuban Invasion Brigade.

The Kennedy Administration apparently is attempting to establish that there was no promise of U. S. air cover for the invasion. Dr. Antonio de Varona, a Cuban Revolutionary Council member from the time when it was first organized as the Democratic Revolutionary Front, and others close to the drama, say that U. S. air cover was promised.

CLOSE

Obviously, the Kennedys have a tremendous asset in their close relations with the Invasion Brigade's top officers. The brigade's future and its usefulness in freeing Cuba may depend on what the Kennedys decide to do about it.

In Attorney General Kennedy's anteroom, Comdr. José San Roman said: "We had our own planes." Later at New York's Overseas Press Club, he declined, on behalf of the six top officers, to discuss the question.

Will these young men now have to testify for the Kennedy version? They have returned from their agonizing experience burning with a desire to make any sacrifice to help their occupied country.

Comdr. Eneido Oliva, third in command, describes the

picture that obsesses the brigade leaders:

"Somehow, the thousands of political prisoners at the Isle of Pines learned we were leaving," he says. "When the guards led us out, suddenly at every barred window in all those great circular cell blocks, thousands of handkerchiefs were waving. In spite of the communist guards, the prisoners set up a chorus: 'Return and free Cuba!'

ROUNDABOUT

"They put us in busses," he says, "and to prevent public demonstrations, they took us to the Havana airport by a round-about way. But the people knew who we were.

"And the farmers came running to the roadside from the fields to shout 'Return! Return!' In every little village the people braved the communist political police to crowd by the hundreds to cheer us and take up the cry, 'Come back again!'

"The communists even hurriedly got up a few people to throw stones at us. But the crowds still pushed forward to call, 'Come back, we'll be waiting!'

If the Brigade officers were made to feel pressure to support the Kennedy version of the assault, and if their chance to free their country was involved, their dilemma would be terrible.

The Invasion Corps belongs to the Free World. Whatever happens to them in the current controversy will not reflect on the brave young fighting men, but on the more powerful elders in the United States Government.

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A Common Sense Approach 21 By Peter Edson



REPUBLICANS on both sides of the Capitol, clamoring for an investigation of the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba two years ago, might well take a leaf from the book of their late Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.

He had a rule on operations policy which went something like this, tho it was never recorded on tape or put down on paper in quotation marks:

Don't bother about the details of what went wrong yesterday. If mistakes were made, learn what you can from them for future guidance. But yesterday's mistakes are part of the situation as it exists today. That's what we have to concentrate on, to decide what we're going to do about it tomorrow. Don't spend too much time looking backward or refighting yesterday's battles. Keep your eyes on what's ahead.

The common sense of this approach might have some moral value in it for the Democrats, too. What stirred up this furore as much as anything else was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's interview denying there had been any promise of U. S. air support for the Cuban invasion fiasco.

President Kennedy now confirms no U. S. air cover was planned. If there had been U. S. air cover, says the President, it might as well have been an American invasion.

Sen. Wayne Morse's Foreign Relations sub-committee on Latin America investigated all this soon after it happened. He has been offering his colleagues a look at his closed hearings record of two years ago, but he has had few takers.

But even if the Attorney General had not reopened this old sore, the Cuban controversy might have been revived by New York GOP Sen. Kenneth B. Keating. He insists

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Russia is continuing its military buildup on the island, ~~the~~ the missiles and the jet aircraft have been removed.

The President in his last press conference tried to give reassurance that this situation was under constant surveillance. He says that only one Soviet supply ship has arrived in Cuba since the withdrawal of offensive weapons. It may have brought arms. The President also admits that there are still 16,000 to 17,000 Russians in Cuba.

This is of course a legitimate subject for investigation. It is focused on what might happen next, not on past mistakes.

Sen. Morse again moved quickly into this situation, calling Secretary of State Dean Rusk and CIA officials to testify in closed hearings. This may head off further full dress washing of dirty American linen in public, but probably not.

To see the Senate or House or both of them in a joint committee investigation of what went on two years ago might be just another exercise in futility.

It recalls the Pearl Harbor investigation of 1947 which ran for seven months and the Senate investigation of Gen. Douglas MacArthur's dismissal by President Truman, which ran for four months in 1951. The latter ended with only a minority report signed by eight Republicans, the majority voting not to issue any formal findings.

There was political motivation in these investigations, just as there is in today's pressure for dredging the muddy Bay of Pigs bottom once more. It is hard to see how this will contribute anything to getting Castro and communism out of Cuba, which is the major objective ahead.

Political observers also wonder what the Republicans can gain from it. The probe would be all over and forgotten long before the 1964 elections. It is also recalled that former Sen. Homer Capehart (R., Ind.), tried to make Cuba the big issue in his campaign for re-election. He was defeated.

Cuba: New Danger?

Attorney General Kennedy said last week the United States neither planned nor promised air cover to the Bay of Pigs assault force. Republicans urged an inquiry into the 1961 Cuban fiasco.

President denied reports of new Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, but Stennis committee will investigate.

After his successful handling of the crisis brought on by the establishment of Soviet ballistic missile bases in Cuba, President Kennedy warned that the Communist-dominated island represented a continuing danger.

He might have added that it would be a continuing bone of contention in domestic politics. His brother, the Attorney General, saw to that last week.

In a move which even friendly political observers regard as a tactical error, Robert Kennedy granted two "exclusive" interviews in which he broke the administration's long silence on the abortive Cuban invasion. The principle point he made was that the President had never planned nor promised to lend United States air support to the Cuban rebels while they stormed the beaches at the Bay of Pigs.

After the Attorney General's interviews hit the newsstands, a high Cuban rebel leader took issue with him, saying that the invaders were definitely led to believe they would be provided with adequate air cover. And two editors who participated in a discussion at the White House a month after the Bay of Pigs—that is, in May, 1961—said that they understood from the President that the United States planned to support the Cubans with fighter planes.

Two Republican leaders in the

Senate immediately moved into the opening created by the younger Kennedy.

Senator Goldwater of Arizona accused the Attorney General of engaging in "one of the most deliberate and flagrant uses of the 'news management' devices" and called for a Senate investigation.

Senator Dirksen of Illinois, oozing impartiality, announced that he was conducting a preliminary investigation to see whether the Attorney General was giving "the entire story" of the Bay of Pigs operation.

Backs Brother

Some steam may have been taken out of Republican prospects for public hearings, however, when the President at his news conference backed his brother 100 per cent on the United States air cover question.

There was another controversy over Cuba last week which touched off one quickie congressional inquiry and the calling of another full and formal one. The issue: News reports stating that the Russians were engaged in a fresh military buildup in Cuba.

Senator Morse, chairman of the Foreign Relations subcommittee on Latin America, called Secretary of State Rusk and John A. McCone, director of Central Intelligence, to brief his group on Friday.

But on Thursday, the President gave the administration's evaluation of the Soviet "buildup" at his news conference. Largely discounting the stories, he said:

"The best information that we have is that one ship has arrived since the October crisis, which may have arms on it. . . . But there has not been a military buildup in the sense of equipment coming in from outside Cuba. There is no evidence that this ship carried any offensive weapons. . . . and, as I say, our scrutiny of Cuba is daily."

But Chairman Stennis of the Senate Preparedness subcommittee, announced on Friday that his group would hold "formal hearings" on current military strength in Cuba and the nature of the weapons located there.

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
Autopsy

Attorney General Robert Kennedy's off-the-cuff disclosures about the Bay of Pigs disaster have invited the outcry on Capitol Hill for a full formal inquiry into an ignoble failure. Until Mr. Kennedy reopened the Pandora's box in interviews with a Miami newspaper and a news magazine, the Cuban invasion had receded from memory. The Administration's sorry showing had been redeemed by the brilliant handling of the missile crisis.

Now the lid is open and mischief will fly out. Two defensible courses were open to the Administration after the failure of the invasion. Full disclosure was the first, but this path was not chosen because of the divisive effects it might have had. The second was to keep official lips sealed and leave the verdict to history—the policy which was followed until the Attorney General's selective disclosures.

The trouble with the Attorney General's remarks is that he said enough to raise partisan hackles but not enough to satisfy an impartial jury. It may be that no air cover was ever contemplated for the invaders, but Mr. Kennedy brushes under the carpet a whole range of related considerations that doomed the venture. There was an absence in his remarks of any reflective wisdom on the soundness of a military enterprise in which United States complicity could not be concealed or on the wisdom of using a handful of invaders who lacked any underground support in an operation of this scale.

The inescapable impression is that his remarks are self-serving, and it is surely understandable that Republicans in Congress have interpreted them in this light. Whether the full inquiry by the Senate Armed Forces Committee that Senator Goldwater proposes would serve any useful purpose is a separate question. It is arguable that once the Pandora's box is open a fairly conducted inquiry could serve a purgative purpose by answering nagging questions once and for all. But a patently partisan inquiry of the kind some Republicans are talking about would only vent emotion and make the Bay of Pigs a disaster without end. This is an instance when one wrong turn does not deserve another.



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LETTERS TO THE STAR

Air Cover Denial

Attorney General Robert Kennedy denies that the United States planned any air cover during the ill-fated Cuban invasion. But, why would the Kennedy administration wait 21 months to report this? And why should the head of the Justice Department be the one to deny it instead of one of President Kennedy's military advisers, the Pentagon, or the CIA? This only leads one to believe that the administration either has something to hide or the Attorney General's statement is unfounded.

Peter A. Cavanaugh

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JACKSONVILLE, FLA.--SEN. GEORGE A. SMATHERS SAID TODAY THERE WAS "NO CONVERSATION" ABOUT AIR COVER FOR THE CUBAN INVASION PLAN AT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S 1961 LUNCHEON WITH FLORIDA NEWSPAPER EXECUTIVES.

THE FLORIDA DEMOCRAT'S STATEMENT WAS A DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO AN ACCOUNT OF THE LUNCHEON YESTERDAY BY FORT LAUDERDALE PUBLISHER JACK W. GORE, WHO SAID THE PRESIDENT TOLD EDITORS HE PERSONALLY CANCELLED AIR PROTECTION FOR THE CUBAN INVASION.

SMATHERS SAID IN AN INTERVIEW, "I WAS SITTING RIGHT ACROSS THE TABLE FROM THE PRESIDENT AT THE MEETING AND WAS IN A POSITION TO HEAR ALL OF THE CONVERSATION THAT WENT ON."

"I AM CERTAIN THERE WAS NO CONVERSATION OF THE CHARACTER DESCRIBED BY MY GOOD FRIEND JACK GORE. THE ONLY REFERENCE I REMEMBER AT ALL TO THIS MATTER WAS THAT THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT THE AIR COVER THE CUBANS WERE TO HAVE FLOWN IN TH B26S HAD NOT BEEN MORE EFFECTIVE."

SMATHERS CONCEDED THE CONVERSATION WAS TWO YEARS AGO "AND MEMORIES ARE NATURALLY NOT AS FRESH AS IF THIS HAD HAPPENED MORE RECENTLY."

THE LAWMAKER, A CLOSE FRIEND OF THE PRESIDENT, SAID, "DURING THE INTERIM THE OTHER STORY ABOUT THE SUPPOSED CANCELLATION OF AN INTENDED UNITED STATES AIR COVER HAS DEVELOPED AND IT IS OBVIOUSLY VERY EASY TO GET THE TIME OF DEVELOPMENT OF DATES AND FACTS CONFUSED."

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WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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Gavin Calls For Unity

Forget Bay of Pigs, Ex-Captive Urges

By JEAN WARDLOW
Herald Staff Writer

There's been enough criticism of the Bay of Pigs invasion, a Cuban ex-prisoner told a New York City service club Thursday.

What's needed now is "unity of action" for "the ultimate objective... the overthrow of the Bearded One and everything he represents," said Jorge Govin Throckmorton, on whose life Castro once put a \$50,000 price tag.

Govin, whose parents now live in Miami and who makes his own temporary home in Fort Lauderdale, was speaker at the Rotary Club of New York at the Commodore Hotel.

Even while the pros and cons of Attorney general Robert Kennedy's postmortem on the U.S. role in the invasion still swirled in Washington, young Govin told the club:

"Now I believe enough derogatory criticism has been heaped upon this operation from its inception to its culmination. Errors were committed; mistakes made."

The sun-tanned Cuban, who has a diplomatic law degree from the University of Havana and bazooka experience from the ill-fated invasion, ticked off some of the mistakes:

"One air strike on airfields two days prior to our invasion served the purpose of warning the military in Cuba to place all units on immediate alert."

"Miscalculations on the rapidity with which the Communist government moved their forces to meet our onslaught—the failure to inform the underground of the invasion date—all these conditions contributed to the Bay of Pigs fiasco," he said.

"But as this is true," he continued, "so do I believe that in the future the political, military and economic factors will be more thoroughly studied, and that there will be closer and more careful liaison between political and military planning that is absolutely necessary to strategic success."

Govin, whose parents now live in Miami and who makes his own temporary home in Fort Lauderdale, was speaker at the Rotary Club of New York at the Commodore Hotel.

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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

Date: 1/25/63

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'Mystery Agent' Blamed

By ROBERT S. BOYD
Of Our Washington Bureau

WASHINGTON—An embittered Cuban veteran of the Bay of Pigs disaster Thursday blamed a mysterious CIA agent for promising the anti-Castro invaders U.S. air and naval support that never materialized.

Manuel Penabaz, one of 52 members of the ill-starred Freedom Brigade, who escaped from the beachhead, identified the CIA man as "Frank Bender," a German-born guerrilla expert who reportedly was in charge of the April 1961 operation.

Penabaz said Cuban exiles pilots recently have seen "Bender" in the Congo "fixing something new."

"I don't know what he's doing, but I'd like to," Penabaz told a press conference he called to "set the record straight" on the troublesome air cover question.

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who conducted the official autopsy into the failure, told the Knight newspaper Sunday that no U.S. air cover ever was promised the invaders.

"Are you calling Robert Kennedy a liar?" Penabaz was asked Thursday.

"I don't say that," the Cuban said. "Being wrong doesn't mean that you're a liar. Maybe he (Robert Kennedy) doesn't have enough information."

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
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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida



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Others Didn't Hear**Editor Says JFK Nixed Air Cover**

FORT LAUDERDALE — (UPI) — President John F. Kennedy told eight Florida newspaper executives that U.S. air cover was available for the ill-fated Pig's Bay invasion of Cuba but he had decided against supplying it, Jack W. Gore, editor and publisher of the Fort Lauderdale News, said Thursday.

Gore said the President made his remarks at an off-the-record White House luncheon May 10, 1961.

"On that day, less than a month after the invasion had failed miserably," Gore wrote in his newspaper, "the President told us air cover was available to protect the invaders, but that he had made the decision not to use air power."

"The President said one reason he decided against supplying air cover was because U.N. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson had complained that any such action would make a liar of him in the U.N.," the publisher reported.

Gore said a statement of the President's brother, Attorney General Robert Kennedy, that no U.S. air cover was ever planned or promised for the Bay of Pigs invasion had removed the need for keeping the President's luncheon remarks on May 10, 1961, off the record any longer.

He identified the other Florida newspaper executives present at the luncheon as John S. Knight of The Miami Herald and other Knight newspapers, James Cox of The Miami News, Nelson Poynter of The St. Petersburg Times, R. C. Millar of The Jacksonville Journal and Florida Times-Union, Martin Andersen of the Orlando Sentinel.

and Star, J. C. Council of The Tampa Tribune and Times and John H. Perry Jr. of the West Palm Beach Post-Times and other Perry newspapers.

Knight, reached in New York, said: "I do not recall the statement attributed to the President by Mr. Gore. The May 10, 1961 luncheon conversation was of an informal nature, and as I understood it, not subject to public discussion."

Cox of The Miami News said he had "no recollection of the mention of Ambassador Stevenson's name in any of the conversations, nor do I recall any reference to U.S. air cover even being promised or withdrawn."

Perry said his recollection was that Gore's account "is substantially correct."

"That's why President Kennedy took the blame himself for the failure of the invasion," Perry added. "I admired him for admitting his mistake."

Andersen said he recalled the luncheon conversation and added, "The President said the air cover was canceled about 3 a.m. the day of the invasion."

In Tampa, Council said he had "no comment" on the reported luncheon and remarks.

In his report on the luncheon, published on The Fort Lauderdale News front page Thursday, Gore accused the Kennedy administration of attempting to "manage history . . . of one of the most embarrassing episodes of these times."

He said the attorney general presumably "had the approval of his brother to speak for the record when he made his comments" earlier this week.

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The MIAMI HERALD

Miami, Florida

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FPM - CUBA
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Submitting Office: Miami

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DATE 7-17-96 BY SP4 BJS/SP4

President Explains Bay of Pigs Plan

U. S. Air Cover Pledge Denied

By Carroll Kilpatrick
 Staff Reporter

President Kennedy yesterday entered the new controversy over the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion with the assertion that no United States air cover was ever planned to help the Cuban attackers.

What was planned, and what proved to be a failure, he said, was a strike by B-26 bombers flown by pilots not based in the United States.

The invasion brigade thought that this attack would give it protection on the beach, but Cuban jets "were very effective" and the invasion brigade "was not able to maintain air supremacy on the beach," the President said.

He replied to questions raised at his news conference following moves by Senate Minority Leader Everett M. Dirksen (R-Ill.) and Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) for an investigation on the question of air cover.

The controversy was heightened yesterday when a Florida editor and a brigade member claimed that United States air cover was promised but was withdrawn when it was most needed.

Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy said in an interview last week that no air cover was ever promised, and the President said his brother's report was correct. Instead of ending a controversy, however, the Attorney General's comment spurred the critics on to new demands for a full scale inquiry.

President Kennedy also replied to questions about a re-

ported new buildup of Soviet weapons in Cuba. He said one Soviet ship has arrived in Cuba since the October crisis, which may have arms on it, possibly military cargo.

But he said that there was no military buildup in the sense of equipment coming in from outside Cuba. There is no evidence that this ship carried any offensive weapons, the President said.

Some 4500 Soviet technicians have been withdrawn from Cuba since October, he said, and there are 16,000 or 17,000 Russians still there, operating technical equipment and building barracks. Some of the Russians are in organized military units, he said.

"Our scrutiny of Cuba is daily," the President said.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk is scheduled to testify today before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee inquiring into the reports of a continuing Soviet buildup in Cuba.

Sen. Kenneth B. Keating (R-N. Y.) said yesterday the buildup consists of tanks, guns, fighter planes and other weapons but not long-range missiles and bombers.

Keating said he had learned from refugee sources that Soviet military activity on Cuba is 10 times greater than it was

last July 1 before the missile crisis.

In the House, Rep. William E. Minshall (R-Ohio) introduced a resolution calling for creation of a Joint House-Senate Committee to make a full scale investigation of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Referring to the Attorney General's comment that no air cover was promised, Minshall said "this tremendously important controversy transcends political parties and partisan motivations. At this late date, an honest, accurate report of events leading up to and including the invasion would not break security."

Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara and other Pentagon officials are expected to be questioned about reports of a new Cuban buildup when they appear before the House Armed Services Committee for an annual military review next Wednesday.

Chairman Carl A. Vinson (D-Ga.) said he had no information to support Keating's assertion, but he said: "We'll ask all about that."

Shortly before President Kennedy's news conference, Cuban exile fighter Manuel Penabaz said at a press conference here that "all our brigade leaders and fighters believed that air cover would be furnished by U. S. air and naval forces."

Penabaz called the Attorney General ill-informed when he

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said air cover was not promised.

"Certainly we in the brigade were assured by our American military instructors that we would be given air cover sufficient to succeed in our mission," Penabaz insisted.

"If there was to have been United States air cover, the President said, 'you might as well have a complete United States commitment, which would have meant a full-fledged invasion.'"

The other assertion that air cover was promised came from Jack W. Gore, editor and publisher of the Fort Lauderdale News. Gore and six other Florida editors visited the President at the White House on May 10, 1961. The editor said:

Gore said the President told them he canceled the plan for air cover. The President related that Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson was concerned that any such action would make a liar out of him in the United Nations.

Noting that the meeting with the President was off the record, Gore said he felt released from his pledge when the Attorney General commented on the issue.

"What Robert Kennedy hoped to accomplish by coming out at this late date and denying that any air cover had ever been planned, The News cannot fathom," Gore wrote.

The President said there was no such conversation of the kind Gore related.

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4 The Knoxville Journal
Knoxville, Tennessee

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Date: 1/25/63
Edition: City
Author:
Editor: GUY L. SMITH
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MIAMI ACCOLADE FOR FORMER BATISTA HATCHETMEN AND THE LANDED GENTRY

Kennedy's heroes: A look at the Bay of Pigs boys

By Carleton Beals
 Special to the Guardian

AT THE ORANGE BOWL in Miami Dec. 29, President Kennedy and his wife, Jacqueline, spoke to the released invaders of Cuba, seized at the Bay of Pigs (Playa Giron) April 17, 1961. From José Alfredo Perez San Roman, commander of invading Brigade 2506, the President received the flag of that unit, allegedly smuggled out of Cuba after the defeat, and Kennedy promised that the flag would be returned to the invaders "in a free Havana."

The President, in his oath of office, had pledged himself to uphold the laws of the United States, which include all foreign treaties. But in this Miami ceremony, he honored as heroes the motley group which, at his behest, had violated U.S. neutrality laws as well as Cuban sovereignty.

Who are these men Kennedy called "the bravest in the world?" The stories and backgrounds of their leaders can be pieced together from statements they themselves made in Cuba after their capture, from testimony at trials, from interviews on TV and from letters.

FOR EXAMPLE: Take San Roman, the commander who handed his brigade's banner to Kennedy. For ten years he was an officer in the Batista army. After the revolution he got a job with INRA, the

The following is an excerpt from an editorial in the Jan. 1 San Francisco Chronicle as it appeared in I. F. Stone's Weekly Jan. 14:

"AS A MAN who does not ordinarily betray his emotions, President Kennedy presented a rather surprising televised figure when he visited the returned Cuban prisoners of war in Miami. His fire in declaring that they would deserve to march at the head of the column that should one day liberate Havana was hardly in keeping with the often-remarked Kennedy coolness. No one reading the speech would find in it any precise commitment. But... it is a good bet that the exiles have taken it as an implicit promise of American help in the physical overthrow of the Castro regime by revolt... The day may come when President Kennedy will regret his fiery exuberance in his speech to the Cubans."

institute handling agrarian reform. For helping his brother Roberto (also a Batista officer, but being hunted for war crimes), escape to the U.S., José Alfredo spent several months in prison; then also fled to Florida. In March, 1960, he and his brother, with 60 other ex-Batista militarists, were taken to Fort Meyer, Fla., to be trained by the CIA for the Cuban invasion. Later, San Roman got special guerrilla training in Panama and Guatemala.

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 National Guardian
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Captured in the invasion and taken to Havana, he wrote to Premier Castro (May 11) that it had been impossible to learn the truth about Cuba behind "the curtain of gold." The volunteers had been told, San Roman wrote, that the Cuban people were ready to revolt; that the invaders would be fighting Czechs and Chinese; that the Cuban air force had been destroyed; that they would get reinforcements and air support. All this had been false. The invaders were, he concluded, "1,400 idiots."

San Roman had been told Cuba was on the brink of economic collapse; he was astonished by the elimination of slums, the diminution in unemployment, the improvement in living standards, the campaign against illiteracy. He said he regretted that before he could get his eyes opened, "he had had to sink into the opprobrium and contempt of his fellow citizens and nearly all Latin Americans"; that he "first had to lose his brother (killed in action) and more than 100 comrades who thought as you do; that

it was first necessary to make mothers, wives, sisters and sweethearts of the hundreds of other Cubans who fell before our fire, put on mourning; that it had been necessary for this whole spectacle of horror, blood, tears, useless sacrifices and irreparable injuries to fall upon my shoulders."

"I have sunk so deep into the slime that no human force can ever get me out."

President Kennedy did his best, and in the Miami Orange Bowl, San Roman was knighted, and ready for a new bloody crusade of "idiots."

A DIFFERENT SONG: Manuel Artime Buena, civil affairs co-chief for the invasion forces, was one of the spokesmen for the released prisoners. A few days before the Miami Bowl reunion, he told a meeting of 4,000 Cuban exiles, "Today we want no tears. We call everybody to war."

Artime had spoken differently in a press conference in Havana in May, 1961, after his capture at Playa Giron. He spoke bitterly about the U.S. government, whose officials "had planned, trained, subsidized and directed" the invasion. "What was done with the brigade was a real crime," he said. "They just played with the lives of 1,400 men. . . . I am ready to tell the world before the UN all about the U.S. participation in the invasion."

Artime has told how, in Cuba after the revolution, he was accused of stealing funds intended for peasants, and was helped by a U.S. secret agent to escape to Florida. He said he was met in Miami by another agent in charge of financing the planned invasion and sabotage on the island. He was passed through a chain of agents to make a tour of Latin America to contact Catholic and ultra-conservative groups in the fight against Castro. He purchased boats for transporting saboteurs, bombs and arms to terrorists in Cuba, contact with whom was strictly in the hands of CIA agents.

THE BRAVE ONES: Mrs. Kennedy told the throng at the Orange Bowl she was going to teach her little son, as soon as he was old enough, to be at least half as brave as the "fighters for freedom" and to emulate them.

Freedom Fighter Jorge King Yun perhaps? To get to the U.S., he killed the custodian of a Cuban army boat, knifing him in front of his wife and children. He kidnaped the woman and children as hostages and reached Florida, where the authorities gave him asylum.

Or perhaps Ramon Calvino Insua, a Batista police sadist who tortured and raped, along with others, prisoner Angela Gonzalez? He murdered young Marcelo Salado on a street in Havana April 9, 1958. He killed another prisoner in the police station July 2, 1958. The bodies of his victims were scattered in the streets of Havana, after they had been tortured, mutilated and killed, their heads suspended in a noose hanging from a small Christian cross.

There are others: Emilio Soler Ruiz,

was sent to prison during Prio Socarras administration for murdering labor leaders and Dominican exiles; Antonio Valentin Padron, operating under the Batista Colonel Fermin Cowley, dragged youths from their homes, tortured them and hung their mutilated bodies in the public plaza of Holguin. Roberto Perez Cruzada is an excellent model for a young American boy. He machine-gunned Dr. Rafael Escalona in his cell, but he escaped from Cabana prison and fled to asylum in the U.S. Scores of others like these joined the Bay of Pigs expedition to be shot or later to be honored at the Orange Bowl.

LAND OWNERS: In all, the invaders included 194 former Batista military men and policemen, most having positions of authority. The aims of the invasion were (1) to restore private property (2) to restore the 1940 Batista constitution (3) to hold elections within 18 months. The volunteers were closely screened by the CIA with respect to land reform and restoration of estates. Anybody with progressive or reform ideas was eliminated. More than half the invading force consisted of property owners. Doubtless they believed that the U.S. would see that everything went smoothly, that there was little danger in the attempt to get back their lost properties and their positions as exploiters. Besides, they would be favored in any new regime set up by the CIA.

Almost half the land of Cuba had been owned by absentee foreign corporations, and they controlled much of the rest. What was not owned by the United Fruit et al was held by big native landowners. Ninety percent of the rural population owned no land at all. They survived by working a few months every year during sugar cane or tobacco cutting time for the \$1.50 or less a day, and scrounging in garbage pails the rest of the year.

The 1961 invasion force included 124 proprietors of large estates. One hundred of them owned more than 800,000 acres and most were members of families owning even more. For instance, young Albert Fowler owned 63,000 acres in central Narcisa. His father was one of the wealthiest landowners on the island. Carlos Lopez-Ona of the expedition owned 66,000 acres, two sugar centrales (Santa Lutgarda and Nazbal), also dozens of apartment houses. Fabio Freire owned 50,000 acres, the refinery Santa Isabel, three shipping companies, 12 houses and various apartment buildings.

Omar and Lincoln Babun were lumber merchants in Oriente, owners of a fleet of ships, a cement factory and a construction company. Like all the others, they enjoyed favors from the Batista dictatorship. Eduardo Zaya Bazan owned 10,000 acres, had a fleet of shrimp boats

and dozens of houses and apartments. Jose Andreau Santos, owner of 12,000 acres, was son of a minister of Public Health who became a millionaire through public works, an owner of land and houses.

MERCHANTS, SPECULATORS: In addition to such large landholders, there were 67 owners of apartment houses and slum rentals. There were 112 big merchants, some of them sugar and molasses speculators; 35 industrial magnates and 179 wealthy persons living off income, but often with lucrative political jobs.

Several of the invaders owned big gambling casinos, tied in with Batista and the U.S. syndicate. Others were well-known dope distributors. Oscar Diaz was the son of the owner of the Montemarte Cabaret, tourist vice spot, and a nephew of the owner of the Marianao Hippodrome.


Some had been members of "unofficial" Batista terror and murder gangs, such as that of Senator Masferrer. Jose Ramon Gutierrez is the son of Batista's radio censor. Salvador Ziegenhirt is brother-in-law of Batista's Prime Minister Santiago Ray Pernas. At least four priests joined the expedition. All were Spanish Falangists or Fascists. One, Father Ismael de Lugo, had been a Franco officer in the Spanish civil war.

There were half-a-dozen labor leaders belonging chiefly to the Eusebio Mujal clique. Mujal had been given control of the Cuban Confederation of Labor by the army under President Prio, continued in the post under Batista and in a short period became a millionaire owning newspapers, a radio station, apartment buildings, hotels, and a \$4 million estate.

TERROR CAMPAIGN: Operation Pluto (the invasion) was preceded by CIA Operation Preparation, started soon after the revolution to soften up the island for the invasion. In Cuba it is known as Operation Mad Dog. Mercenaries staked out in Pinar del Rio and the Escambray Mountains were supplied by air and sea with U.S. army munitions, but were soon suppressed. The operation included propaganda leaflets by air, bombings, straf-

ings, burning of cane fields and sugar
centrals, attacks on oil refineries, dyna-
miting of power lines, sabotage of rail
and bus service, sinking of boats, the
dynamiting of stores, etc. In one air at-
tack four persons were killed and about
50 wounded in Havana. I was in Havana
when a department store was bombed,
killing and wounding women.

Kennedy, who took full responsibility
for the bloody Bay of Pigs fiasco, assured
the Orange Bowl crowd that his anti-
Castro policy would be continued. Follow-
ing the invasion, Mad Dog operations
have been resumed.



Kamb in Humanite, Paris
"How can they say we constitute a
menace to peace?"



PRESIDENT KENNEDY IS HOST TO 'FREEDOM FIGHTERS' AT PALM BEACH
Roberto San Roman (left); Jose San Roman and Manuel Artime are guests.

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Cuban Invasion**Bobby's 'Clarification'
Needs Clearing Up**

Almost anyone could think of a dozen matters more deserving of the national attention right now than the two-year-old episode at the Bay of Pigs, but unfortunately, the subject came up in an interview with Robert Kennedy, and Bobby's attempt to "clear up" a few things has been remarkably unsuccessful.

The U.S. attorney general was one

of a three-man committee which ran a microscope over the misadventure, from planning to final fiasco, so he should know the facts. Assuming he does, he will have to reveal them in much greater detail if the public is to be convinced that no air cover was planned for the invaders, as he claims.

Whether air cover was promised by the highest authorities or not, the fact is that members of the invasion brigade here in Miami recall quite vividly that air support was a part of



BOBBY

the plan which was presented to them.

Far from clarifying anything, Mr. Kennedy so far has accomplished only two things, both of them bad: First, he aroused resentment among the Bay of Pigs survivors, who until now seemed willing to reserve their fire for Castro and not ask embarrassing questions of the U.S. government.

Second, he has exposed the entire Cuban invasion question to partisan political attack, which was not long in arriving. Republicans want to investigate the invasion in the Republican Policy Committee, of all places.

We suggested months ago that one day the invasion would be a fit subject for a thoroughgoing investigation by the Congress. President Kennedy has rightfully assumed responsibility for the blunder, but the public still has a right to know how it happened.

Furthermore, it would seem that such an investigation could be free of political bias, since the affair cut across both Republican and Democratic administrations. But maybe that is hoping for too much.


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The Miami Herald

Miami, Florida

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Date: 1/24/63

Edition:

Author:

Editor: WILLIAM C. BAGGS

Title:

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Goldwater Asks \$100,000 for 'Impartial' Investigation

Hill Probe of 'Bay of Pigs' Is Uncertain

By MARSHALL McNEIL
 Scripps-Howard Staff Writer

Sen. Barry Goldwater (R., Ariz.) may not get his desired \$100,000 "impartial" investigation of the Cuban Bay of Pigs invasion failure 21 months ago. But he will have a chance soon to quiz top military and civilian officials involved in the fiasco.

Sen. Goldwater's opportunity will come when the Senate Armed Services Committee of which he is a member holds its annual hearings on our military preparedness.

Thereafter Sen. Richard Russell (D., Ga.) may ask the committee, which he heads, to decide whether the Goldwater inquiry should be held.

OPEN MIND

Sen. Russell has an "open mind" on the proposed probe.

But he sees no need to "re-laundry this linen" which, he says, "has never seemed to be real clean." He is not anxious to "re-hash a very humiliating experience in our national life." However, he would not oppose the inquiry if he thinks a national purpose would be served.

The Bay of Pigs already has been investigated at least twice by Senate committees and touched on in House hearings, too.

One inquiry was by a Foreign Relations sub-committee headed by Sen. Wayne Morse (D., Ore.); another by the Senate's committee that keeps tabs on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Both were secret; there was no official public report on either.

But Sen. Morse mentioned his investigation briefly in a TV debate during his 1962 re-election campaign. He said, in effect, the President never refused air cover for the invasion because "none was promised."

STATEMENT

It was the statement by Attorney General Robert Kennedy in a newspaper interview this week that no air support was contemplated in the invasion plan that sud-

denly caused Republicans to seize on the Bay of Pigs incident and demand an investigation.

Sen. Goldwater, an Air Force reserve major general, introduced his resolution for

the investigation yesterday. He said only by such a move could the people be "fully informed about the events attendant to one of the most inglorious adventures this nation has ever been involved in."

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(PIGS BAY)

WASHINGTON-DEMOCRATIC FOREIGN POLICY EXPERTS TODAY OPPOSED
 REPUBLICAN DEMANDS FOR A NEW SENATE INVESTIGATION OF THE ABORTIVE
 1961 INVASION OF CUBA.

"THE BAY OF PIGS INCIDENT WAS TERRIBLE," SAID SEN. JOHN J.
 SPARKMAN, D-ALA., "BUT I DON'T BELIEVE ANY FURTHER INVESTIGATION WOULD
 SERVE THE NATIONAL INTEREST."

"WE HAD AN INVESTIGATION WHICH WAS CONDUCTED IN A BI-PARTISAN
 MANNER," SAID SEN. WAYNE MORSE, D-ORE. HE ADDED THAT HE DID NOT
 FAVOR DISCLOSURE OF DATA, SUPPLIED AS SECRET, "JUST TO SATISFY A
 GROUP OF REPUBLICANS."

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THE POLITICAL MILL

By GOULD LINCOLN

Once More Into the Bay of Pigs

The Bay of Pigs issue has been revived. This time by the President's brother, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. The President blunted it as a political issue in 1962 when a couple of weeks before the elections he firmly told Nikita Khrushchev he would have to remove long-range missiles from Cuba, or else, and the Russian premier complied. The country was inclined, it seemed, to forget about the Bay of Pigs fiasco, in which the American-sponsored invasion of Castro's Cuba by the Freedom Fighters became a shambles when air support was not forthcoming. The President had immediately taken the blame on his own shoulders for letting the invasion go ahead. It was a bitter pill — and all the facts attendant on the action and lack of action have never been produced.

Purpose Not Clear

Now the President's brother, the Attorney General, in interviews with the Miami Herald and U. S. News & World Report, has made the flat statement that no United States air support had been promised or expected. Reports that orders had been issued from the White House to call off air support, including a second strike by planes piloted by anti-Castro Cubans, have been widely published. The Attorney General said in his interviews he was undertaking to set the record straight. Also the administration has said there never was any intention to give military support to the invaders. Just why the Attorney General chose to raise this issue again and, by inference at least, to put the blame on the Eisenhower administration is not clear.

It is a fact, however, that some Republicans in Congress and outside have begun another drumfire of charges that President Kennedy has not really dealt a death blow to international communism in Cuba, but has left that island still firmly in the hands of the Communists and with an implied promise

that the United States would not invade unless Castro should start aggression or the Russians try to return long-range missiles to him. Senator Barry Goldwater, Arizona Republican, who served in the Air Force during World War II, has been one of the severest critics of the administration's handling of the Cuban situation. He immediately took issue with the Attorney General's statements.

Senator Goldwater said it was strange 21 months after the invasion, the Attorney General should make a claim that his brother, the President, never saw fit to make at the time he was assuming the blame for the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs. The Senator said he had visited the President at his request a few days after the invasion attempt and he added: "I certainly got the impression then that an air cover had been part of the original invasion plan... I suggest it is proper to inquire into this latest example of 'news management' by the New Frontier. Has this practice of the administration now been extended to the rewriting of history in an image acceptable to the men presently in charge of the national government?" In fact, Senator Goldwater charged that the most recent Kennedy statements were motivated by political reasons, the purpose being to attach a major portion of the blame to the Eisenhower administration.

The Arizona Senator told the Senate he believed that a Congressional investigation should be made. His suggestion was later adopted by the Republican Policy Committee of the Senate on motion of Senator Dirksen of Illinois. Republican leader of the Senate, Mr. Dirksen has said that he personally will take a preliminary look and report to the committee. It is difficult for a minority party in the Senate and House to conduct a full-fledged investigation of an antagonistic administration, or to force a committee of the Senate to conduct such an inquiry. It has been done on occasion,

however. For example, the investigation of the Teapot Dome oil scandals by the late Senator Tom Walsh of Montana, Democrat, during the Harding administration.

Much to be Cleared Up

There remain a lot of things to be cleared up — and not brushed under the rug — in the Bay of Pigs abortive invasion of Castro's Cuba. If reports are correct, the United States gathered a great array of naval and air strength in the vicinity of the Isle of Pines and Cuba at the time set for the invasion. For what purpose if it had not originally been intended to use it?

When and for what reason were the original plans changed? President Kennedy, himself, in discussing his first two years in the White House on a television program on December 17, freely admitted that the advice he received from those called in on the Cuban invasion had been "wrong." He was contrasting the handling of the Bay of Pigs affair with the successful naval blockade of Cuba in 1962. He said: "In the Cuba of 1961, the advice of those brought in on the Executive branch was also unanimous, and the advice was wrong. And I was responsible." It has still to be disclosed who were all of those brought in and just what they advised. It is time the whole story were told the American people.

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DORIS FLEESON

'Political Angles in Cuban Issue

Attorney General's Discussion Is Called A Mistake, Giving Dirksen an Opening

That able political craftsman, Senate Republican Leader Dirksen, has seized the opening afforded him when Attorney General Kennedy reopened discussion of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. Senator Dirksen will make his own inquiry into what really happened.

What the Senator quickly perceived was the fortuitous conjunction of a legitimate reason for inquiry and a handful of political targets.

The legitimate reason is the confusion over what really happened in Cuba both with respect to the original fiasco and the recent success. When the President opened the doors to favorite reporters for supposed "inside" accounts, he helped create that confusion and handed Republicans the "managed news" issue.

The Attorney General has obliged them further by calling attention to the original fiasco which the later triumph had done so much to erase. It is also a personal political mistake on his part.

Republicans darkly suspect that he is being set up to run for President in 1968 to succeed his brother and in

that, they are not alone. Senator Dirksen is only the first of many who will seek to embarrass Robert Kennedy while there is yet time, the general opinion here being that it is too late to stop the President's re-election.

Merely to have any Kennedy on the firing line will soothe a lot of Republican frustration. Senator Edward is behaving much too modestly to serve the purpose and it is politically unwise when foreign affairs seem to be going well to attack the President on that score.

Republicans believe, maybe wrongly but sincerely, that in the wide area between the East and West coasts many voters feel there are too many Kennedys. It is this area they look to for substantial congressional gains in 1964 even should the winner-take-all framework of the electoral college re-elect the President.

Few would argue with Chairman Fulbright of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the Dirksen proposal has a "very strong partisan aura." So will this entire session of Congress. To meet it the President will

have to work unceasingly to spread his own aura, and he will need the help of some shock troops of Democrats willing to risk expending a reputation for the statesmanlike approach to all questions.


There is, after all, a great deal of hypocrisy in the proposed inquiry. The White House always manages the news, more or less, and never so much as in the recent Eisenhower years when Press Secretary Hagerty shaped the propaganda that his employer was a hard-working ball of fire despite age, operations and heart disease.

The country, if must be said, enjoyed the fable. Just as it now seems willing to relax about Cuba, though the Castro regime remains in power.

Adlai Stevenson must view the present carnage with a deep sense of irony. Saturday Evening Post writer Stewart Alsop, who is still insisting that the United Nations Ambassador was an appeaser in the Cuban triumph, wrote months ago attributing blame to him for withdrawing of air cover from the Bay of Pigs invasion. Now the Attorney General says that an air strike was never part of the invasion plans.

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UPI-19

(PIGS BAY)

NEW YORK--FORMER PRESIDENT EISENHOWER SAID LAST NIGHT HIS ADMINISTRATION PLANNED FOR A "GUERRILLA TYPE OF ACTION" AGAINST FIDEL CASTRO AND NEVER CONSIDERED AN INVASION SUCH AS THE BAY OF PIGS ATTACK.

EISENHOWER'S STATEMENT IMPLIED THE ENTIRE PLAN FOR THE ILL-FATED APRIL, 1961 INVASION OF CUBA WAS FORMULATED IN THE THREE MONTHS AFTER PRESIDENT KENNEDY TOOK OFFICE.

THE FORMER PRESIDENT'S REMARKS, IN A TAPED ONE-HOUR INTERVIEW WITH NEWSMAN WALTER CRONKITE ON CBS-TELEVISION, APPEARED TO CONFLICT WITH A STATEMENT ON THE BAY OF PIGS AFFAIR MADE EARLIER THIS WEEK BY ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY.

ASKED BY CRONKITE IF AN INVASION PLAN WAS MADE WHILE HE WAS IN OFFICE, EISENHOWER REPLIED:

"NO, NO, NO..."

"THERE WAS NO WAY," HE DECLARED. "WE DIDN'T EVEN KNOW AT THAT TIME WHETHER WE COULD DO ANYTHING MORE, OR WHETHER THESE REFUGEES WOULD BE SUFFICIENTLY NUMEROUS AND STRONG TO DO MORE THAN GO INTO THE ...EASTERN PART OF THE ISLAND, IN THE MOUNTAINS, AND START IN AND RETURN A COUNTER REVOLUTION..."

"WE MORE OR LESS WERE THINKING OF GUERRILLA TYPE OF ACTION UNTIL WE COULD GET ENOUGH FORCES TO DO MORE THAN THAT," HE SAID.

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
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NO, NO, NO...

Bay of Pigs Invasion Is Disclaimed by Ike

NEW YORK, Jan. 24 (UPI)—Former President Dwight D. Eisenhower said last night his administration planned for a "guerilla type of action" against Fidel Castro and never considered an invasion such as the Bay of Pigs attack.

Mr. Eisenhower's statement implied the entire plan for the ill-fated April, 1961, invasion of Cuba was formulated in the three months after President Kennedy took office.

The former President's remarks in a taped one-hour interview with newsmen Wal-

ter Cronkite on CBS television, appeared to conflict with a statement on the Bay of Pigs affair made earlier this week by Atty. Gen. Robert F. Kennedy who said the "general concept" of the invasion arose during Eisenhower's administration and "the logistics and the details" were worked out later.

Asked by Mr. Cronkite if an invasion plan was made while he was in office, Mr. Eisenhower replied:

"No, no, no."

"There was no way," he declared. "We didn't even know at that time whether we could do anything more, or whether these refugees would be sufficiently numerous and strong to do more than go into the eastern part of the island, in the mountains, and start in and return a counter revolution."


Mr. Eisenhower said the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba makes it necessary to continue constant surveillance over the island.

"I understand there are still some thousands of Russian soldiers in Cuba," he said, "and unquestionably they must be manning some kind of equipment. They must be training these people and it's still a very dangerous spot in our hemisphere."

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
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UPI-99

ADD 2 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-87)

THE STATE DEPARTMENT SAID LATER RUSK WOULD APPAR BEFORE THE
GROUP A TOP CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICIAL ALSO MAY TESTIFY.
MEANWHILE, REP. WILLIAM E. MINSHALL, R-OHIO, INTRODUCED A
RESOLUTION IN THE HOUSE CALLING FOR THE CREATION OF A SPECIAL JOINT
CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO MAKE A FULL INVESTIGATION OF WHAT HE
DESCRIBED AS "THE BAY OF PIGS FIASCO."

"NATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN OUR ABILITY TO COPE WITH THE CUBAN
SITUATION IS AT A LOW EBB," MINSHALL TOLD THE HOUSE.

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UPI-87

ADD 1 CUBA, WASHINGTON (UPI-46)
 SECRETARY RUSK IS EXPECTED TO TESTIFY IN PERSON TOMORROW WHEN
 THE SUBCOMMITTEE BEGINS ITS INQUIRY.
 KEATING ENDORSED THE IDEA OF MORSE'S SUBCOMMITTEE LOOKING INTO
 THE REPORTS RATHER THAN HAVING THE SENATE LAUNCH ANOTHER FULL-
 BLOWN INVESTIGATION OF THE ILL-FATED BAY OF PIGS INVASION.
 KEATING SAID "IF THERE IS GOING TO BE AN INVESTIGATION, IT
 SHOULD BE BY AN AUTHORIZED SENATE COMMITTEE," SUCH AS MORSE'S
 GROUP.

"I'M MUCH MORE INTERESTED IN THE PRESENT SITUATION THAN IN REVIEWING
 PAST HISTORY," KEATING SAID.

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Senate Group Urged to Probe Cuban Invasion

Associated Press

Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) proposed yesterday a full Senate Armed Services Committee investigation of the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba.

Sen. Richard B. Russell (D-Ga.), the committee chairman, said if military and defense issues and not politics are involved, the committee would look into them.

"It's not our function to set political matters," he said. Sen. Wayne Morse (D-Ore.), whose Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Latin American Affairs has already investigated the invasion, told the Senate its members should read the still-secret transcript of those hearings before making "partisan speeches."

Goldwater fired back that he had and "it's the most inconclusive testimony I've ever read."

His resolution asking the inquiry was sparked by the denial of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy that any United States air cover was ever planned for the Cuban exiles' invasion and therefore could not have been withdrawn, as some Republicans charge, by the Administration of his brother, President Kennedy.

And it followed an announcement yesterday by Senate GOP Leader Everett M. Dirksen (Ill.) that he would make an investigation of his own.

Goldwater proposed that were ignored.

the Armed Services Committee have \$100,000 to finance its inquiry and report no later than March 31. Goldwater is a committee member.

The Senator said the then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Lyman Lemnitzer, and Allen Dulles, then Central Intelligence Agency chief, should be called to testify.

Last night, in Miami, four Cuban refugees said that four Americans, flyers, were killed in combat over Cuba during the ill-fated 1961 invasion.

[In a statement to United Press International the refugees said that the two obsolete B-26 bombers flown by Americans were riddled with bullets by converted T-33 jet trainers of Fidel Castro's air force and crashed in flames in the sea.

[The four Americans were not identified. So far as was known, they were not members of the U. S. armed forces. The statement was issued by Gonzalo Herrera, Gustavo Villoldo, Alfredo Caballera and Julio Gonzalez Rebull, identified as pilots with the invasion force.

[The four Cubans said the invasion airmen were told a U. S. aircraft carrier was standing by to provide support if they needed it. Herrera said, "They made several distress calls."

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UPI-196

ADD 4 CUBA, WASHINGTON
 ANTI-CASTRO REFUGEE LEADERS, INCLUDING ANTONIO DE VARONA, VICE
 PRESIDENT OF THE CUBAN REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL WHO TOOK PART IN THE
 INVASION, ALSO CHARGED THAT THE AIR COVER WAS PROMISED BUT THEN
 WITHDRAWN.

IN ADDITION, JACK W. GORE, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER OF THE FORT
 LAUDERDALE, FLA., NEWS, REPORTED TODAY THAT A MONTH AFTER THE INVASION,
 KENNEDY TOLD AN OFF-THE-RECORD WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON GROUP THAT AIR
 COVER HAD BEEN AVAILABLE BUT THE PRESIDENT HAD DECIDED AGAINST
 USING IT.

THE PRESIDENT, ASKED TO SET THE SITUATION STRAIGHT, ACKNOWLEDGED
 THAT AN AIR STRIKE ON BEHALF OF THE INVADERS HAD BEEN POSTPONED
 FROM MORNING TO AFTERNOON. BUT HE SAID THESE "WERE FLOWN BY
 PILOTS...BASED NOT IN THE UNITED STATES, NOT AMERICAN PLANES."

HE CONCEDED THAT THE INVASION FORCES "WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION"
 THAT THE B26 BOMBERS WERE AVAILABLE AND "WOULD GIVE THEM PROTECTION
 ON THE BEACH."

"THAT DID NOT WORK OUT," THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE ADMITTED. "THAT
 WAS ONE OF THE FAILURES."
 HE OBSERVED THAT JETS SENT UP AGAINST THE B26'S WERE "VERY EFFECTIVE
 AND, THEREFORE...THE BRIGADE WAS NOT ABLE TO MAINTAIN AIR SUPREMACY
 ON THE BEACH."

THE PRESIDENT TWICE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THE AIR COVER PLANES WERE
 "NOT FROM THE UNITED STATES."

KENNEDY TOLD HIS NEWS CONFERENCE THAT MUCH OF THE CONFUSION STEMS
 FROM THE USE OF THE WORD "AIR COVER."

HE DIFFERENTIATED BETWEEN UNITED STATES AIR COVER "AS OPPOSED TO
 AIR COVER WHICH WAS ATTACHED TO THE (INVASION) BRIGADE, SOME OF WHICH
 FLEW FROM VARIOUS PARTS OF THIS CONTINENT, NOT FROM THE UNITED
 STATES."

OF GORE'S ACCOUNT OF HIS LUNCHEON REMARKS, THE PRESIDENT SAID
 THERE WAS "NO SUCH CONVERSATION OF THE KIND...THAT HAS BEEN
 READ TO ME."

HE COMMENTED: "THE PROBLEM OF AIR COVER AND ONE OF THE REASONS
 THAT THE INVASION FAILED MAY HAVE WELL BEEN DISCUSSED BUT ONLY
 IN THE TERMS THAT I HAVE DESCRIBED BECAUSE WHAT I HAVE DESCRIBED
 ARE THE FACTS."

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
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UPI-155
 CUBA)

WASHINGTON--PRESIDENT KENNEDY SAID TODAY THERE NEVER WAS ANY
 PLAN TO USE U.S. AIR COVER FOR THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

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UPI-156

ADD 1 CUBA, 82-8, & 59, (UPI-155)

AT HIS NEWS CONFERENCE, THE PRESIDENT SUPPORTED THE STATEMENTS OF HIS BROTHER, ATTY. GEN. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, WHO DENIED EARLIER THIS WEEK THAT U.S. AIR FORCE COVER HAD BEEN PROMISED AND THEN WITHDRAWN.

THE PRESIDENT'S STATEMENT CAME SHORTLY AFTER A CUBAN EXILE, MANUEL PENABAS, TOLD A NEWS CONFERENCE THAT "ALL OUR BRIGADE LEADERS AND FIGHTERS BELIEVED THAT AIR COVER WOULD BE FURNISHED BY U.S. AIR AND NAVAL FORCES."

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UPI-158

ADD 2 CUBA, WASHINGTON

IT WAS PENABAZ, A PARTICIPANT IN THE INVASION, WHO FIRST CLAIMED, FOLLOWING RELEASE OF THE INVASION PRISONERS, THAT THE UNITED STATES LEFT THE INVADERS WITHOUT PROMISED AIR SUPPORT. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL LATER SAID NO SUPPORT WAS PLEDGED, AND THE PRESIDENT BACKED HIM UP TODAY.

THE PRESIDENT SAID NO U.S. AIR COVER WAS PLANNED AND THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S STATEMENT WAS CORRECT.

IF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WERE GOING TO PROVIDE AIR COVER FOR THE CUBAN EXILE INVADERS, HE SAID, THIS NATION MIGHT AS WELL HAVE UNDERTAKEN THE INVASION ITSELF.

WHAT WAS TALKED ABOUT, THE PRESIDENT SAID, WAS THE USE OF B26 PLANES WHICH WERE NOT MANNED BY U.S. PILOTS OR FLOWN FROM U.S. TERRITORY. HE SAID A STRIKE BY THOSE PLANES WAS POSTPONED ON THE DAY OF THE INVASION.

THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED THE BELIEF THAT MEMBERS OF THE CUBAN EXILE BRIGADE MUST HAVE HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THE B26'S WOULD PROVIDE AIR COVER FOR THE INVASION FORCE AND THAT THIS MISTAKEN BELIEF WAS THE CAUSE OF CONFUSION.

KENNEDY REITERATED THAT THE INVASION WAS A FAILURE AND SAID AGAIN THAT THE RESPONSIBILITY RESTED WITH THE WHITE HOUSE.

HE SAID THE OPERATION WAS REVIEWED AND THAT THE HANDLING OF THE CUBAN CRISIS LAST FALL INDICATED THAT "A GOOD MANY LESSONS WERE LEARNED" FROM THE EARLIER FAILURE.

KENNEDY ALSO WAS ASKED ABOUT REPORTS THAT THERE HAS BEEN AN INTENSIFIED SOVIET ARMS BUILDUP IN CUBA SINCE SETTLEMENT OF THE MISSILE CRISIS. HE SAID CONTINUAL SURVEILLANCE BY THE UNITED STATES OF THE ISLAND HAS SHOWN "NO INFLUX" OF RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS THERE.

TWO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES HAVE ARRANGED TO QUESTION STATE AND DEFENSE OFFICIALS ABOUT REPORTS OF A RUSSIAN BUILDUP ON THE ISLAND. SEN. KENNETH B. KEATING, R-N.Y. SAID HE LEARNED OF THE REPORTED BUILDUP FROM CUBAN REFUGEE SOURCES.

KENNEDY SAID THAT SINCE THE CRISIS AND REMOVAL OF RUSSIAN MISSILES AND BOMBERS, ONE SOVIET SHIP HAS ARRIVED THAT MAY HAVE HAD ARMS ON IT. BUT HE SAID THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT IT CARRIED OFFENSIVE WEAPONS THAT MIGHT POSE A THREAT TO THE UNITED STATES.

HE ESTIMATED THAT THERE ARE STILL BETWEEN 16,000 AND 17,000 RUSSIANS IN CUBA AND SAID THAT THE SOVIET PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO OPERATE DEFENSIVE MISSILE SITES AND OTHER MILITARY INSTALLATIONS. THEY ALSO, KENNEDY SAID, ARE BUILDING SOME BARRACKS.

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UPI-170 (CORRECT)

ADD 3 CUBA, WASHINGTON

PANABEZ EARLIER TODAY REPEATED CHARGES THAT THE U.S. AIR
 AIR SUPPORT TO THE BAY OF PIGS INVADERS AND THEN WITHDREW IT.
 HE ASSERTED: "I KNOW THAT ALL OUR BRIGADE LEADERS AND FIGHTERS
 BELIEVED THAT AIR COVER WOULD BE FURNISHED...BY U.S. AIR AND NAVAL
 FORCES."

AT HIS NEWS CONFERENCE, HE SAID ATTY. GEN. KENNEDY WAS ILL-INFORMED
 WHEN HE SAID IN TWO WIDELY PUBLISHED INTERVIEWS THAT U.S. AIR COVER
 FOR THE INVASION WAS NEVER PROMISED OR PLANNED.

"CERTAINLY WE IN THE BRIGADE WERE ASSURED BY OUR AMERICAN MILITARY
 INSTRUCTORS THAT WE WOULD BE GIVEN AIR COVER SUFFICIENT TO SUCCEED
 IN OUR MISSION," PENABAZ INSISTED.

HE SAID A MAN NAMED FRANK BENDER, WHOM HE IDENTIFIED AS THE
 U.S. OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF THE INVASION OPERATIONS, TOLD HIM ABOUT
 THE ALLEGEDLY FORTHCOMING U.S. AIR AND NAVAL SUPPORT.

PENABAZ SAID, THAT "BENDER TOLD ME THAT AMERICAN AIRCRAFT
 WOULD BE 100 MILES BEHIND US AND THAT 6,000 U.S. MARINES WOULD BE
 READY TO LAND AFTER US." PENABAZ WAS THE TOP LEGAL OFFICER OF THE
 INVASION BRIGADE.

HE MADE THE REMARKS AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB AS REPUBLICAN
 MEMBERS OF CONGRESS CALLED FOR AN INVESTIGATION OF U.S. ROLE
 IN THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION.

PENABAZ REPEATED HIS CHARGES THAT THE INVASION BRIGADE, WAS
 "BETRAYED."

HE ALSO CHARGED THAT THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS TRYING TO "CLOSE
 DEFINITELY THE CUBAN CASE" NOW THAT THE 1,100 INVASION PRISONERS
 HAD BEEN FREED AND THAT THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION HAS ACCEPTED
 THE BALEME FOR THE INVASION FAILURE.

PENABAZ SAID THAT INVASION PLANNER BENDER WAS SEEN RECENTLY
 IN THE CONGO BY ONE OF THE CUBAN REFUGEE PILOTS WHO TOOK PART
 IN THE INVASION.

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UPI-172

(CUBA)

FORT LAUDERDALE, FLA.--A FLORIDA NEWSPAPER PUBLISHER SAID TODAY THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY TOLD HIM LESS THAN A MONTH AFTER THE CUBAN INVASION THAT U.S. AIR COVER WAS AVAILABLE AT THE BAY OF PIGS, BUT HE DECIDED AGAINST USING IT. ^{7/10}
JACK W. GORE, EDITOR AND PUBLISHER OF THE FORT LAUDERDALE NEWS, QUOTED THE PRESIDENT AS SAYING THAT ONE REASON FOR HIS DECISION WAS A COMPLAINT FROM U.N. AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON THAT USE OF U.S. FORCES WOULD MAKE A "LIAR" OUT OF HIM IN THE UNITED NATIONS.

GORE SAID THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS REMARKS AT AN OFF-THE-RECORD WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON FOR EIGHT FLORIDA NEWSPAPER EXECUTIVES ON MAY 10, 1961.

"ON THAT DAY, LESS THAN A MONTH AFTER THE INVASION HAD FAILED MISERABLY," GORE WROTE IN HIS NEWSPAPER, "THE PRESIDENT TOLD US AIR COVER WAS AVAILABLE TO PROTECT THE INVADERS BUT THAT HE HAD MADE THE DECISION NOT TO USE AIR POWER."

"THE PRESIDENT SAID ONE REASON HE DECIDED AGAINST SUPPLYING AIR COVER WAS BECAUSE UNITED NATIONS AMBASSADOR ADLAI STEVENSON HAD COMPLAINED THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WOULD MAKE A LIAR OF HIM IN THE UNITED NATIONS," THE PUBLISHER REPORTED.

GORE SAID A STATEMENT OF THE PRESIDENT'S BROTHER, ATTY. GEN. ROBERT KENNEDY, THAT NO U.S. AIR COVER WAS EVER PLANNED OR PROMISED FOR THE BAY OF PIGS INVASION HAD REMOVED THE NEED FOR KEEPING THE PRESIDENT'S LUNCHEON REMARKS OFF THE RECORD ANY LONGER.

IN HIS REPORT ON THE LUNCHEON, PUBLISHED ON THE FORT LAUDERDALE NEWS' FRONT PAGE TODAY, GORE ACCUSED THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OF ATTEMPTING TO "MANAGE HISTORY... OF ONE OF THE MOST EMBARRASSING EPISODES OF THESE TIMES." HE SAID THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PRESUMABLY "HAD THE APPROVAL OF HIS BROTHER TO SPEAK FOR THE RECORD WHEN HE MADE HIS COMMENTS," EARLIER THIS WEEK.

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11 FEB 11 1963 WASHINGTON CAPITAL NEWS SERVICE

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